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I 
 
 
 
 
“Reason has built the modern world. It is a precious but also a fragile thing, 
which can be corroded by apparently harmless irrationality. We must favour 
verifiable evidence over private feeling.”  
Professor Richard Dawkins 
 
“Science is a philosophy of discovery.” 
Professor Neil deGrasse Tyson 
 
“The greatest danger facing us is ourselves – our irrational fear of the 
unknown. But there’s no such thing as the unknown. Only things temporarily 
hidden, temporarily not understood.” 
Gene Roddenberry 
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Abstract 
The ability to make judgements and decisions is crucial to our lives. The dual-process framework of 
judgement and decision-making (e.g. Stanovich, 2009) proposes that decisions are usually made using 
mental processes relying on automatic processes (called Type 1 processing) or on more controlled 
processes (called Type 2 processing). According to this theory, when we make a decision without 
conscious effort we rely on the autonomous processes of Type 1 intuitive thinking, which is prone 
towards errorful decision-making. Alternatively, if we use Type 2 thinking by committing cognitive 
resources (e.g., working memory) we engage analytic thinking by at least partly inhibiting Type 1 
processing. The primary goal for this thesis is to test whether Type 1 versus Type 2 processes in 
decision-making can be linked to different neural substrates. Transcranial direct current stimulation 
(tDCS), a non-invasive method for enhancing or decreasing cortical excitability was used. Participants 
completed decision-making tasks (e.g., Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), syllogistic reasoning) to 
capture performance indicating Type 1 or Type 2 processing, and executive function tasks to assess 
the basis of Type 1 and Type 2 processing. First, a meta-analysis was performed on a variety of 
experiments using tDCS, finding evidence for the involvement of frontal structures in judgement and 
decision-making. In subsequent experiments stimulation of the right but not left dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) with anodal tDCS increased performance compared to sham in the CRT and 
solving vignettes measuring heuristic thinking. In experiment three there was a cumulative effect of 
neuromodulation on Type 2 processing, with an increase in reflective thinking performance following 
each of two stimulation sessions. Individual differences in thinking dispositions and cognitive ability 
could not explain the results, and there were no performance-enhancing effects of stimulation on 
syllogisms or executive functions. These experiments provide evidence for the involvement of the 
right DLPFC in decision-making which relies on the inhibition of pre-potent responses (e.g., the CRT).  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction and overview of chapters 
 
1.1 Cognitive processes in judgement and decision-making 
In recent decades an extensive field of research has emerged exploring the idea of 
the duality of mind in judgement and decision-making (JDM) (Stanovich & West, 1998; 
Kahneman, 2011). Starting in the early 1970s, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 
examined mental short-cuts, known as heuristics, during judgement and decision-
making. They suggested that the use of heuristics led to systematic deviations from 
normative correct answers, called judgement and decision-making biases 
(Kahneman, 2011). 
 
According to Kahneman and Tversky people often answered a difficult question (e.g., 
Consider the letter R, in the English language is R more likely to appear in ... (a) the 
first position? Or (b) the third position?) with a simpler one. (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1973). In the case of thinking about the position of the letter R it is easier to think of 
examples of this letter appearing in the first position (Can I think of more example of 
the letter R appearing in the first position?) than the third position – Kahneman and 
Tversky called this the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).  
 
The research on heuristics and biases made an important contribution to the idea of 
how we can understand intuitive processing of information when making a decision 
(Evans, 2003; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011). Kahneman was awarded the 2002 
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for investigating how these short-cuts 
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influence decision-making in economics and finance. Fifteen years later in 2017, 
Richard Thaler, another decision-making scholar and economist won the Nobel 
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his work that included ‘nudging’ – the 
alteration of ‘choice architectures’ (i.e., how a choice is presented) to promote better 
decision-making. Both Nobel laureates have made important contributions to the 
expanding field of decision-making. The fact that these Nobel prizes have been 
awarded to Kahneman and Thaler highlights the importance of examining how we 
make decisions. This thesis examines the neural correlates of decision-making by 
using non-invasive techniques of brain stimulation.           
 
1.2 Non-invasive brain stimulation techniques 
In Chapter 2, non-invasive brain stimulation techniques (NIBS) are reviewed in detail. 
These techniques offer the possibility to induce temporary cortical excitability 
alterations in localised brain areas (Nitsche & Paulus, 2000; Priori, 2003). By shifting 
cortical excitability these non-invasive techniques cause small neuroplastic changes 
in the anatomical region of interest. Since neuroplastic changes are crucial for 
memory, learning and higher-order cognitive functions researchers use the temporary 
window of change from the norm to investigate the causal involvement of a brain 
region in cognition or behaviour.  
 
Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) is a method by which alterations in 
cortical excitability are utilised in the laboratory setting on typical, healthy participants 
(Nitsche & Paulus, 2000; Priori, 2003). In 2001, Nitsche and Paulus demonstrated that 
the application of an electrical current to the motor cortex has a prolonged aftereffect 
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on cortical excitability. The use of tDCS involves the application of a weak electrical 
current for a short duration of twenty minutes or less (Fritsch et al., 2010; Bikson et 
al., 2016). The current passes through the scalp to alter the cortical excitability of the 
target brain region. In cognitive research tDCS has been used to investigate the neural 
correlates of language function (Flöel, Rösser, Michka, Knecht, & Breitenstein, 2008; 
Liuzzi et al., 2010), memory (Utz, Dimova, Oppenländer, & Kerkhoff, 2010; Hill, 
Fitzgerald, & Hoy, 2016), language acquisition (Flöel et al., 2008; Liuzzi et al., 2010) 
and attention (Weiss & Lavidor, 2012; Reteig, Talsma, van Schouwenburg, & Slagter, 
2017).   
 
1.3 Review of judgement and decision-making literature  
In Chapter 3 research on judgement and decision-making is reviewed. Here decision-
making is defined within a dual-process framework of human thinking (Evans, 1984; 
Stanovich & West, 1998). Dual-process theories posit that there are two qualitatively 
different types of processing that underlie human judgement and decision-making: 
intuitive (Type 1) and analytic (Type 2) processes. In the case of the frequency of the 
position of the letter R in words, Type 1 processing results in an intuitive solution that 
relies on the availability heuristic by using easily thought of examples of words starting 
with the letter R, whilst Type 2 processing considers examples of the R appearing in 
the third position before arriving at a solution (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).  
 
Type 1 decision-making is associated with automatic responses (Evans, 2003) and 
high impulsivity (Strack & Deutsch, 2004) that use mental short-cuts (e.g., heuristics). 
Type 1 processing is usually associated with more errorful, biased outcomes (Evans, 
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2003). Type 2 thinking, however, is proposed to be a more controlled type of 
processing and requires the use of effortful mental operations (Schneider & Shiffrin, 
1977; Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2006). Crucially, for 
normatively correct judgement and decision outcomes Type 2 processing is thought 
to largely inhibit Type 1 processing (Evans, 2012).  
 
It is important to investigate and understand the cognitive and neurophysiological 
aspects of decision-making, two of the reasons are that: (i) understanding whether the 
important claims of qualitatively different higher processes in the brain can be 
substantiated, and (ii) decision-making is a crucial aspect of our cognition with wide 
social relevance. Sub-optimal, incorrect decision-making, when not corrected by Type 
2 processing can result in poor decision-making with consequences for finance 
(Hedesström, Svedsäter, & Gärling, 2007; Thoma, White, Panigrahi, Strowger, & 
Anderson, 2015), health (Scheibehenne, Miesler, & Todd, 2007; Pachur, Hertwig, & 
Steinmann, 2012) and even politics (Selb, 2008; Nisbet, 2009).  
 
1.4 Current understanding of the neurobiology of decision-
making 
In Chapter 4, the neurophysiology of judgement and decision-making is reviewed in 
detail. The current understanding of the neurophysiology of decision-making is 
informed by functional neuroimaging research (Ernst & Paulus, 2005; Kable & 
Glimcher, 2009). Much of the research is concerned with the investigation of subjective 
valuation (Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944; Kable & Glimcher, 2009) and forecasting 
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(Delgado, 2007). For the purposes of this PhD research, the neurophysiology of 
executive functioning is more applicable because impulsivity control (Evans & Curtis-
Holmes, 2005) and set-shifting (Toplak et al., 2011) are crucial components of dual-
process decision-making (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005; Stanovich, 2009).  
 
The brain region of interest for executive functioning in decision-making is the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), an area that has been reliably linked to 
decision-making (Dockery, Hueckel-Weng, Birbaumer, & Plewnia, 2009; Tayeb & 
Lavidor, 2016). The left DLPFC is involved in affective modulation (Hare, Camerer, & 
Rangel, 2009), attentional processing (Goel et al., 2006) and self-regulation 
(Mengarelli, Spoglianti, Avenanti, & Di Pellegrino, 2015), whilst the right DLPFC has a 
role in set-shifting (i.e., the ability to move from one mental simulation to another) 
(Loftus, Yalcin, Baughman, Vanman, & Hagger, 2015) and impulsivity control (Loftus 
et al., 2015).     
 
Direct current neuromodulation has been used successfully to investigate the neural 
substrates of executive functioning (Weiss & Lavidor, 2012; Tayeb & Lavidor, 2016). 
Some executive functions are crucial aspects of the dual-processing framework of 
judgement and decision-making (Miyake et al., 2000; Evans, 2008). Among the 
executive functions that have been investigated in the tDCS literature are attention 
(Weiss & Lavidor, 2012; Reteig et al., 2017), set-shifting (Strobach, Antonenko, 
Schindler, Flöel, & Schubert, 2016; Tayeb & Lavidor, 2016), and response inhibition 
(Li, Huang, Constable, & Sinha, 2006; Jacobson, Javitt, & Lavidor, 2011). The 
successful application of tDCS as a tool for investigating the neural correlates of 
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executive functions, and the association between executive functions and judgement 
and decision-making suggests that tDCS can be a useful tool for examining the 
neurophysiology of judgement and decision-making.   
 
1.5 Focus, scope of research and research objectives 
This PhD thesis has applied tDCS as a technique to investigate the neural substrates 
of the dual-process framework of judgement and decision-making. The 
neuromodulation is used online (i.e., during behavioural testing) in Experiment 1 
(Chapter 5) and offline (i.e., before behavioural testing) in Experiments 2 and 3 
(Chapters 6 and 7) to examine any differences that these neuromodulatory modes 
have on judgement and decision-making.  
 
This research assesses the effects that tDCS has on the neural substrates of decision-
making tasks that vary in executive function requirements, for example the Cognitive 
Reflection Test (CRT) which taps inhibitory control whilst syllogistic reasoning does 
not. Furthermore, working memory and inhibition tasks are examined.    
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Research questions 
The specific questions to be addressed by this research are: 
1. Does neuromodulation of the frontal brain areas (specifically the DLPFC) affect 
judgement and decision-making performance?  
2. Does stimulating different regions in the prefrontal cortex (specifically the DLPFC) 
differentially modulate performance in tasks associated with Type 1 and Type 2 
(executive function tasks)?  
3. What is the relationship between executive functions (e.g. updating, inhibition) and 
Type 2 thinking performance?  
4. What is the nature of the interaction between Type 1 and Type 2 processing in the 
dual-processes framework of judgement and decision-making?  
Existing concepts and models of judgement and decision-making are examined 
throughout this body of research.  
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Chapter 2 – Review of tDCS 
On transcranial direct current stimulation: principles, 
physiological mechanisms and effects on cognition – a 
literature review 
 
2.1 Background of tDCS 
This method is a safe, cost-effective, non-invasive neuromodulatory technique that is 
characterised by the application a weak direct electrical current through the scalp 
(Nitsche & Paulus, 2000; Priori, 2003). The use of a direct current to modulate cortical 
excitability was first described in the invasive, clinical literature for the treatment of 
presurgical epilepsy (Dymond, Coger, & Serafetinides, 1975). In the research 
literature, the effects of a non-invasive direct current were first described in a study of 
the after-effects of the application of direct current through the motor cortex (Nitsche 
& Paulus, 2000).   
 
Since the reintroduction of tDCS as a technique for the investigation of neurological 
processes, tDCS has been used to modulate cognition functions that include working 
memory (Utz et al., 2010; Hill et al., 2016), language acquisition (Flöel et al., 2008; 
Liuzzi et al., 2010), planning (Dockery et al., 2009), set-shifting (Strobach et al., 2016; 
Tayeb & Lavidor, 2016), attention (Weiss & Lavidor, 2012; Reteig et al., 2017), 
response inhibition (Li et al., 2006; Jacobson et al., 2011), and visual cognition 
(Barbieri, Negrini, Nitsche, & Rivolta, 2016; Costantino, Bossi, Premoli, Nitsche, & 
Rivolta, 2017). In clinical research, tDCS has been successfully used to alter motor 
function in stroke (Hummel et al., 2005; Boggio et al., 2007) and Parkinson’s disease 
patients (Benninger et al., 2010; Kaski, Allum, Bronstein, & Dominguez, 2014), 
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cognitive deficits in schizophrenic (Vercammen et al., 2011; Hoy, Arnold, Emonson, 
Daskalakis, & Fitzgerald, 2014) and Parkinson’s Disease patients (Leite, Gonçalves, 
& Carvalho, 2014; Manenti et al., 2016), and addiction (Feil & Zangen, 2010; den Uyl, 
Gladwin, & Wiers, 2015). 
   
2.2 Physiological background of tDCS: mechanisms of 
action 
In the typical setup the direct current is delivered through a pair of rubber electrodes 
that are encased within sponges. The sponges are moistened with a contact media 
that is either tap water (Palm et al., 2014), deionised water (DaSilva, Volz, Bikson, & 
Fregni, 2011), an electrolyte-based gel (Woods et al., 2016) or sodium chloride (NaCl) 
saline solution (Dundas, Thickbroom, & Mastaglia, 2007). The moistening of the 
sponges minimizes any discomfort from the stimulation, reduces resistance to the 
current and improves the homogeneity of the electric field under the electrodes 
(Nitsche et al., 2008). Oversaturation of the sponges with a contact media undermines 
the reproducibility and effectiveness of the tDCS so care must be taken when 
preparing the electrodes (Woods et al., 2016).      
 
The primary effect of direct current on neurons is the alteration of resting membrane 
potentials towards hyperpolarisation or depolarization (Bindman, Lippold, & Redfearn, 
1962; Reinhart, Cosman, Fukuda, & Woodman, 2017). The polarization depends on 
the direction of the flow of current relative to axonal orientation (Bikson & Rahman, 
2013; Lefaucheur et al., 2017). With a few exceptions, when direct current is delivered 
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to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortices (DLPFC) anodal tDCS increases cortical 
excitability (Georgii, Goldhofer, Meule, Richard, & Blechert, 2017), whilst cathodal 
tDCS decreases cortical excitability (Zmigrod, Zmigrod, & Hommel, 2016). In a few 
exceptions, anodal tDCS has been reported to decrease excitability (Monte-Silva et 
al., 2013; Pelletier & Cicchetti, 2015), and cathodal tDCS increase excitability 
(Batsikadze, Moliadze, Paulus, Kuo, & Nitsche, 2013; Pirulli, Fertonani, & Miniussi, 
2014). Variance in brain morphology at stimulation sites (e.g., neuronal density) 
(Laakso, Tanaka, Koyama, De Santis, & Hirata, 2015), individual differences in skull 
thickness (Horvath, Forte, & Carter, 2015a) and hair thickness (Horvath, Carter, & 
Forte, 2014) may account for the difference in the effects of stimulation across studies. 
   
2.2.1 Physiological mechanisms during tDCS (i.e., online) 
When a direct current is applied to the cortex through the use of online 
neuromodulation (i.e., stimulation during behavioural testing) the current preferentially 
modulates neuronal networks that are already activated by inducing a change in 
electrical activity in the neurons within this network (Coffman et al., 2012; Bikson & 
Rahman, 2013). For example, when an individual is asked to attend to an object in a 
visual search task anodal neuromodulation of the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex can 
boost attention by decreasing the ability to shift from local-to-global features (Coffman, 
Clark, & Parasuraman, 2014). 
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2.2.2 Physiological mechanisms after tDCS (i.e., offline)  
When a direct current is applied prior to behavioural testing (i.e., offline 
neuromodulation) the neuromodulatory effects can last up to an hour after the 
cessation of stimulation (Priori, 2003). Any changes in behavioural results (e.g., 
working memory capacity) from testing during the hour after stimulation, compared to 
sham, can be associated with the aftereffects of stimulated area of the cortex. For 
example, offline stimulation can affect reaction time and accuracy in the 2-back 
variation of the n-back (Hoy et al., 2013). Furthermore, Hoy and colleagues (2013) 
reported that the behavioural effects of offline stimulation varied depending on the time 
of testing after stimulation. Reaction times on the 2-back decreased over time from 
592ms immediately after stimulation to 523ms at 40 minutes after stimulation. 
 
2.2.3 Physiological mechanisms of multiple sessions of 
tDCS 
Multiple sessions of low intensity anodal direct current show a cumulative effect on 
cortical excitability after repeated daily sessions (Alonzo, Brassil, Taylor, Martin, & 
Loo, 2012; Martin, Liu, Alonzo, Green, & Loo, 2014). The cumulative effects of direct 
current have been used for the treatment of neuropsychiatric conditions that include 
depression (Liebetanz et al., 2006; Mutz, Edgcumbe, Brunoni, & Fu, 2018) and eating 
disorders (Ljubisavljevic, Maxood, Bjekic, Oommen, & Nagelkerke, 2016).  
 
In healthy participants, multiple sessions of direct current stimulation have 
demonstrated a cumulative and additive increase in motor cortex excitability 
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(Ammann, Lindquist, & Celnik, 2017). When anodal direct current is applied to the left 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in two daily sessions an enhancement in skill acquisition 
in cognition have been demonstrated (Martin et al., 2014). One explanation for the 
improvement in skill acquisition is that the repeated practice of a given task makes the 
task easier overtime through the practice effect (Donovan & Radosevich, 1999), whilst 
the direct current when applied to the relevant cortical network enhances cortical 
excitability (Martin et al., 2014). Paired together the practice effect and increased 
cortical excitability produces the enhanced effects on cognition from the multiple 
sessions of tDCS (Martin et al., 2014).   
 
2.3 Electrode positions, polarity and individual differences 
in tDCS influence 
The cellular influence of direct current on the brain depends on the distance and 
orientation of the axonal axes with respect to the electric field (Das, Holland, Frens, & 
Donchin, 2016; Fertonani & Miniussi, 2017). A minimum of two electrodes must be 
used in order to generate an electric field that can modulate neuronal excitability (see 
Figure 2.1). When a positive site electrode (the anode) is positioned opposite a 
negative site electrode (the cathode) the direct current is produced when weak 
constant current flows from the positive electrode to the negative electrode (Purpura 
& McMurtry, 1965; Stagg & Nitsche, 2011).  
 
In tDCS experiments, the stimulating electrode which is placed over the site of interest 
can be either anodal or cathodal depending on the direction of polarity between 
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electrodes (Parazzini, Rossi, Rossi, Priori, & Ravazzani, 2013; Coffman et al., 2014). 
The second electrode that is at the site that is of no interest to researchers (called the 
return or reference electrode) can be  positioned on a part of the body that is far from 
the brain, e.g., the shoulder (Parazzini et al., 2013; Ferrucci, Cortese, & Priori, 2015) 
or wrist (Tremblay, Beaulé, Lepage, & Théoret, 2013; Fertonani & Miniussi, 2017).  
 
Anodal tDCS increases neuronal excitability (Das et al., 2016), whilst cathodal tDCS 
deceases neuronal excitability (Pirulli et al., 2014). A third type of stimulation, sham 
stimulation causes a slight tingling sensation under the electrodes with the aim of 
preventing participants from differentiating between active and sham. Crucially, sham 
does not affect cortical excitability (unlike active stimulation), as it ceases after a short 
time without increasing or decreasing neuronal excitability (Ambrus et al., 2012; 
Georgii et al., 2017). Sham stimulation is the equivalent of a control condition in the 
psychological literature (Gandiga, Hummel, & Cohen, 2006). After the behavioural task 
is performed the results can be compared with either baseline data (Jones, Peterson, 
Blacker, & Berryhill, 2017) or sham stimulation data (Woods et al., 2016).  
 
The behavioural effects of anodal and cathodal direct current stimulation are not 
always linear, as many factors are known to influence the outcome of direct current 
stimulation. The actions of a participant whilst they are waiting for the completion of 
the stimulation can directly produce cognitive interference in offline studies by 
activating neuronal networks which are consequently influenced by the direct current 
(Hsu, Tseng, Liang, Cheng, & Juan, 2014; Bortoletto, Pellicciari, Rodella, & Miniussi, 
2015; Antal et al., 2017). Other inter-individual variables that can influence direct 
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current include cranial anatomy (e.g., head size, brain lesions), brain morphology, 
baseline behavioural states, neurochemistry, hormones, sex, genetics, handedness, 
age and medication (Das et al., 2016; Hsu, Juan, & Tseng, 2016).  
 
Figure 2.1. The direction of current flow (polarity) from the anode (positive electrode) to the 
cathode (negative electrode) within a typical two-electrode tDCS set-up.  
 
2.4 Current intensity and current density 
The intensity of tDCS refers to the steady-state strength of the direct current 
(measured in mA) that is applied to the anode electrode or cathode electrode 
depending on whether the experimenter wants to increase or decrease cortical 
excitability (Bikson et al., 2016). When multiple electrodes are used, the current 
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intensity is the sum of the current across all electrodes (Nitsche & Paulus, 2000; Tang, 
Hammond, & Badcock, 2016).    
 
The current density of tDCS refers to degree of compactness of the current intensity 
in a given area. Current density (mA/cm2) can be calculated by dividing the current 
intensity (mA) by the electrode size (cm2) (see Figure 2.2 below). Determining the 
current density at the targeted brain region is crucial for predicting stimulation efficacy 
(Miranda, Lomarev, & Hallett, 2006). Larger current densities result in stronger effects 
of tDCS compared to low current densities (Nitsche et al., 2008; Woods et al., 2016). 
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 shows the current density that can be predicted from different 
current intensities and electrode sizes.  
 
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑚𝐴)
𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 (𝑐𝑚2)
 
Figure 2.2. The equation for calculating current density from current intensity and electrode 
size.  
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Figure 2.3. The predicted current density (mA/cm2) from electrode size (cm2) and current 
intensity (mA). 
 
2.5 Duration of stimulation and duration of after-effects 
The direct current stimulation duration influences the extent to which cortical activity 
is modulated by the weak electrical current (Ohn et al., 2008; Cuypers et al., 2013). A 
minimum stimulation duration of 7 minutes is required to induce a notable change in 
cortical excitability (Fritsch et al., 2010; Bikson et al., 2016). The upper end of 
stimulation duration in the tDCS literature is twenty-five minutes (Lefaucheur et al., 
2017). The average duration that a direct current stimulation is applied for in the 
literature is between twenty and twenty-five minutes (Nitsche et al., 2008). 
 
Direct current stimulation of 9 to 13 minutes has a neuromodulatory after-effect of an 
hour, whilst twenty-minutes of stimulation can have lasting after-effects for over an 
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hour (Nitsche & Paulus, 2000; Priori, 2003; Nasseri, Nitsche, & Ekhtiari, 2015). The 
after-effects of stimulation remain whilst the heightened (anodal stimulation) or 
lowered (cathodal stimulation) cortical excitability gradually return to baseline levels in 
the minutes after neuromodulation (Peterchev et al., 2012).   
 
The short-lived after-effects of a single session of direct current stimulation can be 
reinforced with the application of multiple sessions of tDCS (Reis et al., 2009; Vallence 
& Ridding, 2014). In healthy participants, multiple spaced sessions with an inter-
session interval of less than 24 hours can increase the duration of the behavioural and 
cognitive effects of stimulation to several weeks (Reis et al., 2009; Vallence & Ridding, 
2014) or months (Stagg & Nitsche, 2011; Molaee-Ardekani et al., 2013).   
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Chapter 3 – Judgement and decision-making review 
On judgement, decision-making and the mechanisms 
beyond the dual-process framework, a literature review 
 
3.1 Dual-process theories in decision-making 
3.1.1 The history of dual-process theory 
The distinction between two different types of judgement and decision-making 
processes has its origins in ancient Greece (Vaisey, 2008). Plato famously described 
emotion and reason as two horses trying to pull a chariot in opposite directions 
(Fugate, 2007; Bari & Robbins, 2013). In order to steer the chariot in the intended 
direction the charioteer must take control the horses. If the charioteer is pulled in the 
direction that either horse was pulling then this determines whether emotion or reason 
alone plays a crucial role in decision-making. This Platonic tradition of philosophy 
suggests that decisions are made by inferential, reflective thinking (the horse of 
reason) or intuitive thinking (the horse of emotion) (Croskerry, 2009). 
 
The modern foundations of dual-process theory originated in the work of William 
James in his 1890 book: The Principles of Psychology (James, 2013). James 
suggested that there are two distinct types of reasoning: ‘true reasoning’ and 
associative reasoning. Associative reasoning is synonymous with inferential and 
intuitive thinking, whilst true reasoning is equivalent to reflective, and analytical 
thinking (Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Evans, 2008). Unlike Plato’s allegory of the horses, 
James’ theory was informed from the early of psychology rather than philosophy.   
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In 1973, Seymour Epstein published the Cognitive Experiential Self Theory (CEST) of 
personality building on eighty-three years of research in psychology since James’ 
publication of The Principles of Psychology (Epstein, 1973; Novak & Hoffman, 2008). 
Epstein’s dichotomous theory posits that individuals have the capacity to process 
information through either an experiential system (i.e., inferential and intuitive) or a 
rational system (i.e., reflective and analytical). The experiential system is influenced 
by affect (i.e., emotion), whilst the rational system relies on logical rule-based 
processes. It is from building on the CEST that Epstein developed the Rational 
Experiential Inventory (REI) which measures the precepts set-out in the CEST - this 
has become a highly cited tool in the decision-making literature with over 900 citations 
to date (Google Scholar, July, 2018) (Pacini & Epstein, 1999).      
 
Evans’ first dual-process theory of judgement and decision-making was published in 
1984 (Evans, 1984; Stanovich & West, 1998). Evans’ dichotomy distinguished 
between heuristic thinking (i.e., intuitive thinking) and analytic thinking. Heuristic 
thinking, meaning to discover without a guarantee of optimal decision-making, is 
responsible for the processing of the relevant information for a decision whilst ignoring 
non-important information. Analytic thinking is rule-based and operates by generating 
inferences from information (Evans, 2008). Evans’ model differs from Epstein’s CEST 
model in two ways: (i) it focuses on judgement and decision-making rather than 
personality, and (ii) it is a sequential rather parallel model – in sequential models 
intuitive thinking starts before analytic thinking, whilst in parallel models both 
processes begin at the same time (Epstein, 1973; Evans, 1984).       
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At about the same time as Epstein (Epstein, 1973) and Evans (Evans, 1984) began to 
work on judgement and decision-making, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky started 
work on heuristics and biases (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Amos Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973). Although there was no explicit discussion of a dual-process model 
in Kahneman and Tversky’s early work in the 1970’s, they examined some of the 
heuristics and biases that are used in intuitive thinking, also called decision-making 
biases or cognitive biases (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Amos Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). Kahneman’s work established that individual’s often make errors in decision-
making by employing sub-optimal decision processes (i.e., heuristics) that result in 
decision-making biases. These decision-making biases fit into the dual-process 
dichotomy because when used without conscious effort these heuristics and biases 
have the potential to produce errorful decisions (Amos Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 
1974). When sufficient effort and cognitive resources are allocated to making a 
decision these biases can be avoided and the analytic processes employed (De Neys, 
2012; Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015).  
 
In 2000, Stanovich and West coined the terms ‘System 1’ and ‘System 2’ to refer to 
the dual-processes of decision-making, these terms cleared up much of the confusion 
around what to call each of these processes (see Table 3.1). System 1 refers to the 
intuitive, automatic, and rapid decision-making process that is associated with 
heuristic use (Evans, 1984). System 2 is characterised by rule-based, reflective, 
analytic, and slow decision-making (Evans, 2008). These terms for the dual-processes 
have enabled researchers to publish their research in decision-making with relatively 
unified labels for these thinking processes. As of 2008 dual-process theorists have 
replaced the terms System 1 with ‘Type 1’ and System 2 with ‘Type 2’ after Evans 
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suggested that the original terminology commits scholars to a two-system view 
(Evans, 2008). Stanovich and West support the change in terminology, noting that to 
use the labels Systems 1 and 2 connote that the two processes can be accurately 
mapped onto distinct corresponding brain systems which is not the case (Stanovich, 
West, & Toplak, 2011). Some researchers still use the terminology of System 1 and 
System 2 (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Tay, Ryan, & Ryan, 2016). Evans argued 
that Type 2 processes require access to working memory capacity, whilst Type 1 
processes do not, therefore these are not cognitive systems (Evans, 2008).  
 
Table 3.1. A few examples of dual-process framework labels by publication 
Literature reference Type 1 label Type 2 label 
Epstein, (1973) 
Schneider & Shiffrin, (1977) 
Experiential system 
Automatic 
Rational system 
Controlled 
Evans, (1984) Heuristic Analytic 
Stanovich & West, (2000) System 1 System 2 
Nisbett et al., (2001) Holistic Analytic 
Krishna & Strack, (2017) Impulsive Reflective 
 
 
Among the scholars of judgement and decision-making who support the dual-process 
framework there is disagreement about the exact nature of the framework (De Neys & 
Glumicic, 2008; Stupple & Ball, 2008) (Figure 3.1). Some of the scholars conceive of 
a dual-process framework in which intuitive, Type 1 processing and analytic, Type 2 
processing begin at the same time, working in parallel until one of these processes 
produce a solution (Epstein, 1973; Sloman, 1996). On the other hand, other theorists 
Daniel Edgcumbe [Chapter 3 –Judgement and decision-making review] 
22 
 
posit that intuitive (Type 1) and analytic (Type 2) processes act sequentially (Evans, 
1989; Thompson, 2009). The sequential theorists suggest that Type 1 processing 
begins before Type 2 processing with this latter taking over once the former has failed 
to produce a solution.  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Parallel (panel A) and sequential (panel B) models of the dual-process framework 
of judgement and decision-making.  
 
3.1.2 Parallel models of dual-process theory 
Parallel models of dual-process decision-making posit that the Type 1 and Type 2 
processes are in constant operation (Sladek, Phillips, & Bond, 2006). The Type 1 and 
Type 2 processes start at the same time, run in parallel, and operate in a ‘first-past-
the-post’ race with the process that arrives first producing an answer. This can be 
illustrated with the following example of an incongruent base-rate vignette.  
In a study of 1000 people, there were 5 engineers and 995 lawyers. Jack is a 
randomly chosen participant of this study. Jack is 36-years-old. He is not married 
and is somewhat introverted. He likes to spend his free time reading science fiction 
and writing computer programmes. 
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What is most likely? 
a. Jack is an engineer. 
b. Jack is a lawyer. 
When this vignette is presented to an individual parallel models of dual-process theory 
posit that the Type 1 solution (an engineer) and the Type 2 solution (a lawyer) have 
the same potential of being reached. The intuitive, Type 1 solution relies on the 
stereotype of the occupation engineer (e.g., introverted and a fan of science fiction) 
whilst the analytic, Type 2 processing computes the probability of each occupation 
(e.g., there were 5 engineers and 995 lawyers). 
 
The following sections describe variations of dual-process models that propose a 
parallel, sequential or hybrid operation of Type 1 and Type processing. 
 
3.1.2.1 Epstein’s (1973) Cognitive Experiential Self Theory 
(CEST) 
The Cognitive Experiential Self Theory (CEST) of personality has been influential in 
the development of the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI), a measure of Type 1 
and Type 2 usage (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Epstein’s CEST dichotomy posits that all 
information is processed by an experiential system that is effortless (Type 1) and a 
rational system that is affect-free, abstract and analytical (Type 2); these act in parallel 
(Novak & Hoffman, 2008). Epstein hypothesised that the analytic processes 
developed to operate in the medium of language (Epstein, 1973; Osman, 2004).       
Daniel Edgcumbe [Chapter 3 –Judgement and decision-making review] 
24 
 
3.1.2.2 Sloman’s (1996) dual-process theory 
Sloman’s dual-process theory focuses on the computational distinctions of the two 
processes of decision-making (Sloman, 1996; Osman, 2004). According to Sloman’s 
model the first process, associative reasoning (Type 1), operates by drawing 
inferences from related information. The second process of decision-making (Type 2) 
is rule-based and operates by applying logical abstractions (i.e., rules) to a set 
premises about which a decision is required (Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). 
Both associative and rule-based processes start operating on the information at the 
same time.   
 
3.1.3 Sequential models of dual-process theory  
Sequential models of dual-process decision-making posit that information is 
processed by a Type 1 process prior to any Type 2 processing (Evans, 1989; 
Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015). If intuitive, Type 1 decision-making cannot 
produce a solution then a conflict arises as a result of the uncertainty about the correct 
solution, at this point analytic Type 2 processing monitors and resolves the conflict. In 
the example of the incongruent base-rate vignette (i.e., engineer versus lawyer) both 
Type 1 (an engineer) and Type 2 (a lawyer) remain the same as the aforementioned. 
The key difference in the sequential models is that the conflict and state of uncertainty 
primes Type 2 processing to take over.  
 
 
 
Daniel Edgcumbe [Chapter 3 –Judgement and decision-making review] 
25 
 
3.1.3.1 Evans’ (1989) original heuristic-analytic theory 
Evans’ original heuristic-analytic theory posits that information is processed by Type 
1 heuristic processes pre-consciously without the awareness of the individual (Evans, 
1989; Osman, 2004) (Figure 3.2). The relevant representation and features of the 
information (e.g., a stereotype in a base-rate vignette) are selected and a response is 
inferred. Deliberate and conscious, Type 2 processing computes the information 
through logical analysis when an individual has sufficient experience with dealing with 
this type of logic. One of the key features of this model is that the Type 2, analytic 
function is dependent upon the context and an individual’s experience with logic and 
reasoning, this explains why individuals who do not know how to solve a logic problem 
answer incorrectly (Evans, 2006).       
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Evans’ (1989) heuristic-analytic theory, figure adapted from cited article. 
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3.1.3.2 Thompson’s (2009) metacognitive framework of 
reasoning  
Thompson's (2009) metacognitive framework of reasoning emphasises that the 
outcome of reasoning is equally determined by the content of the information and the 
experience an individual has in processing this type of information (metacognition) 
(Figure 3.3). In this model the Type 1, heuristic process cues a response to 
information, if the response if fluent, familiar or consistent with metacognitive beliefs 
then it passes through the analytic Type 2 function with little or no processing. 
Alternatively, when the information does not cue a Type 1 response, it requires effortful 
processing, after which no response can be given (the give up function). With 
additional effort (requiring extra cognitive capacity) a reformatted piece of information 
can be resolve with a response that is consistent with Type 2 processing.    
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Figure 3.3. Thompson’s (2009) metacognitive framework of reasoning. The acronym TASS 
stands for The Autonomous Set of Systems. Figure adapted from cited article. 
 
3.1.3.3 De Neys’ (2012) logical intuition model  
De Neys' (2012) dual-process model emphasises reaction time, rather than accuracy 
as the main indicator of Type 1 or Type 2 use. He compares the sequential / serial 
(Figure 3.4 panel A) and parallel models (Figure 3.4 panel B) of judgement and 
decision-making and concludes that Type 1, intuitive processing can be split into two 
parts: heuristic intuition and logical intuition (Figure 3.4 panel C). Logical intuition 
differs from intuition because this refers to logical or probabilistic knowledge that is 
intuitive rather analytic. In this model reasoning based on the logical structure of an 
argument can be accomplished by logical intuition as rapidly as heuristic reasoning. 
Both logical intuition and heuristic intuition start processing information in parallel, 
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once a conflict is detected between solutions produced by both forms of Type 1 
processing, deliberate, Type 2 processing takes over. After the information is effortfully 
processed by Type 2 reasoning a correct solution is produced (De Neys, 2012; 2014).  
 
 
Figure 3.4. De Neys’ (2012) logical intuition model of decision-making, figure adapted from 
cited article. 
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3.1.3.4 Pennycook’s (2015) Three-stage dual-process model 
of analytic engagement 
Pennycook, Fugelsang and Koehler's, (2015) three-stage dual-process model of 
analytic engagement emphasises that multiple conflicting solutions (i.e., initial 
responses - IR) can be cued from information during Type 1 processing and Type 2 
processing (Figure 3.5). In stage 1, there may be more than one potential solution to 
a set of information. The multiple competing solutions (IRs) are initially processed by 
Type 1 thinking. For example, when an individual is confronted with an incongruent 
base-rate vignette (as in the engineer and lawyer example) two or more Type 1 
solutions compete – is Jack an engineer or perhaps a lawyer? The second stage of 
the model monitors for these conflicting, and competing, Type 1 solutions in parallel. 
If there is no conflict, either due to an error in decision-making or because there is only 
one solution, the solution continues to stage 3 and is given as the answer (see the 
right-hand side of figure 3.5). Alternatively, Type 2 processing, acting as a monitor in 
the conflict detection function may detect a conflict and then begin Type 2 processing 
whereby the information continues to be processed through either the ‘decouple’ or 
‘rationalize’ function. If the information continues to Type 2 processing through the 
rationalize function then one attempts to rationalize the solution that has made it this 
far, for example, Jack must be an engineer because...  Alternatively, if the information 
continues through the (cognitive) decoupling function, then either (i) the solution is 
inhibited and replaced with a Type 2 solution (e.g., the base-rate suggests Jack must 
be an lawyer, therefore he is a lawyer), or (ii) if multiple solutions still exist then these 
are amalgamated into one solution (the alternative response - AR). Crucially, in the 
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example of the base-rate vignettes amalgamation is not possible as all solutions are 
based on occupations (i.e., Jack cannot be an amalgamation of two occupations).  
 
 
        
 
Figure 3.5. Pennycook’s (2015) three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement and 
decision-making, figure adapted from cited article. Abbreviations: Initial response (IR); 
alternative response (AR); Type 1 (T1) and Type 2 (T2). 
 
3.1.4 Hybrid models of dual-process theory 
Hybrid models combine elements of sequential and parallel model of dual-processing 
decision-making. Some of the hybrid models contain a feedback function so that 
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information can be passed back through a previously used function (Evans, 2006), 
whilst other hybrid models distinguish between different forms of Type 2 reasoning 
(Stanovich, 2009). All hybrid models, like the parallel and sequential models, 
eventually produce the same response, they just differ in the route taken to produce 
the response.     
 
3.1.4.1 Strack and Deutsch’s (2004) Reflective-impulsive 
model 
Strack and Deutsch's (2004) reflective-impulsive model posits that decision-making, 
and social behaviour can be explained by the functions of reflective (Type 2) and 
impulsive (Type 1) processes (Figure 3.6). They proposed that Type 1 and Type 2 
decisions (resulting in a behaviour) are processed through two different routes. An 
associative network (made of learned information) which can be strengthened and 
modified when new information is learned which is crucial to both Type 1 and Type 2 
processes. The Type 1 response begins in the associative store which contains 
episodic links (i.e., links of the information to experience-based knowledge), and then 
passes directly to a behavioural schema function – a function for assessing whether a 
response is consistent with known behavioural schemas (i.e., how to act in a particular 
situation). If a Type 1 response matches a known behavioural schema then this 
response is given as a solution. Type 2 responses also originate in the associative 
store, they pass through a series of metacognitive and perceptual functions 
(perception, referring, categorization and reasoning) after which it arrives in the noetic 
decision function. In the noetic decision function, the response is compared with 
abstract, syllogistic rules where the information is compared to logical rules (e.g., is 
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this syllogism logical valid or invalid?). After processing by the final metacognitive 
functions (reasoning, behavioural decision and intending) the response is passed 
through the behavioural schema function to be compared to known schemas and a 
Type 2 response is produced.  
  
 
 
  
Figure 3.6. Strack and Deutsch’s (2004) reflective-impulsive model of decision-making and 
behaviour, figure adapted from cited article. Abbreviations: RS, reflective system; IS, impulsive 
system. 
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3.1.4.2 Evans’ (2006) Revised and extended heuristic-
analytic theory model 
Evans' (2006) revised and extended heuristic-analytic model builds on his 1989 
heuristic-analytic model. The emphasis of this model is on hypothetical thinking 
(Figure 3.7). Evans suggests that to succeed in hypothetical thinking the reasoning 
must satisfy the three principles of hypothetical thinking (see Table 3.2): the singularity 
principle, relevance principle and satisficing principle. This model posits that Type 1 
reasoning is the simplest form of decision-making. A Type 1 decision must satisfy 
three metacognitive functions (task features, current goal and background knowledge) 
before an error in the analytic Type 2 processes passes the response as a solution. 
Errors in Type 2 processing can occur through either time constraints (time available), 
insufficient cognitive ability (general intelligence) or a misunderstanding of instructions 
(instructional set). Evans emphasises that Type 1 reasoning is the default form of 
decision-making, whilst Type 2 responses are only produced after the construction of 
a relevant model in the analytic system. For the Type 2 response to be generated the 
information must pass through a satisfying function. When a model does not satisfy 
the function an evaluation the process starts over again.   
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Table 3.2. The three principles of hypothetical thinking as proposed by Evans, Over, and 
Handley (2003). 
Principle Explanation 
Singularity People consider a single mental model at a time 
Relevance People consider the most relevant model in the current context 
Satisficing Models are evaluated in the context of current goals and accepted if satisfying. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7. Evans’ (2006) Revised and extended heuristic-analytic theory model, figure 
adapted from cited article. 
 
3.1.4.3 Stanovich’s (2009) Tripartite model 
Stanovich's (2009) tripartite model is unique among the dual-process models because 
it distinguishes between two different sub-divisions of Type 2 reasoning: the reflective 
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mind (thinking dispositions) and algorithmic mind (fluid intelligence) (Figure 3.8). This 
model posits that information is initially processed by Type 1 decision-making, also 
called The Autonomous Set of Systems and the Autonomous Mind (AM). This process 
can in some instances directly produce a response without going through Type 2 
processing (the lowest route in Figure 3.8). Secondly, the information that originates 
in the AM goes on to be processed by the rule-based algorithmic mind where the 
response passes through a serial associative cognition function (analytic thinking 
without any hypothetical thinking) before arriving at a solution. Alternatively, after 
leaving the AM the information passes through the algorithmic mind, a cognitive 
simulation is produced (e.g., by imagining a scenario) before going on to the reflective 
mind. In the case of two individuals with similar algorithmic minds (e.g., fluid 
intelligence) a difference in solutions can result from difference at the reflective mind 
level (thinking dispositions). For example, if two individuals, with the identical scores 
on tests of fluid intelligence are given the same information they can produce different 
solutions because of variance in individual differences in rational thinking dispositions. 
In some cases, the variance in solutions from these two individuals could be corrected 
by further processing in the algorithmic mind to produce a normative Type 2 solution. 
 
The results of the experiments in this thesis are discussed in detail in the context of 
Stanovich’s tripartite model in Chapter 8. As this model specifically divides Type 2 
processing into the ‘reflective’ and ‘algorithmic’ minds this has the potential to in part 
explain the effects of individual difference in thinking dispositions for judgement and 
decision-making.    
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Figure 3.8. Stanovich’s (2009) tripartite model of decision-making, figure adapted from cited 
article. 
 
3.1.4.4 Handley and Trippas’ (2015) dual-process model 
Handley and Trippas' (2015) dual-process model of judgement and decision-making 
emphasises that individuals are intuitively sensitive to the logical structure of an 
argument (Figure 3.9). In this model time is represented from left to right. The length 
of the horizontal line indicates when an answer is available. Whether a logical problem 
is simple or complex, two Type 1 processes begin in parallel: a structure-based 
process (reliant on logic) and knowledge-based process (reliant on belief). For simple 
logical problems, a structure-based process is inhibited after a conflict between the 
two streams is detected to produce a Type 2 solution. In the case of complex logical 
problems, the knowledge-based process is inhibited to produce a Type 2 solution. It 
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is at the time of conflict that either one of the Type 1 processes become consistent 
with Type 2 processing. Intuitive, errorful Type 1 solutions are produced when the 
incorrect Type 1 stream is inhibited.      
 
 
Figure 3.9. Handley and Trippas’ (2015) dual-process model, figure adapted from cited article. 
 
3.2 Cognitive executive functions and decision-making 
Executive functions are a set of cognitive processes that are necessary for many 
cognitive tasks (Jurado & Rosselli, 2007; Chan, Shum, Toulopoulou, & Chen, 2008). 
At the basic level of cognition, they are responsible for the attentional control (Kane & 
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Engle, 2002; Schmeichel, 2007), inhibitory control (Diamond, 2013; Aron, Robbins, & 
Poldrack, 2014), working memory (updating) (Pennington, Bennetto, McAleer, & 
Roberts, 1996; St Clair-Thompson & Gathercole, 2006) and set-shifting (task switching 
/ cognitive flexibility) (Monsell, 2003; Kiesel et al., 2010). At a higher level of cognition 
executive functions are crucial for planning (Lezak, 1982; Robbins, 1996), reasoning 
(Jurado & Rosselli, 2007; Diamond, 2013) and problem solving (Gilhooly & Fioratou, 
2009; Wiley & Jarosz, 2012).  
 
In the dual-process framework executive functions are key mechanisms to understand 
the relationship of intuitive, Type 1 and analytic, Type 2 processing (Barrett, Tugade, 
& Engle, 2004; Del Missier, Mäntylä, & Bruine de Bruin, 2010). Miyake and colleagues 
(Miyake et al., 2000) examined data from tasks that measure executive functioning 
and developed their three-factor model. In Miyake’s model inhibition, updating and set-
shifting all correlate highly with each other. This explains some of the variance in 
individual differences when making a decision. All three of the functions included in 
Miyake’s model are crucial aspects of the dual-process framework: inhibition when 
overriding Type 1 processing; updating when differing working memory capacity is 
needed and set-shifting when changing from Type 1 to Type 2 processing (Del Missier 
et al., 2010; Del Missier, Mäntylä, & Bruin, 2012). The following sections will introduce 
some executive functions in more detail.       
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3.2.1 Inhibition 
In the dual-process framework of judgement and decision-making, inhibition is an 
important executive function in the interaction between intuitive, Type 1 processing 
and analytic Type 2 processing (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Evans, 2008). Since the 
dual-processes act in parallel (in the parallel models) with the fastest processes 
producing a solution, these models are the exception in not utilising an inhibition 
component (Epstein, 1973; Sloman, 1996). In the sequential and hybrid models 
incorrect Type 1 thinking must be inhibited in order to start correct Type 2 analytic 
thinking (Stanovich, 2009; Handley & Trippas, 2015). Inhibition starts when a conflict 
is detected between the two processes of decision-making (De Neys, 2014; 
Pennycook, Fugelsang, et al., 2015). For example, when considering the 
aforementioned engineer versus lawyer incongruent base-rate vignette, Type 1 (the 
engineer) and Type 2 (the lawyer) processes produce competing solutions. Upon 
noticing the conflict between the two solutions Type 2 processing overrides Type 1 
processing, thereby correctly answering the problem with the ‘lawyer’ solution (Evans, 
2006; 2008). A Type 1 solution is given when no Type 2 solution is available due to 
lack of knowledge or cognitive ability (Stanovich & West, 1997; Stanovich, 2009).        
 
The neuromodulation research on inhibition focuses on the inhibition of prepotent 
automatic processes (Horvath et al., 2015a; Loftus et al., 2015). The Stroop task 
(Stroop, 1935) and stop-signal task (Horvath et al., 2015a) are both tasks that measure 
this type of inhibition and have been administered in tDCS studies (Duell et al., 2018). 
The effects of tDCS neuromodulation on inhibition is mixed – some studies find that 
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tDCS boosts inhibitory control (Loftus et al., 2015) whilst other studies find that it does 
not (Duell et al., 2018).     
 
3.2.2 Updating 
Judgement and decision-making rely on information updating and monitoring in 
working memory, otherwise called updating (Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Miyake et al., 
2000). Intuitive, Type 1 processing requires very little working memory capacity 
(WMC) as intuitive thinking is not affected by constraints imposed on WMC by the 
environment (Evans, 2012).  
 
The capacity to update one’s working memory should not influence Type 1 processing 
as it is deemed to proceed automatically without any interference from executive 
functions. Thus, for example, if two people (without Type 2 processing) were asked to 
answer the engineer versus lawyer incongruent base-rate vignette they would both  
likely arrive at the same Type 1 ‘engineer’ solution even if one of these individuals was 
distracted. On the other hand, analytic Type 2 processing is severally limited by WMC 
(Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2003; Evans, 2008). Type 2 processing requires high 
levels of WMC to function because analytic thinking requires the use of abstract 
thought that often includes cognitive simulation (i.e., thinking about consequences of 
a scenario) (Stanovich, 2009). When an individual has low WMC available they are 
less likely to engage in Type 2 processing (Evans, 2008; Stupple, Gale, & Richmond, 
2013).  
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The neuromodulation research on updating is extensive with many studies measuring 
updating with the n-back and Sternberg tasks (Hill et al., 2016; Arciniega, Gözenman, 
Jones, Stephens, & Berryhill, 2018). The tDCS effects on updating is mixed with some 
studies finding an increase in updating after stimulation (Hill et al., 2016) and other 
studies finding no effect of neuromodulation (Imburgio & Orr, 2018).   
 
3.2.3 Set-shifting 
The final executive function that is crucial to the dual-process framework is mental set-
shifting, also called task-switching, task-shifting, attention-switching and cognitive 
flexibility (Miyake et al., 2000; Monsell, 2003). One widely used example of set-shifting 
can be seen in the Stroop task (Sternberg, 1969). When one performs the Stroop task 
one must switch between different sets of instructions, for example, ‘Name the colour 
of the word’ or ‘Read the word.’ Set-shifting is important to the dual-process framework 
when switching between rules or instructions in Type 2 processing (Stanovich, 2009; 
Kiesel et al., 2010).  
  
The neuromodulation studies that examine set-shifting primarily capture set-shifting 
by using task switching paradigms (Leite, Carvalho, Fregni, Boggio, & Gonçalves, 
2013; Savic, Müri, & Meier, 2016). In these tasks, participants must switch between 
two instructions, for example ‘Name the letter’ or ‘Name the number.’ The effects of 
tDCS neuromodulation on set-shifting are mixed with reduced set-shifting after 
stimulation in one experiment (Leite et al., 2013) and no effect of stimulation in another 
study (Savic et al., 2016). Testing set-shifting is outside of the scope of this PhD thesis 
as there are no adequate tasks for examining this executive function.   
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3.3 Alternative perspectives on decision-making 
Opponents of the dual-process framework of decision-making suggest that all 
judgement and decision-making can be mapped onto a single type of reasoning. Two 
of the single-type decision-making frameworks are bounded rationality (Simon, 1957) 
and dynamic graded continuum theory (Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002).   
 
3.3.1 Bounded rationality (Simon, 1957; 1991) 
Bounded rationality does not posit that there are two types of decision-making (Type 
1 and Type 2). It is the idea that individuals are limited (or bounded) in the ability to 
make decisions by time, cognitive ability, and cognitive capacity. Reasoners act as 
satisficers (meaning to satisfy and suffice) and choose the most satisfying response 
to a problem, rather than the optimum choice (Simon, 1991). This theory suggests that 
decision-making is a rational process for finding the optimal solution given the 
information provided. For example, when asked “Which city has the largest 
population? (a) Hamburg or (b) Cologne” reasoners often respond with the first city 
that comes-to-mind because they are acting upon the limited amount of information 
that they have available (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996).    
 
Scholars of the dual-process framework respond to bounded rationality in three ways. 
Firstly, judgement and decision-making research that use reaction time data find that 
errorful Type 1 processing is always quicker than analytic Type 2 processing (Handley 
& Trippas, 2015; Pennycook, Fugelsang, et al., 2015). Secondly, evidence exists that 
clearly show that an ancient, intuitive form of decision-making evolved in our ancestors 
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whilst analytic thinking evolved with language. Non-human primates, of which we 
share common ancestors have the capacity to make decisions that are consistent 
Type 1 processing but not analytic Type 2 decisions (Chen, Lakshminarayanan, & 
Santos, 2006; Krupenye, Rosati, & Hare, 2015). The third major piece of evidence for 
dual-process framework is that Type 1 and Type 2 processing have different neural 
substrates (Hare et al., 2009; Greenwood, Blumberg, & Scheldrup, 2018). Intuitive, 
affective, Type 1 processing is linked to the left DLPFC (Hare et al., 2009; Oldrati, 
Patricelli, Colombo, & Antonietti, 2016) whilst analytic Type 2 processing is associated 
with impulsivity control and set-shifting in the right DLPFC (Loftus et al., 2015; Tayeb 
& Lavidor, 2016). 
 
3.3.2 Dynamic graded continuum theory (Cleeremans & 
Jimenez, 2002) 
Dynamic graded continuum theory is a learning framework that posits that the quality 
(i.e., it’s strength, distinctiveness and stability) of a representation or simulation can 
be mapped onto a continuum with intuitive, implicit (Type 1) processes and analytic, 
explicit (Type 2) reasoning at opposite ends of the continuum (Osman, 2004; 
Barrouillet, 2011). Implicit or explicit information leads to the corresponding type of 
learning and decision-making. When an individual makes a decision about some 
information and it is processed quickly, under time constraints then the solution is 
consistent with Type 1 processing. If given sufficient time to construct a solution to the 
information then the solution is consistent with analytic, Type 2 processing. The crucial 
aspect of this theory is that unlike the dual-process framework all solutions can be 
plotted on this continuum based on the quality of the solution.        
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3.4 Individual differences and dual-process theory 
Individual differences in thinking disposition (West, Toplak, & Stanovich, 2008; 
Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012), cognitive ability (Frederick, 2005; West et al., 2008) 
and cognitive capacity / working memory capacity (Hinson et al., 2003; Gómez-
Chacón, García-Madruga, Vila, Elosúa, & Rodríguez, 2014) all influence decision-
making. Thinking dispositions that include a tendency towards religiosity (Pennycook, 
2014), open-mindedness (Stanovich & West, 1997) and need for cognition (Cacioppo 
& Petty, 1982) influence an individual’s use of intuitive (Type 1) and analytic (Type 2) 
reasoning. Individuals with high cognitive ability (intelligence) make more analytic 
decisions, whilst avoiding errorful intuitive responses (Stanovich & West, 2008). Whilst 
cognitive capacity moderates analytic thinking (Type 2), reasoners with high working 
memory capacity make more analytic decisions (Evans & Stanovich, 2013) whilst 
individuals with low working memory capacity are restricted to making intuitive 
decisions (De Neys, Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 2005).  
 
Some of the models of dual-process reasoning such as Stanovich’s (2009) tripartite 
model and Evans’ (2006) revised heuristic-analytic model account for the variability in 
individual differences. Stanovich’s tripartite model posits that an individual’s belief 
system (thinking disposition) is located in his reflective mind whilst their fluid 
intelligence if located in the algorithmic mind where these can influence the outcome 
of reasoning. Evans’ revised heuristic-analytic model places cognitive ability (general 
intelligence) in his analytic system intervention function where it can influence 
reasoning. However, some models such as Evans’ (1989) heuristic-analytic model and 
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De Neys’ (2012) logical intuition model do not include functions by which individual 
differences can mediate decision-making.   
 
3.5 Critiques of dual-process theory 
3.5.1 Why is there no singular or agreed version of dual-
process theory? 
Critics of dual-process theory suggest that the lack of a consensus about a single 
version of dual-process theory is a weakness (Keren & Schul, 2009; Kruglanski & 
Gigerenzer, 2011). The diverse range of dual-process theories have their roots in 
domains ranging from memory (Pellegrino, Rosinski, Chiesi, & Siegel, 1977; Smith & 
DeCoster, 2000), learning (Sun, Slusarz, & Terry, 2005; Chandrasekaran, Yi, & 
Maddox, 2014) and social psychology (Chaiken, 1980; Rydell & McConnell, 2006). It 
is important to note that whilst all of these domains of research have dual-process 
theories that use similar terminology (e.g., implicit / explicit processing) these 
processes are not the identical; these terms are simply used differently (Evans, 2012). 
In general, the social psychology dual-process theories are concerned with 
consciousness and moral responsibility, rather than cognitive architecture (Evans, 
2008). 
 
In the reasoning, judgement and decision-making literature the lack of a unified dual-
process theory reflect the notion that not all dual-process theories refer to the same 
underlying processes (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). For example, in Type 2 processing 
Stanovich emphasises the decoupling operation whilst Evans maintains the 
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importance of a central working memory resources (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). In this 
thesis Type 2 processing is defined as relying on a decoupling operation and a central 
working memory resource.  
 
3.5.2 Are heuristics and biases unique to Type 1 
processing? 
Some critics of dual-process theory (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011) propose that 
heuristics and biases (i.e., systematic patterns of deviation from the norm) are not 
unique to Type 1 processing (Evans, 2012). They state that errorful responses, which 
are a result of heuristics and biases can arise when processing information through 
Type 1 thinking or Type 2 thinking (Evans, 2006; Stanovich, 2009). These dual-
process theorists respond to this by explaining that Type 1 thinking does have the 
capacity to produce the correct answer to a problem some of the time, however, this 
is only possible if the correct answer is consistent with Type 1 processing (i.e., see 
congruent base-rate vignettes in Chapter 7) (Evans, 2006). The problem with rapid 
decision-making is that it is very susceptible to errorful and biased responses  (Amos 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Croskerry, 2009). 
 
The dual-process theorist Evans  explains in his "revised heuristic-analytic model” that 
heuristics and biases are attributes of Type 1 processing (Evans, 2006). In his model 
he says that errorful biased decision-making can arise through Type 2 processing 
when the explicit representation of information is manipulated incorrectly through 
working memory which appears as if these heuristics and biases were used in Type 1 
processing when they were not (Evans, 2006; 2012).  
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3.5.3 Is fast processing always indicative of Type 1 rather 
than Type 2 use? 
Critics of dual-process theory question whether a rapid response to information is 
necessarily indicative of Type 1 processing (Evans, 2012). When heuristics and biases 
are used effortlessly, unconsciously and during uncertainty the information is 
processed rapidly which is indicative of Type 1 use (Evans, 2008). When Type 2 
processing is used this is slower than the former because to make an analytic decision 
cognitive resources such as working memory need to be dedicated to the careful 
processing of information (Evans, 2012). Reaction time analysis is beyond the scope 
of this PhD thesis as the focus is on accuracy using either Type 1 or Type 2 
processing. 
 
3.5.4 Why is Type 1 processing domain-specific whilst Type 
2 is abstract? 
Some dual-process theorists and critics of dual-process theory highlight the 
descriptions of some of the aspects of Type 1 processing as contextualised, domain-
specific (e.g., in finance of medical decision-making) and concrete, and Type 2 
processing as abstract, rule-based and decontextualized (Evans & Stanovich, 2013).  
 
Evans suggests that this is not correct (Evans & Stanovich, 2013): if Type 1 processing 
is always domain-specific then many of the heuristics and resulting biases would only 
work within specific domains of decision-making. For example, if this were correct then 
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the framing bias, that states that our decisions are influenced by the way in which 
information is presented (i.e., ‘framed), would not work across multiple domains of 
decision-making. Contrary to this, we have clear evidence that the framing bias 
influences decision-making in many domains including policy making and pension 
investments (Van Rooij, Kool, & Prast, 2007; Morton, Rabinovich, Marshall, & 
Bretschneider, 2011).  
 
If Type 2 processing is as abstract as these critiques suggest then the other attributes 
of Type 2 thinking such as slow, rule-based, and explicit characteristics would be 
limited to abstract reasoning, for example when solving mathematics problems – this 
is not the case as Type 2 processing can also be applied to problems that are not 
abstract (Evans, 1984; Verschueren, Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 2005).    
 
3.5.5 What is the evidence for the old (Type 1) and new (Type 
2) processes?  
Critics of dual-process theory question the idea of Type 1 processing as evolutionary 
ancient whilst Type 2 processing is evolutionary young, and uniquely human (Evans, 
2006). They say that there is little evidence to support idea about the ancient origin of 
Type 1 processing and modern Type 2 processing (Evans, 2012).  
 
Supporters of the evolutionary ancient Type 1 idea have two sources of evidence to 
support this view: (i) the recent observation of heuristics in non-human animals (i.e., 
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other primates), and (ii) the association of Type 2 processing with language and 
associative learning in humans. Evolutionary psychologists and zoologists have 
observed the framing bias in chimpanzees (Pan trogladytes) (Krupenye et al., 2015) 
and capuchin monkeys (Cebus appela) (Chen et al., 2006), and the sunk cost bias in 
pigeons (Columba livia) (White & Magalhães, 2015). According to molecular-clock 
estimates the hominid genus split from our common ancestor with the non-human 
primates about 23 million years ago which supports the idea that some of the 
components of Type 1 thinking must have evolved during this early part of our 
evolution (Campbell, 2012). Since no evidence of Type 2 processing have been 
observed in other animals (other than human) theorists posit analytic thinking is 
evolutionary young and therefore evolved when humans developed the capacity to 
use higher cognition and language (Evans, 2006; 2008). One caveat here is that the 
description of Type 1 thinking as evolutionary ancient may be oversimplified as the 
different forms of implicit processing evolved at different times (Evans, 2006). 
 
3.5.6 Are decision-making processes on a continuum, rather 
than discrete types? 
Some critics of dual-process theory suggest that there are no distinct types of 
processing that underpin decision-making (e.g., intuitive and analytic) (Cleeremans & 
Jiménez, 2002). Rather than unique types of processes opponents of dual-process 
theory state that all decision-making processes can be mapped onto a continuum of 
processing style (Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002). Evans and Stanovich maintain that 
the notion of a continuum of processing style arise from the confusion between modes 
and types of decision-making processing (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Modes of 
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processing are forms of Type 2 thinking that differ in individual differences for thinking 
dispositions. For example, when Type 2 processing is defined as the explicit 
processing of rules through the allocation of working memory resources modes of 
processing are engaged to explain the variance in decision-making (i.e., slow and 
reflective, or fast and intuitive). These modes of processing are measured with scales 
such as the Actively Open-Minded Thinking scale (AOT - Stanovich & West, 1997), 
Rational Experiential Inventory (REI - Pacini & Epstein, 1999), and Need for Cognition 
(NFC - Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) measure thinking disposition. In this thesis decision-
making is mapped onto the dual-processing framework, with thinking dispositions (i.e., 
modes) accounting for some of the variability in decision-making outcome.  
 
3.5.7 ‘The cluster problem’: why aren’t the attributes of Type 
1 and 2 processes reliably aligned? 
Critics of dual-process theory suggest that the attributes (i.e., binary characteristics) 
of the dual-process framework are not reliably aligned between models (Keren & 
Schul, 2009). According to the opponents of dual-process theory these attributes (e.g., 
affective-cognitive, automatic-controlled) are clustered together by selecting the 
relevant attributes and discarding everything else that does not fit with this attribute 
(Keren & Schul, 2009). Furthermore, they maintain that the attributes of the two 
cognitive processes (Type 1 and Type 2) are not always observed together.  
 
Dual-process theorists concede that the attributes are not always reliably aligned 
(Evans & Stanovich, 2013). However, although the critics of dual-process theory 
Daniel Edgcumbe [Chapter 3 –Judgement and decision-making review] 
51 
 
maintain that this is a problem for the dual-processing account of decision-making, 
(Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011), it is not (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Evans replies to 
this critique by stating that the ‘cluster problem’ is only a problem if all attributes are 
considered to be necessary defining features of the Type 1 and Type 2 processing 
(Evans & Stanovich, 2013).     
 
3.6 Decision-making: Dual parallel, sequential, hybrid - or a 
single process? 
The question of whether analytic and intuitive decision-making are constituent parts of 
a dual-process model that work in parallel (Pacini & Epstein, 1999) or sequentially 
(Pennycook, Fugelsang, et al., 2015), or as antipodes of a single process (Barrouillet, 
2011) varies among scholars. Sequential model dual-process theorists emphasise the 
importance of reaction time when making a decision were analytic (Type 2) decisions 
start after the earlier intuitive (Type 1) process: Type 1 response latencies are always 
shorter than Type 2 response latencies (De Neys, 2012). The parallel model dual-
process theorists posit that both decision processes start at the same time, the first 
process to produce a response resolves the problem (Sloman, 1996). The hybrid 
model dual-process theorist incorporate feedback loops into their models emphasising 
accuracy over reaction time (Evans, 2006). The type of data used (i.e., accuracy or 
reaction time) is therefore one of the crucial factors in deciding which model to map 
experimental data to.  
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In this thesis accuracy data is recorded for analysis in each of the experiments. 
Judgement and decision-making, and executive functioning data is collected, mapped 
onto dual-process theories and assessed. In particular, individual differences in 
thinking dispositions are recorded and used as covariates to examine whether 
performance on these measures modulate Type 1 or Type 2 thinking. When paired 
with the neuromodulatory manipulations the neural substrates of the dual-process 
framework is examined through the use of Stanovich’s tripartite model of decision-
making.     
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Chapter 4  
A systematic review and meta-analysis of the effects of 
tDCS neuromodulation on decision-making in the dual-
process framework 
4.1 Introduction 
The dual-process framework suggests that there are qualitative differences in 
cognitive processes (or related neural systems) in decision-making. Type 1 processes 
are associated with intuitive decisions based on rapid associations requiring low effort, 
and Type 2 processes are based on slow reflective consideration of the decision 
problem (Evans, 2008). The former is often associated with mental short-cuts, 
hereafter referred to as heuristics, which are presumably employed when cognitive 
resources are scarce, and often lead to judgement or decision bias, that is, suboptimal 
(or wrong) answers according to a normative standard (Tversky, Kahneman, Wendt, 
& Vlek, 1975). Type 2 processes are associated with normative correct responses in 
judgement and decision tasks. Furthermore, risky decision-making refers to decision-
making under uncertainty about the outcome of a decision (Lejuez et al., 2002). High 
levels of risky decision-making are associated with low levels of inhibition, which is in 
turn linked with Type 1 decision-making processes, whilst high inhibitory control over 
pre-potent responses is often associated with Type 2 decision-making (Evans, 2008). 
 
TDCS has been applied in a number of decision-making studies, such as affective and 
deliberate risk-taking (Ly et al., 2016), use of heuristics in judgement and decision-
making (Votinov, Aso, Koganemaru, Fukuyama, & Mima, 2013) as well moral 
judgement (Sellaro, Derks, et al., 2015). The effects of tDCS on decision-making have 
included improved accuracy, for example in the affective bias task (Ly et al., 2016), 
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but also reduced accuracy, such as in the probabilistic guessing task (Hecht, Walsh, 
& Lavidor, 2010). In risk decision-making tasks, namely the Balloon Analogue Risk 
Task (BART), tDCS was found to reduce risk-taking behaviour when participants are 
asked to make decisions about continuing to increase the size of a balloon which 
increases the risk of the balloon bursting and thus losing their credit or whether to bank 
some of their accumulated credit with the increasing size of the balloon and potentially 
lose out on gaining additional credit (Cheng & Lee, 2015). 
 
It is proposed that a potential explanation for the disparate effects of tDCS on decision-
making is whether the task was linked to Type 1 processes which are associated with 
increased decision bias, Type 2 decision-making which are linked with decreased 
decision bias, or to risky decision-making. Here the effects of tDCS on decision-
making were examined in a systematic review and meta-analysis.  
 
Whilst there has not yet been a meta-analysis of the effects of tDCS in decision-
making, Hill, Fitzgerald and Hoy (2015) performed a meta-analysis of the effects of 
tDCS on working memory. In the dual framework model, working memory is linked 
with Type 2 processes. Hill et al., (2015) found a small albeit statistically significant 
reduction in reaction time and a trend towards an improvement in accuracy following 
offline anodal tDCS, which was applied before the working memory tasks. In contrast, 
the effects on reaction time and accuracy did not reach significance during online 
stimulation, which was applied during the task (Hill et al., 2015). In these studies, tDCS 
had been applied to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (14 studies) as well as to 
orbitofrontal region (4 studies). When tDCS is applied specifically to the dorsolateral 
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prefrontal cortex, Dedoncker et al.’s (Dedoncker, Brunoni, Baeken, & Vanderhasselt, 
2016) meta-analysis found an improvement in reaction time during cognitive tasks with 
a single session of anodal tDCS in healthy participants, but there were no changes in 
accuracy. This effect was evident whether the stimulation was online or offline and 
whether applied to either the right or left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. 
 
The studies were grouped by assessing the site of the anodal stimulation (left versus 
central and right locations) and whether stimulation increased bias (Type 1 or Type 2). 
As anodal tDCS applied to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex has been found to 
improve accuracy in cognitive tasks, which included working memory, and working 
memory is associated with Type 2 decision-making (Stanovich, 2009), anodal tDCS 
when applied to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex would be expected to improve 
outcome in Type 2 decision-making tasks. It was hypothesized that anodal tDCS 
applied to the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex would improve Type 2 decision-making 
processes and that susceptibility to Type 1 processes would be reduced. 
 
4.2 Research questions 
In this Chapter, the influence of tDCS over the right and / or left dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortices (DLPFC) on tasks that tap the dual-process framework of decision-making 
were examined for both intuitive thinking (Type 1) and cognitive reflection (Type 2).  
Research question 1 
Does online anodal tDCS of either the right DLPFC or left DLPFC alter the propensity 
to use Type 2 decision-making over Type 1 decision-making compared to sham? 
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Prediction 1: anodal stimulation of the right and left DLPFCs will increase the 
propensity to use Type 2 decision-making during stimulation as shown by higher 
scores that are consistent with Type 2 responses compared to Type 1 responses.   
Research question 2 
Does offline anodal tDCS of either the right DLPFC or left DLPFC alter the propensity 
to use Type 2 decision-making over Type 1 decision-making compared to sham? 
Prediction 2: anodal stimulation of the right and left DLPFCs will increase the 
propensity to use Type 2 decision-making after stimulation as shown by higher scores 
that are consistent with Type 2 responses compared to Type 1 responses. 
Research question 3 
Does online anodal tDCS of the right DLPFC or left DLPFC alter risk-taking behaviour 
compared to sham? 
Prediction 3: anodal stimulation of the right DLPFC will decrease risk-taking behaviour 
during stimulation as shown by lower risk-taking scores in the BART during stimulation 
compared to sham. 
Research question 4 
Does offline anodal tDCS of the right DLPFC or left DLPFC alter risk-taking behaviour 
compared to sham? 
Prediction 4: anodal stimulation of the right DLPFC will decrease risk-taking behaviour 
after stimulation as shown by lower risk-taking scores in the BART during stimulation 
compared to sham. 
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4.3 Methodology 
A search of the literature and the meta-analysis was conducted following the Preferred 
Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines 
(Moher, Liberati, Tetzlaff, & Altman, 2010).  
 
4.4 Literature review 
The literature search was conducted using Scopus, Medline (PubMed), PsychINFO 
(Ovid) and Science Direct electronic databases with the criteria: “decision-making” or 
"heuristic" or "judgment" or "judgement" and either “tDCS” or “transcranial direct 
current stimulation” or “direct current stimulation” or “transcranial alternating current 
stimulation” or “TACS” or “transcranial random noise stimulation” or “tRNS” or 
“neuromodulation” in all fields in Science Direct and Wiley Online, and limited to 
articles title, abstract and keywords in Scopus, with publication dates ranging from 
1966 to December 2016 (see Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1. Flow chart for the database search using the Preferred Reporting for Systematic 
Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA). 
 
4.5 Selection criteria 
Inclusion criteria were: (1) tDCS; (2) healthy participants; (3) adult ages18-65 years; 
and (4) articles written in English. The exclusion criteria were non-human studies, 
theoretical articles and commentaries without any statistical analysis and case reports.  
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The studies were assessed according to the type of the targeted decision-making 
process, Type 1 (increase of decision bias) and Type 2 (decrease of decision bias) 
processing.  
 
4.6 Data extraction 
The following demographics were extracted: sample size, gender, age, years of 
education, and handedness. The following parameters of the experimental designs 
were coded: tDCS montage locations (e.g., right DLPFC, left DLPFC), electrode size 
(cm2), type of electrode (anodal / cathodal or reference), session duration (seconds), 
within or between-group design, current intensity (mA), current density (mA/cm2), 
fade-in (duration of the gradual onset and increase in current intensity), fade-out 
(duration of the gradual decrease and end in current intensity) and whether tDCS was 
used in an online or offline paradigm (Table 4.1). Behavioural task measures 
(accuracy and reaction time) were extracted for active, sham (i.e., same protocol as 
active, but with tDCS turned off) and control groups (i.e., no tDCS) for analysis. 
 
Data from novel tasks included Ye, Chen, Huang, Wang, Jia, et al.,'s (2015) risk-
aversion task, Sellaro, Güroǧlu, et al.,'s (2015) Moral Judgement Task (MJT), Minati, 
Campanhã, Critchley, and Boggio's (2012) Gambling Task, Hecht et al.,'s (2010) 
Probabilistic Guessing Task, Colombo, Balzarotti, and Mazzucchelli's (2016) object 
valuation task, and Ly et al.,'s (2016) Affective Biasing and Instrumental Action Task. 
 
 
Daniel Edgcumbe [Chapter 4 – Meta-analysis & Systematic Review] 
60 
 
4.7 Search results 
4.7.1 Study selection 
A total of seventeen papers met the inclusion and exclusion criteria consisting of forty-
three independent participant samples in eighteen studies. One paper met a criteria 
for exclusion with a mean age of participants in the experimental group of sixty-nine 
years or above (Boggio et al., 2010) which was considerably more than any of the 
other studies included in this review. 
 
The majority of the studies utilized risk decision-making tasks such as the BART (5 
studies, 126 participants) (Cheng & Lee, 2015; Fecteau et al., 2007 -2 studies; Gorini, 
Lucchiari, Russell-Edu & Pravettoni, 2014; Ouellet et al., 2015) and Columbia Card 
Task (CCT; 1 study, 29 participants (Pripfl, Neumann, Kohler & Lamm, 2013)). In the 
Type 1 tasks, heuristic-based strategies can be used to complete the task: endowment 
effect task (1 study, 12 participants (Votinov, Aso, Koganemaru, Fukuyama & Mima, 
2013)), Moral Judgement Task (MJT, 1 study, 60 participants (Sellaro et al., 2015)), 
Implicit Association Task (IAT, 1 study, 60 participants (Sellaro et al., 2015)), affective 
biasing and instrumental action task (1 study, 120 participants (Ly et al., 2016)), and 
the Cognitive Reflection Test when scored as incorrect answers (1 study, 39 
participants) (Oldrati, Patricelli, Colombo & Antonietti, 2016). Type 2 tasks included 
the temporal discounting task (1 study, 14 participants (Hecht et al. 2013)), 
probabilistic guessing task (1 study, 28 participants (Hecht et al., 2010)), paired lottery 
choice task (PLCT; 2 studies, 120 participants (Ye et al., 2015a; 2015b), choice 
induced preference change task (CIPT, 1 study, 48 participants (Mengarelli, 
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Spoglianti, Avenanti & Di Pellegrino, 2015)), and Cognitive Reflection Test when 
scored as correct answers (1 study, 39 participants) (Oldrati et al. 2016).  
 
Behavioural testing for all offline stimulation studies started immediately after the 
stimulation ended (Ye et al., 2015a: 2015b; Gorini et al., 2014; Ouellet et al., 2015). 
The statistical heterogeneity of I2 was high for all of the datasets included in this 
analysis (93% to 97%), which is to be expected because of the variety of tasks. 
 
4.7.2 Demographic data 
A total of 710 healthy participants were included in the present analysis (351 females, 
195 males, and 164 sex not stated; age range 18 - 36 years: mean age ± SD, 24.71 ± 
3.01 years) (see Table 4.1). For one study that had a clinical sample, the healthy 
participants were selected only (Gorini, Lucchiari, Russell-Edu, & Pravettoni, 2014).  
 
Table 4.1 summarizes the studies included in the meta-analysis. Because of the 
heterogeneity of tasks, predictions, montages, and stimulation sites, the studies were 
grouped along 2 main criteria: (i) tasks: risk-taking versus decision-making-tasks; and 
(ii) stimulation site (left versus other).  
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4.7.3 Decision-making tasks 
Endowment Effect Task: This task measures the degree to which an individual 
believes that an item is of greater value than another identical item simply because 
the individual possesses it (Morewedge & Giblin, 2015). The effect is evident in the 
willingness to pay or to accept in payment for an object which the participant owns 
(Votinov et al., 2013). The data used in this review from this study refer to a willingness 
to accept / willingness to pay ratio, and a high ratio indicates high bias. 
 
Implicit Association Task: A measure of associations which are implicitly held, 
providing a measure of implicit bias (Sellaro, Derks, et al., 2015). Participants are 
presented with two lists of names, one list of familiar names from the same ethnicity 
(in-group) and a list of unfamiliar names from a different ethnicity (out-group) with an 
affective attribute (e.g., joy or sadness). They are then given a short moral scenario 
with a name from one of the lists and rate the permissibility of the actions. The data 
used from the study (Sellaro, Derks, et al., 2015) refer to a compound score that 
represents the difference between congruent and incongruent blocks scores, a high 
compound score is indicative of high implicit bias. 
 
Probabilistic Guessing Task: In this task, people use the matching bias, a heuristic 
which tries to maximize payoffs from independent chance events based on historic 
distributions (Kallir & Sonsino, 2009), which has been measured in the probabilistic 
guessing task (Hecht et al., 2010). Participants watch an asterisk that appears either 
above or below a central fixation point and must guess the location of the next asterisk. 
The location of the asterisk is presented with a greater likelihood in one of the two 
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locations. The data used from the study in this review (Hecht et al., 2010) refer to the 
mean prediction accuracy in block 1 (immediately after tDCS ended) of the task. 
 
Affective Biasing and Instrumental Action Task: The task examines the effect of 
affective biasing on instrumental decision-making (Ly et al., 2016). The task contains 
two separate stages: a learning phase and a transfer phase. In the learning phase, a 
probabilistic learning task is used to learn an instrumental response. In the transfer 
phase, the probabilistic learning task is used with the addition of affective (happy or 
angry) faces that precede the instrumental target. The data used from the study (Ly et 
al., 2016) refer to the mean proportion of go responses for the approach angry transfer 
phase. 
 
Paired Lottery Choice Task: A form of gambling task which measures risky decision-
making (Ye, Chen, Huang, Wang, Jia, et al., 2015; Ye, Chen, Huang, Wang, & Luo, 
2015). Participants decide between a safe option with no risk (i.e., neither win nor lose 
money) or an option with a risk (e.g., 60% chance of losing £5 and 60% of gaining 
£20). The aim of the task is to maximize the total monetary score at the end of the 
round. The data used from the study in the present review (Ye, Chen, Huang, Wang, 
Jia, et al., 2015; Ye, Chen, Huang, Wang, & Luo, 2015) refer to the mean weighted 
risk aversion measure. 
 
Temporal Discounting Task: A measure of the propensity to delay a greater 
monetary reward or accept a smaller reward immediately (Bickel & Marsch, 2001; 
Hecht, Walsh, & Lavidor, 2013). The propensity to delay or accept the reward with the 
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monetary value of the reward is used as the measure of temporal decision-making. 
The data used from this study (Bickel & Marsch, 2001; Hecht et al., 2013) refer to the 
mean percentage of immediate choice made within the first minutes of the task. 
 
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT): A behavioural measure of automatic-heuristic Type 
1 and controlled-reflective Type 2 decision making processing (Frederick, 2005; 
Oldrati et al., 2016). Participants view short questions (e.g., A bat and ball together 
cost £1.10, The bat costs £1 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?) that 
are designed to initially elicit an incorrect intuitive (Type 1) answer (e.g., 10 pence). 
After viewing the question and being given enough time to think about their reply, 
participants arrive at the correct (Type 2) answer (e.g., 5 pence). Crucially, there is a 
third potential answer that is also incorrect (e.g., Anything other than 10 or 5 pence) 
The data in this review refer to either the mean accuracy of correct answers in Type 2 
analysis or the mean number of incorrect answers in Type 1 analysis.  
 
Choice Induced Preference Change Task: A modified version of Brehm’s free-
choice task (Brehm, 1956) which measures implicit choice and implicit choice change 
to works of art was used. The task contains four stages that modulate the preference 
and memory for an item (e.g., piece of art) (Izuma & Murayama, 2013; Mengarelli, 
Spoglianti, Avenanti, & Di Pellegrino, 2015). The data from this study (Mengarelli et 
al., 2015) refer to the mean preference for selected art at phase 3 of the task. 
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Moral Judgement Task: Participants rate the moral permissibility of hypothetical 
scenarios (Sellaro, Güroǧlu, et al., 2015). The data from this study (Sellaro, Güroǧlu, 
et al., 2015) refer to the mean moral judgement on a 7-point Likert scale. 
 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART): Participants ‘inflate’ a series of balloons. As 
the balloon get bigger, the potential reward gets bigger. However, every trial will end 
with the balloon popping if the participant continues to press the button, resulting in a 
loss of earnings. The only sure way to retain earnings is to decide to stop pressing. 
Greater control results in a higher sum of rewards at the end of the task (Lejuez et al., 
2002).  
 
4.8. Meta-analyses 
All studies included in this analysis used continuous outcome measures, and mean 
scores and standard deviations were used for the present analysis. Where standard 
deviations were missing, these were calculated from the reported standard errors (see 
Meron, Hedger, Garner, & Baldwin, 2015). In 7 studies (Cheng & Lee, 2015; Pripfl et 
al., 2013; Ouellet et al., 2015; and Hecht et al., 2010; Oldrati et al., 2016; & 2 studies 
in Fecteau et al., 2007), there were identical sham groups for otherwise independent 
experiments. To avoid a unit-of-analysis error due to the correlation between the 
effects from multiple comparisons, the sham groups were evenly split as per the 
recommendation in the Cochrane Handbook for Systematic Reviews and 
Interventions (Higgins & Green, 2005).  
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Due to the different decision-making task scores that were used in these studies the 
standard mean difference (SMD) of the mean total scores were used as an index of 
effect size because it allows for a direct comparison between studies with different 
scales (Deeks & Higgins, 2010). Review Manager Software package (version 5.3) was 
used to calculate effect sizes (Meron et al., 2015). Review Manager calculates 
Hedge’s adjusted g, an effect size measure that is similar to Cohen’s d, but includes 
an adjustment to account for small samples bias (Higgins & Green, 2005). The effect 
sizes can be interpreted by using the same convention as Cohen’s d, namely small (≥ 
0.2), medium (≥ 0.5) or large (≥ 0.8). 
 
A number of studies had included both baseline and sham conditions. In these cases, 
the measures from the sham conditions were used as the means of comparison for 
these studies. For consistency, studies which contained both unilateral and bilateral 
conditions were compared using the same process in analysis.  
 
4.8.1 Tests of heterogeneity 
Statistical heterogeneity was assessed by utilizing the I2 statistic (Hedges & Vevea, 
1998). I2 evaluates the appropriateness of pooling individual study results with a range 
between 0% and 100%: 0% indicates that there is no heterogeneity between studies 
while 100% suggests that there is a very high level of heterogeneity.  
  
A random-effects model was chosen because it is more appropriate for analysing data 
from a variety of independent studies, and it is considered to be better at accounting 
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for differences in effect sizes across studies than the fixed-effects model (Hedges & 
Vevea, 1998). 
 
4.8.2 Results 
4.8.2.1 TDCS effects on risk-based decision-making 
Risk-taking behaviour was examined in a total of 6 studies in 5 articles that used the 
BART (Fecteau, Pascual-Leone, et al., 2007; Pripfl et al., 2013; Gorini et all., 2014; 
Cheng & Lee, 2015) and the Columbia Card task (Ouellet et al., 2015) – one article 
(Fecteau, Pascual-Leone et al., 2007) contained two studies that included the BART. 
Behavioural measures for the analysis were accuracy, as reaction times were not 
reported in all studies. Overall, comparison of the effect sizes in these studies showed 
that online tDCS significantly reduced risk-taking behaviour as measured by the BART 
and Columbia Card Task (SMD = -0.86, 95% CI = -1.53, -0.18, p = 0.01), which was 
attributable to online stimulation of left DLPFC, whilst offline tDCS (Gorini et al., 2014; 
Ouellet et al., 2015) did not show any significant effect (SMD = -0.02, 95% CI = -0.50, 
0.44, p = 0.99) in comparison to sham (Figure 4.2). 
 
Looking at the online stimulation only, anodal tDCS to the left DLPFC was associated 
with a significant reduction in risk-taking behaviour as measured by mean BART 
adjusted pumps and Columbia Card Task as compared to sham (SMD = -1.05, 95% 
CI = -2.11, 0.01, p = 0.05), based on 4 studies (Fecteau, Pascual-Leone, et al., 2007; 
Pripfl et al., 2013; Cheng & Lee, 2015) (Figure 4.2). However, stimulation of the right 
DLPFC did not reduce risk-taking behaviour (SMD = -0.70, 95% CI = -1.7, 0.30, p = 
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0.17) (Fecteau, Pascual-Leone, et al., 2007; Pripfl et al., 2013; Cheng & Lee, 2015) 
as compared to sham.  
 
For the offline anodal stimulation only, there were 2 studies in which tDCS was applied 
to the orbitofrontal cortex (Ouellet et al., 2015) or DLPFC (Fecteau, Pascual-Leone, et 
al., 2007). Effect sizes revealed that tDCS to either the left orbitofrontal cortex (Ouellet 
et al., 2015) or DLPFC (Fecteau, Pascual-Leone, et al., 2007) or right prefrontal 
cortices (orbitofrontal cortex (Ouellet et al., 2015)) or DLPFC (Fecteau, Pascual-
Leone, et al., 2007) did not significantly reduce risk-taking behaviour as measured by 
mean BART adjusted pumps in comparison to sham (SMD = -0.03, 95% CI = -0.70, 
0.62, p = 0.90, and SMD = -0.02, 95% CI = -0.67, 0.63, p = 0.90, respectively) (Figure 
4.2).  
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Figure 4.2. Forest plot of the effect of tDCS on risk-taking behaviour in the Balloon Analogue 
Risk Task (BART) and Columbia Card Task (CCT). Panel A shows studies in which risk-taking 
performance was measured during online stimulation. Panel B shows studies in which risk-
taking performance was measured offline following stimulation. Online tDCS to the left DLPFC 
was associated with a significant medium effect size in reducing risk-taking performance, while 
online tDCS to the right DLPFC and offline tDCS did not show a significant effect. The overall 
effect of online tDCS was attributable to the effect on the left DLPFC. 
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4.8.2.2 TDCS effects on Type 1 decision-making 
A total of 5 studies (Votinov et al., 2013; Votinov et al., 2013; Sellaro, Derks, et al., 
2015; Sellaro, Güroǧlu, et al., 2015; Ly et al., 2016; Oldrati et al., 2016) were 
categorised as measuring Type 1 processing (i.e., resulting intuitive or biased 
answers) during stimulation. There were no offline tDCS studies found in the meta-
analysis involving the right hemisphere. The overall comparison of the effect sizes in 
these studies revealed no effect of stimulation on accuracy (SMD = -0.33, 95% CI = -
10, 0.32, p = 0.32) compared to sham across left and right hemispheres.  
 
For the 3 studies  that used tDCS over the left frontal lobe (Votinov et al., 2013; Sellaro, 
Derks, et al., 2015; Ly et al., 2016) the analysis revealed that stimulation was 
associated with a significant improvement in accuracy (SMD = -0.6, 95% CI = -1.04, 
0.15, p = 0.01) compared to sham. There was no effect of anodal tDCS over the right 
DLPFC (Votinov et al., 2013) (SMD = -0.10, 95% CI = -0.71, 0.95, p = 0.82). Only 
accuracy scores were used for the meta-analysis. 
 
The one study that used offline anodal tDCS to the left DLPFC found no improvement 
in accuracy (Oldrati et al., 2016) (SMD = 0.13, 95% CI = -0.64, 0.90, p = 0.74) 
compared to sham. One study (Sellaro, Derks, et al., 2015) used offline tDCS over 
medial prefrontal cortex (at FPz) so was not included the left or right hemisphere 
analyses.  
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4.8.2.3 TDCS effects on Type 2 decision-making 
In this category, a total of 8 studies (Hecht et al., 2010; Minati et al., 2012; Hecht et 
al., 2013; Ye et al., 2015a 2015b; Mengarelli et al., 2015; Colombo et al., 2016; Oldrati, 
et al., 2016) met the criterion of the author (i.e., aiming to improve normative decision-
making performance). The overall comparison of the effect sizes of the 4 studies in 4 
articles with online tDCS collapsed across hemispheres (Hecht et al., 2010; Minati et 
al., 2012; Hecht et al., 2013; Mengarelli et al., 2015) revealed no effect of stimulation 
on accuracy (SMD = 0.53, 95% CI = -0.60, 1.66, p = 0.36) compared to sham. The 
overall comparison of the effect sizes of the 4 studies in 2 articles using offline tDCS 
(Ye et al., 2015a; 2015b; Oldrati et al., 2016) also revealed no effect of stimulation on 
accuracy (SMD = -0.42, 95% CI = -1.50, 0.67, p = 0.45). All behavioural measures for 
this analysis were accuracies. 
 
Looking at the online stimulation studies only, the effect size analysis of the 4 individual 
studies (Hecht et al., 2010; Minati et al., 2012; Hecht et al., 2013; Mengarelli et al., 
2015) revealed that left DLPFC online anodal tDCS was not associated with any 
changes in accuracy (SMD = 0.85, 95% CI = -0.60, 2.30, p = 0.25) compared to sham. 
There was also no effect of online anodal tDCS over the right DLPFC (Hecht et al., 
2010 Minati et al., 2012) (SMD = -0.11, 95% CI = -0.96, 0.74, p = 0.82). One 
behavioural measure for this analysis was a percentage of choice score between two 
alternatives (Hecht et al., 2013), all other measures were accuracy scores. 
 
For the offline stimulation studies only, the effect size analysis of the 3 studies using 
anodal tDCS over the left DLPFC (Ye et al., 2015a; 2015b; Oldrati et al., 2016) 
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revealed no improvement in accuracy (SMD = -0.57, 95% CI = -2.15, 1.02, p = 0.48) 
compared to sham. As only one study applied offline anodal tDCS over the right 
DLPFC (Ye et a., 2015a), effect size analysis was not possible. All behavioural 
measures were accuracies.  
 
4.8.2.4 Combined effects of anodal tDCS on decision-
making and risk-taking 
An omnibus comparison of the effect sizes of all included studies after collapsing the 
data across tasks revealed that online stimulation (Fecteau et al., 2007 – two studies; 
Hecht et al., 2010; Hecht et al. 2013; Minati et al., 2013; Pripfl et al., 2013; Votinov et 
al., 2013; Cheng & Lee, 2015; Mengarelli et al., 2015; Colombo et al., 2016; Ly et al., 
2016) was associated with improved decision-making accuracy and reduced risk-
taking behaviour (SMD = -0.5, 95% CI = -0.85, -0.13, p = 0.01; 8 studies in total). For 
offline stimulation (Gorini et al., 2014; Ouellet al., 2015; Ye et al., 2015a; 2015b; Oldrati 
et al., 2016) there were no statistically significant effects (SMD = -0.14, 95% CI = -
0.78, 0.50, p = 0.66; 6 studies in 5 articles) (Figure 4.3). All behavioural measures for 
this analysis were accuracies. 
 
Looking at the online stimulation studies only, the 10 studies from 9 articles (Fecteau 
et al., 2007 – two studies; Hecht et al., 2010; Hecht et al. 2013; Minati et al., 2013; 
Pripfl et al., 2013; Cheng & Lee, 2015; Mengarelli et al., 2015; Colombo et al., 2016; 
Ly et al., 2016) targeting the left DLPFC only revealed a significant increase in 
decision-making accuracy and decreased risk-taking behaviour (SMD = -0.60, 95% CI 
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= -1.05, -0.15, p = 0.01) as compared to sham tDCS. This was largely due to studies 
that captured Type 1 thinking and risk decision-making (Cheng & Lee, 2015; Ly et al. 
2016). However, the 6 studies targeting the right DLPFC (Fecteau et al, 2007; Hecht 
et al., 2010; Minati et al, 2013; Pripfl et al., 2013; Votinov et al., 2013; Cheng & Lee, 
2015)) found no effect of stimulation on accuracy in these tasks (SMD = -0.33, 95% 
CI = -0.96, 0.30, p = 0.31) compared to sham.  
 
For the 9 studies using offline stimulation (Gorini et al., 2014; Ouellet al., 2015; Ye et 
al., 2015a; 2015b; Oldrati et al., 2016), there was no statistically significant effect of 
stimulation on decision-making for either hemisphere. Of these 6 studies in 5 articles 
(Gorini et al., 2014; Ouellet et al., 2015; Ye et al., 2015a; 2015b; Oldrati et al., 2016 – 
2 studies) were stimulating the left DLPFC (SMD = -0.13, 95% CI = -1.13, 0.87, p = 
0.80) and found no effect of stimulation on decision-making. Whilst the 3 studies 
(Gorini et al., 2014; Ouellet et al., 2015; Ye et al. 2015a) targeting the right DLPFC 
were not associated with any significant effects of stimulation on decision-making 
(SMD = -0.21, 95% CI = -0.71, 0.30, p = 0.42) as compared to sham tDCS. All 
behavioural measures for the analysis were accuracies. 
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Figure 4.3. Forest plot of effects of stimulation on all tasks in this systematic review. Panel A 
shows studies in which performance was measured during online stimulation. Panel B shows 
studies in which performance was measured offline following stimulation. Only studies with 
left hemisphere online stimulation showed an overall significant effect of tDCS on 
performance. All studies regardless of site of hemisphere stimulation with online stimulation 
showed a significant large effect size of tDCS on performance.  
 
4.9 Discussion 
The present systematic review and meta-analysis investigated whether tDCS 
neuromodulation affects decision-making performance, including risk-taking. Across 
tasks, non-invasive tDCS over the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex showed an effect in 
modulating behaviour, but only for task-completion during stimulation, and significantly 
only for the left hemisphere (although there were trends for right stimulation effects 
also). This pattern was mirrored at the level of groups of tasks. For risk-taking only 
online tDCS to the left DLPFC or collapsed across both hemispheres was associated 
with reduced risk-taking behaviour. Similarly, for tasks that tapped Type 1 decision-
making (or collapsed across Type 1 and Type 2), only online anodal stimulation to the 
left frontal lobe – or again across both hemispheres - increased decision-making 
performance. There were no significant effects of either online or offline tDCS on Type 
2 decision-making alone.  
 
The proposed mechanism behind successful manipulation of decision performance 
via tDCS of the left DLPFC is that tDCS alters other cognitive functions that are 
associated with decision-making, such as working memory (updating) (Evans & 
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Stanovich, 2013), attention (Goel & Vartanian, 2004) and impulsivity (Ye et al., 2015a). 
Furthermore, the left DLPFC has been suggested to be important in self-regulation 
processes (Mengarelli et al. 2015) and affective modulation (Hare et al., 2009). In 
contrast, the right DLPFC has been suggested to be involved in impulsivity (Loftus et 
al., 2015), and to have a critical role in set-shifting (the manipulation of mental models) 
in problem solving, reasoning and planning (Loftus et al., 2015). 
 
One possible explanation for the reduction in decision-making bias and improvement 
in accuracy is that the left DLPFC is involved in the cognitive control of prepotent and 
impulsive responses in decision-making (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004; Stagg & 
Nitsche, 2011). This region supports the convergence of interconnections with other 
brain structures that in turn coordinate complex behaviour such as planning, decision-
making and problem solving (Hecht et al., 2010; Cheng & Lee, 2015). Anodal tDCS to 
the left DLPFC may increase activity in the neural populations that are crucial for the 
integration of signals involved in the cognitive control of decision-making (André 
Russowsky Brunoni & Vanderhasselt, 2014). More specifically, anodal stimulation of 
the left DLPFC has been found to significantly reduce reaction times and error rates 
for incongruent items in the Stroop inhibitory test (Aron et al., 2004), thereby improving 
control over the prepotent responses, compared to sham. Here, the reviewed decision-
making tasks measure something similar: just in how far participants overcome pre-
potent (biased) responses to arrive at correct answers. By this logic improved Type 1 
decision-making may be a result of online stimulation because of the ‘fast’ automatic 
nature of processes that have to be overcome just as in the Stroop task. The question 
then remains is as to why we saw no increase for Type 2 performance? 
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Rather than just relying on successful inhibition, Type 2 processes also rely on a 
participants’ ability to simulate certain situations or outcomes (Evans, 2003). This is 
achieved by mapping the encountered world onto a primary representation, whilst a 
copy of it (a secondary representation) can be successfully ‘decoupled’ and mentally 
manipulated. Working memory performance is a potential measure of this ability for 
mental simulation. Dual-process frameworks (Evans, 2003; 2008) typically link 
working memory performance with increased decision-making performance, and in a 
meta-analysis, Hill et al., (2016) found an improvement in working memory 
performance during offline stimulation. However, there was a failure to show any 
improvements in tasks that may have benefitted from Type 2 simulation processes. 
One reason for the lack of overall significant effect of stimulation may be that most of 
the studies that were included in the Type 2 analysis used online stimulation rather 
than offline stimulation, whereas the current analyses mainly obtained significant 
effects of neuromodulation on decision-making during offline stimulation (experiments 
1 to 3). Alternatively, the potential relationship between working memory processes 
and analytical decision-making in the left DLPFC may be more complex than some of 
the dual-process models state (Evans, 2003; 2008).  
 
Online tDCS applied to the left prefrontal cortex, namely to the DLPFC, also 
significantly reduced risk-taking behaviour. However, online tDCS applied to the right 
prefrontal cortex and offline tDCS to the right prefrontal cortex, did not improve risk-
taking. The differences in tDCS effects between online and offline stimulation can be 
explained by the functional differences in underlying mechanisms of these types of 
stimulation (Nitsche et al., 2003; Caumo et al., 2012).  
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The functional specificity of online and offline tDCS can be explained in two ways 
(Nitsche et al., 2003; Priori, 2003). Online stimulation is dependent on changes in the 
membrane potential during task performance: the effect of stimulation on task-relevant 
neurons boosts the already heightened activity of these neuron populations (Aron et 
al., 2004). At the cellular level, online anodal stimulation alters the membrane potential 
of neurons by depolarizing neurons by increasing Na+ (sodium) influx into the cell 
(Liebetanz et al., 2002). The result of the influx of sodium ions (Na+) is evident when 
Na+ channel antagonists, such as carbamazepine, block the effect of anodal 
stimulation during the stimulation (Liebetanz et al., 2002).   
 
Conversely, offline stimulation, is driven by changes in synaptic strength (Nitsche et 
al., 2003). This, involves the modulation of glutamatergic activity through the 
potentiation of synaptic glutamatergic receptors, which in turn has an effect on 
neuronal populations independent of task performance (Nitsche et al., 2003;  2008). 
The neuroplastic changes from offline stimulation is similar to those of long-term 
potentiation (LTP) and long-term depression (LTD) in that the GABAergic and 
glutamatergic systems are both implicated in LTP, LTD and after effects of offline 
stimulation (Stagg et al., 2009; Dayan et al., 2013).     
 
One limitation of this review concerns the methodological differences in each of the 
articles that have been included (e.g., duration of tasks, number of trials etc). If one 
takes the BART as an example there were differences in the number of trials and total 
durations of some of the studies (Fecteau, Pascual-Leone, et al., 2007; Hecht et al., 
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2010). The second limitation is that with the exception of the BART there was little 
uniformity between the tasks included in this review, for example, there were not 
enough studies combining any of the heuristics with tDCS to conduct a larger analysis.  
 
Taken together with the omnibus and risk-taking meta-analyses that were conducted 
in this review this suggests that left DLPFC is involved in the modulation of decision-
making bias. Increasing cortical excitability by depolarizing the neuronal membranes 
in the left DLPFC increased accuracy compared to sham. When combined with the 
literature on neuromodulation of the Stroop task (Aron et al., 2004) this may indicate 
that increasing cortical excitability in the left DLPFC moderates the inhibitory 
mechanisms that are involved the Stroop and in decision-making. However, this needs 
to be empirically tested in experiments that combine neuromodulation with judgement 
and decision-making tasks (e.g., the CRT), and crucially, executive function tasks 
(e.g., the Stroop) - the following experiments does so.  
 
4.10 Summary 
This systematic review and meta-analysis of the literature of tDCS neuromodulation 
and decision-making revealed that only online stimulation modulates decision-making. 
Online stimulation of the left frontal lobe modulates decision-making tasks that tap 
Type 1, intuitive thinking. Furthermore, only online tDCS of the left DLPFC was 
sufficient to alter risk-taking behaviour, reducing risk-taking. This review was limited in 
two ways - firstly, by the small number of publications that use tDCS neuromodulation 
with decision-making, and secondly, by the lack of a single consistent experimental 
task that is used across these studies that taps either Type 1 or Type 2 thinking.       
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Chapter 5  
Experiment 1: The effect of tDCS neuromodulation of the 
right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex on risk-taking, working 
memory performance, and cognitive reflection. 
 
5.1 Background   
As reviewed in Chapter 3, executive functions are crucial to judgement and decision-
making. The crucial executive functions in decision-making are updating, inhibition and 
set-shifting (Miyake et al., 2000; Miyake & Friedman, 2012). Inhibition and updating 
are examined in this experiment. To override automatic Type 1 processing with 
analytic Type 2 processing one must inhibit the former in favour of the latter (De Neys, 
2006; Stanovich, 2009). At the same time, high working memory capacity (updating) 
is needed when using Type 2 (but not for Type 1) processing (Evans, 2006; 2012).    
 
A brain region of interest for executive functioning and decision-making processes that 
tap the dual-process framework is the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) which 
has been reliably associated with these decision-making processes (Dockery et al., 
2009; Tayeb & Lavidor, 2016). More specifically, a lateralization has been suggested: 
the left DLPFC is involved in self-regulation (Mengarelli et al., 2015), affective 
modulation (Hare et al., 2009) and attentional processing (Goel et al., 2006), whilst the 
right DLPFC has a role in impulsivity control (Loftus et al., 2015), cognitive control 
(Santarnecchi, Rossi, & Rossi, 2015) and set-shifting (i.e., the manipulation of mental 
models) (Loftus et al., 2015). The latter two aspects of cognitive processing are 
conceived of as important executive functions (Miyake et al., 2000), which are 
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implicated in judgement and decision-making performance (e.g., Type 2 processing, 
(Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011).  
 
In Experiment 1, the effect of tDCS on performance in cognitive reflection and 
judgement tasks was examined. In addition, a series of belief bias syllogisms were 
used that consist of two short premises and a conclusion which vary in congruence 
with prior beliefs, differing in whether there was a conflict or no conflict between logic 
and belief (De Neys, 2006; Trippas, Verde, & Handley, 2014). One measure obtained 
by the belief-bias is the so-called logic index, indicating a participant’s ability to reason 
using presumably mental simulation: the ability to maintain and symbolically 
manipulate separate mental representations of a problem (Stupple, Ball, Evans, & 
Kamal-Smith, 2011; Stupple, Ball, & Ellis, 2013). Some approaches in the dual-
process framework (e.g., Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2013) implicate mental 
simulation performance with successful Type 2 processing (in addition to inhibition 
performance).  
 
In a within-subjects design decision-making was measured following twenty minutes 
of anodal tDCS (a-tDCS) over the right DLPFC or sham. It was hypothesised that 
increasing the cortical excitability of the right DLPFC would boost Type 2 performance, 
in particular inhibition performance, thus increasing cognitive reflection scores and 
reducing heuristic thinking in the heuristics and biases tasks. For the syllogistic 
reasoning it was predicted that the logic index should be affected by stimulation, but 
here performance would be less reliant on inhibition (right DLPFC). Crucially, the 
prediction is that if Type 1 processing is dissociable from Type 2 processing 
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(Stanovich, 2013) then one would predict that only the right DLPFC would benefit 
performance scores. In short, where Oldrati et al., (2016) stimulation studies aimed to 
increase Type 1 responses, our study aimed to test whether right anodal DLPFC 
stimulation increases Type 2 responses. 
 
5.2 Research questions 
It was asked whether the intuitive thinking (Type 1), cognitive reflection (Type 2), 
inhibition (Numerical Stroop), risk-taking behaviour (BART) and working memory (2-
back) are modified by anodal tDCS of the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (right 
DLPFC). Furthermore, it was asked how any modulation of the aforementioned 
influences decision processes in the dual-processing framework of decision-making.  
 
Research question 1 
Does online anodal tDCS of the right DLPFC affect decision-making bias (belief bias, 
heuristics and biases battery)?   
Prediction 1: anodal stimulation of the right DLPFC will decrease decision-making bias 
as shown by higher accuracy scores during stimulation for the belief bias and 
heuristics and biases battery compared to sham. 
 
Research question 2 
Does online anodal tDCS of the right DLPFC affect cognitive reflection as measured 
by the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)? 
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Prediction 2: anodal stimulation of the right DLPFC will increase CRT performance as 
shown by higher accuracy during stimulation compared to sham. 
 
Research question 3 
Does offline anodal tDCS of the right DLPFC affect working memory (i.e., updating) 
as measured by the 2-back? 
Prediction 3: offline anodal stimulation of the right DLPFC will increase working 
memory performance as shown by higher accuracy in the 2-back after stimulation 
compared to sham. 
 
Research question 4 
Does offline anodal tDCS of the right DLPFC affect the inhibition of pre-potent 
responses in the numerical Stroop? 
Prediction 4: offline anodal stimulation of the right DLPFC will increase inhibitory 
control of pre-potent responses as shown by higher accuracy in the numerical Stroop 
after stimulation compared to sham. 
 
Research question 5 
Does offline anodal tDCS of the right DLPFC affect risk-taking behaviour as measured 
by the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART)? 
Prediction 5: offline anodal stimulation of the right DLPFC will decrease risk-taking 
performance as shown by lower BART scores after stimulation compared to sham. 
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5.3 Methodology 
5.3.1 Design 
This experiment adopted a within-subjects design. The independent between-subjects 
variable was stimulation group (anodal right DLPFC or sham). Stimulation began 
immediately before the start of the behavioural tasks and continued for the duration of 
the first block of tasks only, lasting twenty minutes in total (online tasks) (Figure 5.1). 
A second block of offline tasks were completed after stimulation ended lasting 
approximately thirty minutes. The total time of stimulation and current intensity (1.5mA) 
was within the safety recommendations and standard experimental protocols (Nitsche 
et al., 2003). No participant reported adverse effects of tDCS. Sham and experimental 
conditions were randomised. All tasks were counterbalanced within each block. It was 
not possible to counterbalance block 1 with block 2 as one cannot have offline 
stimulation before online stimulation. As the main tasks of interest for this experiment 
were the decision-making tasks these remained in the online stimulation block 
throughout the experiment. 
 
Figure 5.1. Block procedure of this experiment. Arrows denote time course. The Cognitive 
Reflection Test, belief bias syllogisms, heuristics and biases battery (containing 
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representativeness vignettes) and Balloon Analogue Risk Task were issued to participants 
during stimulation (online) in block 1. The 2-back, numerical Stroop and Remote Associative 
Task were use after the cessation of stimulation (offline) in block 2. All tasks were 
counterbalanced during data collection. 
 
5.3.2 Participants 
Thirty participants were recruited through advertising and word-of-mouth on campus 
at The University of East London (mean age = 29.47 ± 7.35 years; mean; 21 females). 
Participants attended two sessions at approximately the same time of day in 
consecutive weeks due to circadian factors as a source of noise (Ridding & Ziemann, 
2010). Each of these sessions were counterbalanced across participants, including 
sham. 
 
A power analysis calculation using G Power 3.0 revealed that a sample size of 18 
participants was needed to reach a significant result. This was based on a medium 
effect size of f = 0.30, according to the convention set out by Cohen (1969, p348), and 
an alpha (α) significance level of p = 0.05 in a within-subjects design experiment with 
a total of 6 measures and 2 conditions.    
 
The inclusion criteria were (i) aged 18 years or above; (ii) fluent English speakers; (iii) 
right-handed; (iv) naïve to tDCS and (v) naïve to the behavioural tasks used. The 
exclusion criteria were (i) history of seizures; (ii) family history of seizures; (iii) past or 
present neurological history; (iv) past or present psychiatric history; (v) part head injury 
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or surgery; (vi) metal implants; (vii) current medication usage; (viii) drug or alcohol 
dependence; (ix) pregnancy and (x) past training in logic during a university course.  
 
All participants gave informed written consent before entering the study, which was 
approved by The University of East London (UEL) Research Ethics Committee. After 
giving consent participants completed a demographic form containing information 
about sex (male, female or do not wish to say), age, religiosity (yes or no), paranormal 
beliefs (yes or no) and education level – self reported highest current education level 
(Table 5.1). Participants were asked about religiosity based on the dual-process 
framework literature that suggest that high levels of religiosity positively correlates with 
high levels of intuitive thinking on the CRT (Pennycook et al., 2012; Razmyar & Reeve, 
2013).   
 
Table 5.1. Demographics and cognitive characteristics. 
Demographic variable 
Sex (F/M) 21/9  
Age 29.47 (7.35)  
Religious (Yes/No) 15/15  
Paranormal belief (Yes/No) 17/13  
Education 6.03 (1.00)  
Education represents qualification level. Abbreviations: Standard Deviations (SD), females 
(F), males (M). 
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5.3.3 tDCS montage and parameters 
TDCS was delivered using a battery-driven stimulator device (Neuroelectrics, 
Barcelona) using two sponge electrodes (anodal and return) each circular with a 
surface area of 25cm2. Electrodes were soaked in a saline solution. Skin preparation 
and electrode placement were in accordance with established procedures. The tDCS 
montage was dependent upon the stimulation condition (anodal electrode – return 
electrode): (i) right DLPFC left DLPFC or (ii) sham condition. The electrodes were 
placed over the F4 (for right DLPFC) or / and F3 (for left DLPFC) according to the EEG 
10-20 international system.  
 
Throughout this thesis the convention of referring to the tDCS electrode that is not at 
the stimulation site of interest (i.e., the right DLPFC in this experiment) as the return 
electrode is used (Woods et al., 2016). This convention is used here as it disingenuous 
to discuss either ‘anodal tDCS’ or ‘cathodal tDCS’ without referring to the presence of 
the return electrode, as assuming that the current flow beneath any electrode into the 
cortex is simply unidirectional (without considering brain morphology) is misleading 
(Bikson et al., 2011; Antal et al., 2017).    
 
In the stimulation condition a constant current of 1.5mA was administered for twenty 
minutes. There was a gradual increase and decrease of 15 seconds each at the onset 
of offset of stimulation to decrease the likelihood of discomfort. For sham, the two 
electrodes were placed over F3 and F4 but stimulation only became active for the 30 
second duration of the onset and offset, after which the stimulation ceased and the 
electrodes remained in place.  
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The sham procedure (with an identical electrode montage to the experiment condition)  
was in line with previous procedures and has been shown to be effective in inducing 
the slight tDCS-associated physiological sensations such as a tingling feeling which 
last for a few seconds during real stimulation (Ambrus et al., 2012).  
 
Due to time constraints during data collection and laboratory consumable resources 
(i.e., funding for the payment of participants) it was not possible to run a third 
experimental group as an active control group. The addition of an active control in an 
experiment in which the main experimental group involves the stimulation of the right 
DLPFC would involve the anodal stimulation of an area such as the occipital lobe with 
the return (reference) electrode over the right DLPFC. Experiment 2 (Chapter 6) 
contains an experimental group with the opposite polarity to the experimental group in 
this experiment, as such this in part excludes the need for an active control group. 
 
After the completion of the judgement and decision-making tasks all of the electrodes 
were removed and the remaining tasks began (i.e., during offline stimulation). This 
procedure was chosen because it has been previously shown to be effective in 
reducing risk-taking (Fecteau, Knoch, et al., 2007; Cheng & Lee, 2015).  
 
5.3.4 Materials and measures 
All materials and measures used in this study were established tasks from the 
literature (see Appendix A). The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) (Oldrati et al., 2016), 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) (Cheng & Lee, 2015),  n-back (Hill et al., 2016) 
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and belief bias syllogisms (Tsujii, Sakatani, Masuda, Akiyama, & Watanabe, 2011) 
have been used in previous neuromodulation studies. The heuristics and biases 
battery, including representativeness, availability, framing, sample size, sunk cost, 
outcome and ratio biases with the conjunction and gambler’s fallacy have been used 
in the judgement and decision-making literature but not with neuromodulation prior to 
this study (Toplak et al., 2011; Oldrati et al., 2016). For details and examples of each 
of these heuristics and biases, other than the representativeness vignettes, see 
appendix A. The representativeness vignette description is below.     
 
5.3.4.1 Online tasks 
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) (detailed in Chapter 4, page 64) and Balloon 
Analogue Risk Task (BART; detailed in Chapter 4, page 65) were administered in this 
study. The CRT consisted of a total of 6 items, split into 2 parts of 3 items and given 
to participants over the 2 testing sessions. There was a maximum score of 3 per 
session. The number of items for the CRT was motivated by the limited number of 
CRT items available at the time of data collection for Experiment 1 – a total of 7 items 
from Frederick (2005) and Toplak et al., (2011). As 7 items could not be split into two 
equal parts the ‘Bat and Ball’ item was excluded from Experiment 1. The BART 
contained a practice of 10 trials, before starting a total of sixty balloon trials per 
experimental session. 
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Heuristic-and-bias battery (including representativeness). 
Heuristics and biases are decision-making aids that require little effort or cognitive 
resources to use (Amos Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Toplak et al., 2011). These 
heuristics rely on the automatic process of Type 1 thinking. Participants saw short 
vignettes or questions that have been used in the heuristics and biases literature 
before and choose a response.     
 
A total of fifteen heuristics and biases were issued to participants per session on a 
computer and the ten ratio bias items were administered on paper. The heuristics and 
biases were the availability heuristic (2 items), conjunction fallacy (2 items), framing 
bias (2 items), gambler’s fallacy (1 item), outcome bias (2 items), representativeness 
heuristic (3 items), sample size bias (1 item), and the sunk cost bias (2 items). 
 
Representativeness (incongruent base-rate) vignettes: The representativeness 
heuristic, also called incongruent base-rate vignettes (Grether, 1980; Teigen & Keren, 
2007) shows that when presented with base-rate information (e.g., the probability of 
independent events or attributes occurring) and specific information (i.e., a stereotype 
of an occupation) participants ignore the former in favour of the latter (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1973; Teovanović, Knežević, & Stankov, 2015).  
 
As mentioned above (under the heuristics and biases section) a total of 3 
representativeness vignettes were issued to participants per session. 
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Belief bias syllogisms: Belief bias syllogisms are a behavioural measure of the 
susceptibility of logic to interference from believability (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005). 
Participants view two premises (e.g., ALL ROSES NEED WATER and PLANTS NEED 
WATER) with a conclusion (e.g., THEREFORE, ROSES ARE PLANTS). Participants 
must respond by deciding if they accept the conclusion (Čavojová, 2015).  
 
At analysis responses were transformed to indicate if participants accepted or did not 
accept the conclusion (from whether they thought the conclusion was valid or invalid)  
using the following indices. For scoring and subsequent parametric analyses, a logic 
index and a belief index were calculated (Stupple et al., 2011; 2013). The logic index 
is the difference between the acceptance of valid and invalid conclusions, with larger 
indices being indicative of greater belief bias. The belief index is the difference 
between the acceptance of believable and unbelievable conclusions, with large 
indices indicating greater belief bias. 
 
A total of sixteen belief bias syllogisms were administered to participants per session. 
There were 4 syllogisms for each of the following types of syllogisms: valid-believable, 
valid-unbelievable, invalid-believable, and invalid-unbelievable. 
 
5.3.4.2 Offline tasks 
n-back  
The n-back is a behavioural measure of working memory capacity (Kirchner, 1958; 
Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Perrig, & Meier, 2010). Working memory capacity is measured 
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by presenting a continuous sequence of stimuli with a load factor of ‘n’ that can be 
adjusted to make the task harder or easier (Jaeggi et al., 2010). The stimuli consist of 
a single letter (e.g., A or B) in the centre of a computer monitor. Participants are 
instructed to remember the sequence of letters and report any repetitions with the load 
factor n. In the 2-back that was used in this study the load factor was 2 (2-back). 
Participants responded to letters that had been repeated 2 steps before (e.g., T L H C 
O K I K). 
Five practice trials preceded a total of thirty main trials per experimental session.  
 
Numerical Stroop  
The numerical Stroop is a variant of the original colour-word Stroop (Stroop, 1935; 
Besner & Coltheart, 1979; Girelli, Sandrini, Cappa, Butterworth, 2001). Participants 
view an instruction that says to report either the number of words (e.g., 3 = ONE ONE 
ONE) or the value of words (e.g., 2 = TWO). Only the words / numbers ‘One’, ‘Two’ 
and ‘Three’ were used during this task. Word stimuli were presented in the centre of 
the screen for one second each in sequence that consisted of thirty incongruent and 
thirty congruent words. Each condition (incongruent or congruent) were 
counterbalanced.  
 
Before starting this task, participants completed 5 practice trials ensure that they 
understood the instructions. A total of thirty main trials were then administered to 
participants per session. Although this task was administered during Experiment 1 this 
was not analysed due to programming issues.  
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Remote Associative Test (RAT) 
The Remote Associative Test (RAT) was originally designed to measure creativity 
(Mednick, Mednick, & Mednick, 1964). In the decision-making literature the RAT has 
been adapted to measure insight (Suzuki & Usher, 2009; Yang, Yang, & Isen, 2013). 
Participants view a triad of words (e.g., CREAM, AFTERNOON and CLOTH) and must 
think of a forth word that can connect the triad together (e.g., TEA). The word that the 
participant thinks of can go before or after each of the triad words (e.g., CREAM TEA, 
AFTERNOON TEA or TEA CLOTH).  
 
A total of ten-word pairs were administered to participants per session as a paper and 
pen task. Participants were limited to a maximum duration of ten minutes for the RAT. 
Answers were classified in terms of accuracy across the ten-word pairs. 
 
No decision-making tasks were administered to participants more than once across 
this experiment. All data collection recorded in Experiment was based on accuracy 
rather than reaction time. Accuracy was chosen here without reaction time because 
the administration of the CRT in Experiment 1 was done through paper and pen.  
 
5.4 Results 
The raw data were screened for outliers and missing values before conducting any 
analysis. Outliers were identified as data points outside of the 1.5 interquartile (IQR) 
range. There were no missing values.  
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Correlations 
Bivariate correlations among all variables were computed. The correlations among the 
variables were low (all rs < 0.60). In line with Frederick (2005), Cokely and Kelley 
(2009) and Gómez-Chacón, García-Madruga, Vila, Elosúa, and Rodríguez, (2014) 
positive correlations were predicted between the measures of cognitive reflection and 
thinking (CRT, representativeness correct answers and belief bias syllogism accepted 
answers). Correlations among cognitive variables for the right DLPFC stimulation 
condition are presented in Table 5.2 and all correlations for the sham condition are 
presented in Table 5.3. For demographic variables see Table 5.1 in section 5.3.2.  
 
Table 5.2. Correlations between all thinking task variables for the stimulation condition.  
 Cognitive variables 
 1 2 3 4  
1. CRT  -0.17 0.03 -0.10  
2. Representativeness   0.05 0.04  
3. Logic index    -0.34  
4. Belief index      
Abbreviations: Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). No correlates for cognitive variables were significant 
below p < 0.05. 
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Table 5.3. Correlations between all thinking task variables and demographics for the sham 
condition.  
 Cognitive variables  
 1 2 3 4   
1. CRT  -0.21 -0.08 0.12   
2. Representativeness   -0.10 0.20   
3. Logic index    -0.05   
4. Belief index       
Abbreviations: Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). No correlates for cognitive variables were significant 
below p < 0.05. 
For all analyses that follow assumptions were checked during analysis including the 
distribution of the data. No assumptions were violated unless otherwise stated. 
 
For the tasks tapping cognitive reflection performance (Cognitive Reflection Test and 
Representativeness) there was a maximum score of 3 items per task per session. A 
two-way repeated measures ANOVA was run with type of stimulation (right DLPFC or 
sham) and thinking task performance (Cognitive Reflection Test and 
Representativeness) as within-subjects variables.  
 
There was a statistical main effect of stimulation on thinking task performance, F (1, 
29) = 10.36, p = 0.01, partial η2 = 0.26. Performance on the thinking tasks improved 
after the stimulation of the right DLPFC compared to sham (Figure 5.2). 
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There was also a statistically significant main effect of the type of task across 
stimulation conditions, F(1, 29) = 6.91 p = 0.01, partial η2 = 0.20. CRT and 
representativeness performance with higher performance for the representativeness 
(stimulation: M = 2.00, SD = 1.11, sham: M = 1.43, SD = 1.13) compared to the CRT 
across stimulation conditions (stimulation: M = 1.30, SD = 0.87, sham: M = 0.86, SD 
= 0.90). 
 
Follow-up t-tests showed that CRT performance was statistically higher in the right 
DLPFC stimulation condition (M = 1.30, SD = 0.87) than sham (M = 0.86, SD = 0.90) 
condition, t(29) = 2.04, p = 0.051. The second follow-up t-test revealed that 
representativeness vignette performance was higher in the right DLPFC stimulation 
condition (M = 2.00, SD = 1.11.) than sham (M = 1.43, SD = 1.13) condition, t(29) = 
2.54, p = 0.017. 
 
There was no 2-way interaction between stimulation condition and task, F(1, 29) = 
0.20 p = 0.66, partial η2 = 0.01. 
An analysis was also run for logarithmic transformations on the performance scores.  
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Figure 5.2. Effects of tDCS on thinking task performance. The panels show the effect of tDCS 
(sham or right DLPFC) on mean correct answers for the Cognitive Reflection Test (panel A) 
and mean correct answers for the representativeness (incongruent base-rate) (panel B). High 
values denote high levels of analytic thinking. Significance levels from follow-up t-tests, error 
bars denote standard errors from the mean: an asterisk denotes p < 0.05. Abbreviations: 
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC).  
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A second repeated measures ANOVA was run to examine the effects of stimulation 
on the logic index (maximum score of sixteen items per task in a session). Stimulation 
condition (right DLPFC or sham) was the within-subjects variable. There was no main 
effect of stimulation on the logic index, F(1, 29) = 1.54, p = 0.22, partial η2 = 0.05.  
 
The next repeated measures ANOVA examined the effects of stimulation on the belief 
index (maximum score of sixteen items per task in a session). Stimulation condition 
(right DLPFC or sham) was the within-subjects variable. There was no main effect of 
stimulation on the belief index, F(1, 29) = 1.20, p = 0.30, partial η2 = 0.04.  
 
For the intuitive incorrect answers in tasks tapping cognitive reflection performance 
(Cognitive Reflection Test and representativeness), a two-way repeated measures 
ANOVA was run with type of stimulation (right DLPFC or sham) and intuitive incorrect 
thinking task scores (Cognitive Reflection Test and representativeness) as within-
subjects variables.  
 
There was a significant main effect of stimulation on the number of intuitive answers, 
F(1, 29) = 5.52, p = 0.02, partial η2 = 0.16. Intuitive responding decreased after 
stimulation of the right DLPFC compared to sham (Figure 5.3).There was no effect of 
the type of task across stimulation conditions, F(1, 29) = 1.68 p = 0.20, partial η2 = 
0.05. 
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The follow-up t-test for the intuitive CRT answers revealed that there was no difference 
between answers for the CRT after stimulation (M = 0.90, SD = 0.76), compared to 
sham (M = 1.13, SD = 0.90), t(29) = -1.10, p = 0.30. 
 
The follow-up t-test for the intuitive representativeness sores found that there was a 
statistically significant difference between scores after stimulation compared to sham, 
t(29) = -2.54, p = 0.017. Intuitive responding decreased after the stimulation of the 
right DLPFC (M = 1.00, SD = 1.11) compared to sham (M = 1.56, SD = 1.13).  
 
There was also no 2-way interaction between stimulation condition and intuitive task 
scores, F(1, 29) = 1.50 p = 0.23, partial η2 = 0.05. 
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Figure 5.3. Effects of tDCS on intuitive incorrect thinking task performance. The panels show 
the effect of tDCS (sham or right DLPFC) on mean intuitive incorrect answers for the Cognitive 
Reflection Test (panel A) and mean intuitive incorrect answers for the representativeness 
(incongruent base-rate) (panel B). High values denote high levels of intuitive thinking. 
Significance levels from follow-up t-tests, error bars denote standard errors from the mean: an 
asterisk denotes p < 0.05. Abbreviations: Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). 
 
Daniel Edgcumbe [Chapter 5 – Experiment 1] 
102 
  
Overall, the analyses showed that participants in the sham condition provided the 
fewest correct answers and that during anodal stimulation of the right DLPFC the 
number of correct answers increased compared to sham (Figure 5.4).  
 
Figure 5.4. Effects of tDCS on Type 1 and Type 2 thinking task performance for the CRT. The 
effect of tDCS (sham or right DLPFC) on mean correct answers and mean intuitive incorrect 
answers for the Cognitive Reflection Test. High values for correct answers denote high levels 
of analytic thinking and high values for intuitive incorrect answers denote high levels of intuitive 
thinking. Significance levels from follow-up t-tests, error bars denote standard errors from the 
mean: an asterisk denotes p < 0.05. Abbreviations: Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). 
 
The next repeated measures ANOVA examined the effect of stimulation (sham or right 
DLPFC) on risk-taking as measured by the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART). 
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There was no effect of stimulation on risk-taking performance, F(1, 29) = 2.53, p = 
0.12, partial η2 = 0.08.  
 
The penultimate repeated measures ANOVA examined the effect of stimulation (sham 
or right DLPFC) on updating in the 2-back working memory task. There was no effect 
of stimulation on 2-back performance, F(1, 29) = 0.17, p  = 0.67, partial η2 = 0.01.  
 
The final repeated measures ANOVA examined the effect of stimulation (sham or right 
DLPFC) on insight in the RAT. There was no effect of stimulation on RAT performance, 
F(1, 29) = 0.74, p  = 0.40, partial η2 = 0.04.  
 
5.5 Discussion 
This experiment showed that online anodal tDCS to the right DLPFC improved 
judgement and decision-making performance. The effect of stimulation was evident 
from the comparison with sham in which CRT and representativeness tasks improved 
suggesting improved Type 2 processing.  
 
An important note here is that an increase in Type 2 processing is not necessarily the 
same as an increase in Type 1 processing – when using the CRT participants can 
respond in three ways: with a correct answer (Type 2), intuitive incorrect answer (Type 
1) or an incorrect answer (neither Type 1 nor Type 2) (Frederick 2005; Toplak, West, 
and Stanovich 2011). If increasing Type 2 processing was the same as decreasing 
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Type 1 processing then there would be no third option when responding to CRT items. 
This emphasises the importance of these findings – that stimulation of the right DLPFC 
boosts Type 2 processing whilst not decreasing Type 1 processing here.  
 
The main prediction was that online anodal tDCS of the right DLPFC would increase 
performance on judgement and decision-making tasks resulting in correct answers. 
This was based on the assumption for a role of the right DLPFC in executive functions 
that are associated with judgement and decision-making (Loftus et al., 2015; 
Santarnecchi et al., 2015). In particular, set-shifting (Tayeb & Lavidor, 2016), inhibition 
(Reteig et al., 2017) and working memory (updating) (Hill et al., 2016) - all crucial for 
the production of correct answers in the CRT and heuristics and biases battery (Evans, 
2008; Toplak et al., 2011).  
 
Importantly, there was no effect of stimulation of the right DLPFC on the belief bias 
syllogisms. A possible explanation for this is that unlike the CRT and heuristics and 
biases tasks our belief bias syllogisms did not require the inhibition of pre-potent 
responses (Frederick, 2005; Stupple et al., 2011; Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016). 
To correctly answer a belief bias syllogism, one must assess the premises and the 
conclusion and decide whether a conclusion is acceptable or not (West et al., 2008; 
Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014).  
 
Furthermore, there was no effect of online stimulation on risk-taking behaviour, as 
measured by the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) (Lejuez et al., 2002) or insight 
in the RAT (Mednick, Mednick, & Mednick, 1964). The meta-analysis and systematic 
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review in Chapter 4 found an effect of stimulation of the left frontal lobe, not the right 
DLPFC on risk-taking decision-making. At the time of commencing the first experiment 
the meta-analysis had not been completed so the right DLPFC was chosen as the site 
of stimulation because some of the papers included, found an effect of 
neuromodulation of the right DLPFC on risk-taking decision-making (Fecteau, Knoch, 
et al., 2007; Cheng & Lee, 2015).  
 
It is possible that the stimulation only modulated decision-making that requires 
inhibitory control over pre-potent responses (e.g., as in the CRT), and not those that 
do not (e.g., as in the BART), as the right DLPFC is involved in inhibitory control 
(Santarnecchi et al., 2015). This increase in the cortical excitation in the right DLPFC 
therefore did not affect decision-making that is reliant on belief-based and logic-based 
reasoning (e.g., belief bias syllogisms), or risk-taking (e.g., BART) alone.    
 
Limitations of this experiment were the bilateral tDCS montage in which the electrodes 
were positioned on contralateral hemispheres – the right DLPFC and left DLPFC. 
Some researchers may consider this a limitation and argue that any effect of 
stimulation was due to the decrease in excitability under the return electrode, and the 
increase in excitability at the site of the anode electrode. This bilateral montage was 
chosen for this experiment after the successful use of this montage in Hecht, Walsh, 
and Lavidor, (2013) and Minati, Campanhã, Critchley, & Boggio, (2012), in which this 
electrode arrangement reduced risk-taking decision-making. Experiment 2 examines 
this electrode montage further with the use of opposing (e.g., right DLPFC with left 
DLPFC, then left DLPFC with right DLPFC) stimulation parameters. The results of the 
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bilateral right DLPFC and left DLPFC condition with sham. At the task level, a limitation 
was the small number of cognitive reflection task items that were available at the time 
of testing. When conducting this experiment there were a total of seven cognitive 
reflection test items available which were split into two sets of three for the two testing 
sessions. Since conducting this experiment more cognitive reflection test items have 
been published (Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016). 
 
5.6 Summary 
This experiment is the first experimental evidence of the involvement of the right 
DLPFC in judgement and decision-making tasks. Online stimulation of the right 
DLPFC boosted Type 2 processing resulting in improved correct answers for the 
cognitive reflection test and representativeness tasks.    
 
In the next chapter (Chapter 6) experiment 2 builds on the results from the first 
experiment (this chapter). The next chapter does this by firstly, increasing the number 
of CRT items from six to twenty, secondly by including CRT items that both rely on, 
and do not rely on numeracy skill, and finally, by using offline neuromodulation only – 
as opposed to both online and offline stimulation in this chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
The effect of tDCS modulation on cognitive reflection and 
thinking disposition in Stanovich’s tripartite model (2009) 
 
6.1 Background   
The results of Experiment 1 revealed that the right DLPFC is involved in Type 2 
decision-making such as cognitive reflection (Chapter 5). Anodal neuromodulation of 
the right DLPFC significantly improved performance in the CRT and 
representativeness vignettes. There was no change to executive functioning, as 
measured by the n-back, after stimulation. Experiment 2 examines the neural 
correlates of the dual-process framework of judgement and decision-making by 
building on Experiment 1 with an expanded battery of decision-making tasks (the CRT, 
verbal CRT, belief bias syllogisms and representativeness vignettes) and additional 
executive function tasks (the n-back with levels of 2 and 3, plus the Attention Switching 
Task). These tasks are all involved in crucial components of dual-process framework, 
in particular Stanovich’s tripartite model (Stanovich, 2009).    
 
As discussed in Chapter 3 (see section 2.1.4.3 – Stanovich’s tripartite model), some 
of the variance in CRT performance was explained by thinking dispositions (Stanovich, 
2009; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011; Baron, Scott, Fincher, & Metz, 2015) and 
cognitive ability (Nelson and Willison 1991). Thinking dispositions are the tendency 
towards patterns of thinking that are based on individual differences (Ennis, 1962), 
whilst cognitive ability (i.e., intelligence) is the ability to acquire and manipulate new 
information. For example, actively open-minded thinking (AOT) represents the 
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willingness to change one’s mind after assimilating new information which conflicts 
with a previously held view. Individuals who score highly on the AOT scale (Baron et 
al., 2015) are thus open-minded to new information, and high AOT scores have been 
positively correlated with performance in the CRT and belief bias syllogistic reasoning 
(Campitelli & Labollita, 2010). This experiment accounted for potential relationships 
with thinking disposition, using the AOT scale (Baron, 1985) and Rational Experiential 
Inventory (REI) (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996). Like the AOT, the REI is 
a thinking disposition that positively correlates with tasks such as the CRT that 
measure cognitive reflection (Liberali et al. 2012).  Cognitive ability was examined 
using the National Adult Reading Test (Crawford, Parker, Stewart, Besson, & Lacey, 
1989; Nelson & Willison, 1991). These thinking dispositions and the cognitive ability 
measure (NART) are used as cognitive characteristics in this experiment to examine 
whether there are any a priori differences between experimental groups – to the best 
of my knowledge this is the first stimulation experiment to control for individual 
differences (now published as Edgcumbe et al., 2019). By controlling for these 
cognitive characteristics there can be certainty about the source of any effects of 
stimulation on cognitive reflection – if there is no difference between experimental 
groups for cognitive characteristics than the change in cognitive reflection can only be 
explained by the stimulation (as opposed to cognitive characteristics).     
 
This experiment is motivated by Stanovich's (2009) tripartite model of decision-
making. Crucially, this model divides Type 2 thinking between the reflective mind (i.e. 
where thinking dispositions reside) and the algorithmic mind (i.e., the source cognitive 
ability). The separation of Type 2 thinking into these minds therefore enables the 
relationship between the properties of these minds (thinking disposition or cognitive 
Daniel Edgcumbe [Chapter 6 – Experiment 2] 
109 
  
ability) to be assessed with cognitive reflection. From this model one can predict that 
when two individuals with the same level of cognitive ability (the algorithmic mind) 
answer CRT questions, differences in their Type 2 performance can be explained by 
differences in thinking disposition (the reflective mind). Between these two individuals, 
low performance on the AOT thinking disposition, causes the reflective mind to 
override the algorithmic mind, resulting in an incorrect answer to the CRT. The second 
person with high inclination to reflective thinking would be more likely to answer the 
CRT correctly. At the lower level of this model Type 1 thinking is as in other dual-
process models with no separation of this process (see section 3.1.4.3) (Evans 2006; 
Pennycook, Fugelsang, and Koehler 2015).    
 
In the only other experiment to combine tDCS and the CRT, other than those contained 
in this thesis (at the time of running Experiment 2), Oldrati, Patricelli, Colombo, and 
Antonietti, (2016) applied cathodal tDCS to the left DLPFC (with a contralateral return 
electrode). They reported that cathodal stimulation of the left DLPFC was associated 
with an increase in Type 1 thinking, as measured by incorrect intuitive answers on the 
CRT. To build on the work of Oldrati et al., Experiment 2 included a left DLPFC 
stimulation group in which anodal stimulation was applied to this region. In line with 
the findings of Oldrati one would predict that Type 1 thinking should decrease after the 
stimulation of the left DLPFC.  
 
A further addition to Experiment 2 which builds on the findings of Experiment 1 is to 
investigate any differences in numeracy-based cognitive reflection (Frederick, 2005; 
Toplak et al., 2011) and cognitive reflection without numeracy (Thomson & 
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Oppenheimer, 2016; Sirota, Kostovicova, Juanchich, Marshall, & Dewberry, 2017). 
The reason for including numeracy-based and none-numeracy based CRT items is 
that some theorists suggest that performance on the CRT can be explained by 
numeracy ability alone (Liberali et al. 2012; Sinayev and Peters 2015), for example, 
those who score highly on tests of numeracy also score highly on the CRT. This line 
of reasoning is supported by the positive correlations between numeracy and CRT 
performance that are reported in many studies (Cokely and Kelley 2009; Thomson 
and Oppenheimer 2016). The original version of the CRT (hereafter called the CRT) 
that was published by Frederick (2005) and then built on by Toplak et al., (2011) solely 
contains CRT items in which mathematical ability is needed to correctly respond with 
the Type 2 solution. Several CRT items that do not require numeracy / mathematics 
to complete have since been created (hereafter called the verbal CRT) (Sirota et al., 
2017). This experiment includes both versions of the CRT so that the effects of 
stimulation on the right DLPFC can be examined with either version of the CRT. By 
including both versions of the CRT, the involvement of numeracy in CRT performance 
was examined.    
 
In order to investigate the involvement of executive functions in the dual-process 
framework of judgement and decision-making inhibition and updating tasks were 
included in this experiment. As in Experiment 1 (Chapter 5) the n-back was used to 
examine updating (Jaeggi et al. 2010) whilst the Attention Switching Task (AST) was 
used to assess inhibition (Hanania and Smith 2010). One explanation for not finding 
an effect of stimulation of the right DLPFC on the 2-back in Experiment 1 was that 
participants found the task to be too easy, and a ceiling effect pattern was supported 
by the high performance on this task. A harder version of the n-back, with a level of 3 
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(i.e., the 3-back) was therefore used alongside the 2-back in this experiment. As 
updating (n-back) and inhibition (AST) are both critical executive functions that 
underpin the dual-process framework it was predicted that as Type 2 thinking 
performance increases so does inhibition and updating.  
 
In a between-subjects design, decision-making performance was measured following 
offline anodal tDCS applied bilaterally to either the left DLPFC, right DLPFC or a sham 
stimulation. The reasons for the change from online (Experiment 1) to offline 
stimulation (Experiment 2) was twofold: (i) Oldtrati et al., (2016) used offline stimulation 
so the efficacy of this form of neuromodulation was examined here, and (ii) offline 
stimulation increases the data collection duration from twenty minutes to forty minutes. 
With the increased data collection duration, more tasks (e.g., the AST) could be 
administered to achieve the aims of this experiment, compared to Experiment 1 
(Chapter 5). It was hypothesised that anodal tDCS to the right DLPFC would inhibit 
Type 1 processing, thus increasing cognitive reflection scores and reducing heuristic 
thinking. In contrast, syllogistic reasoning (as measured by the logic index) would be 
affected by stimulation of the left DLPFC rather than the right DLPFC as this type of 
reasoning has been associated with left frontal activation (Goel et al. 2009; Luo et al. 
2014), performance here does not rely on the inhibition of pre-potent Type 1 thinking 
(Luo et al. 2014). Crucially, the prediction was that if Type 1 processing is dissociable 
from Type 2 processing, then only anodal stimulation to the right DLPFC would 
improve Type 2 performance.  
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6.2 Research questions 
It was asked whether the intuitive thinking (Type 1), cognitive reflection (Type 2), 
inhibition (Attention Switching Task), and working memory (2-back & 3-back) are 
modified by anodal tDCS of the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (right DLPFC) and 
/ or the left DLPFC. Furthermore, the aforementioned processes are discussed with 
reference to Stanovich's tripartite model (2009).  
 
Research question 1 
Does offline anodal tDCS of the right DLPFC enhance cognitive reflection as 
measured by the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) and representativeness 
(incongruent base-rate) vignettes? 
Prediction 1: offline anodal stimulation of the right DLPFC will increase Type 2 
responses as shown by higher accuracy scores for the enhanced CRT and 
representativeness vignettes after stimulation compared to sham. 
 
Research question 2 
Does offline anodal tDCS of the right DLPFC enhance cognitive reflection in the verbal 
CRT? 
Prediction 2: offline anodal stimulation of the right DLPFC will increase cognitive 
reflection that does not rely on numeracy as shown by higher accuracy scores after 
stimulation for the verbal-CRT compared to sham. 
 
Daniel Edgcumbe [Chapter 6 – Experiment 2] 
113 
  
Research question 3 
Does offline anodal tDCS of the right DLPFC or left DLPFC moderate decision-making 
that has no cognitive reflection (e.g., syllogistic reasoning)? 
Prediction 3: offline anodal stimulation of the right DLPFC will increase decision-
making that does not rely on cognitive reflection as shown by higher accuracy scores 
for syllogistic reasoning after stimulation compared to sham. 
 
Research question 4 
Does offline anodal tDCS of the left DLPFC enhance or inhibit cognitive reflection as 
measured by the CRT, verbal-CRT and / or representativeness (incongruent base-
rate) vignettes? 
Prediction 4: offline anodal stimulation of the left DLPFC will increase cognitive 
reflection as shown by higher accuracy for the CRT, verbal-CRT and 
representativeness vignettes after stimulation compared to sham. 
 
Research question 5 
Does offline anodal tDCS of the right DLPFC or left DLPFC affect working memory 
(updating) as measured by the 2-back and 3-back? 
Prediction 5: offline anodal stimulation of the right and left DLPFCs will increase 
working memory performance as shown by higher accuracy after stimulation for the 2-
back and 3-back compared to sham. 
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Research question 6 
Does offline anodal tDCS of the right DLPFC or left DLPFC affect the inhibition of pre-
potent responses in the Attention Switching Task? 
Prediction 6: offline anodal stimulation of the right and left DLPFCs will increase 
inhibitory performance as shown by higher accuracy in the Attention Switching Task 
after stimulation compared to sham. 
 
6.3 Methodology 
6.3.1 Design 
This experiment adopted a between-subjects design. The independent between-
subjects variable was stimulation group (anodal right DLPFC, anodal left DLPFC or 
sham). Stimulation began before the start of the behavioural tasks and continued 
whilst the participants relaxed in a comfortable chair. The tDCS equipment was 
removed from the participant’s head after twenty minutes of stimulation after which 
participants began the tasks (known as ‘offline’ stimulation) (Figure 6.1). Unlike 
Experiment 1 offline stimulation was used here rather than online stimulation because 
(i) this type of neuromodulation allows for data collection that exceeds twenty minutes 
in duration, and (ii) the effects of offline stimulation of the left DLPFC on cognitive 
reflection had been revealed by Oldrati et al., (2016). 
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Figure 6.1. An overview of the procedure used in Experiment 2. Arrows denote time course. 
The Cognitive Reflection Test, Representativeness (incongruent base-rate neglect) vignettes, 
belief bias syllogisms, attention switching, 2-back and 3-back were administered to 
participants after twenty minutes of stimulation (offline). All tasks were counterbalanced during 
data collection.  
 
6.3.2 Participants 
Fifty-four participants were recruited through advertising (e.g., online websites, and 
posters on campus) and word-of-mouth at The University of East London (UEL) (mean 
age = 24.63 ± 4.46 years; 29 females).  
 
A power analysis calculation using G Power 3.0 revealed that a sample size of 33 
participants was needed to reach a significant result. This was based on a medium 
effect size of f = 0.30, according to the convention set out by Cohen (1969, p348), and 
an alpha (α) significance level of p = 0.05 in a between-subjects design experiment 
with a total of 6 measures and 3 groups.    
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The inclusion criteria were (i) aged 18 years or above; (ii) fluent English speakers; (iii) 
right-handed; (iv) naïve to tDCS and (v) naïve to the behavioural tasks used. The 
exclusion criteria were (i) history of seizures; (ii) family history of seizures; (iii) past or 
present neurological history; (iv) past or present psychiatric history; (v) past head injury 
or surgery; (vi) metal implants; (vii) current medication usage; (viii) drug or alcohol 
dependence; (ix) pregnancy and (x) past training in logic reasoning (e.g., during a 
university course). All participants provided informed written consent. The experiment 
was approved by The University of East London (UEL) Research Ethics Committee. 
After giving consent participants completed all scales and questionnaires (NART, AOT 
and REI), and the demographic form containing information about sex (male, female 
or do not wish to say), age, religiosity (1 = not at all religious to 5 = very religious), 
paranormal beliefs (yes or no) and education level – self reported highest current 
education level (Table 6.1). Participants were asked about religiosity based on the 
dual-process framework literature that suggest that high levels of religiosity positively 
correlates with high levels of intuitive thinking on the CRT (Pennycook et al., 2012; 
Razmyar & Reeve, 2013).   
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Table 6.1. Demographics and cognitive characteristics 
 Stimulation group mean (SD) 
Demographic variable Left DLPFC Sham Right DLPFC 
Sex (F/M) 9/9 9/9 11/7 
Age (years) 23.78 (4.63) 24.83 (4.60) 25.28 (4.26) 
Religious (Yes/No) 10/8 10/8 9/9 
Education 5.80 (1.06) 6.30 (1.07) 6.67 (0.70) 
    
Cognitive characteristics    
NART score 117.83 (4.80) 117.90 (5.91) 118.61 (4.60) 
AOT score 38.67 (7.17) 40.83 (3.11) 39.06 (3.45) 
REI 10 R subscale 16.83 (3.10) 19.44 (2.72) 18.22 (3.37) 
REI 10 E subscale 15.22 (1.86) 15.67 (1.57) 16.17 (1.46) 
Education represents the qualification level. Abbreviations: Standard Deviations (SD), 
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), females (F), males (M), National Adult Reading Test 
(NART), Actively open-minded thinking (AOT), Rational Experiential Inventory Rational 
subscale (REI 10 R), Rational Experiential Inventory Experiential subscale (REI 10 E). 
 
6.3.3 tDCS montage and parameters 
As in Experiment 1 the same tDCS device, electrode sizes, sham procedure and 
current intensity (1.5mA) were used. TDCS was delivered using a battery-driven 
stimulator device (Neuroelectrics, Barcelona) using two sponge electrodes (anodal 
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and return) each circular with a surface area of 25cm2. In the stimulation groups, a 
constant current was administered for 20 minutes before testing (‘offline’). The tDCS 
montage was dependent upon the stimulation group (anode electrode – return 
electrode): (i) anode right DLPFC return left DLPFC, (ii) anode left DLPFC return right 
DLPFC   or (iii) sham right DLPFC sham left DLPFC condition. The electrodes were 
placed over the right DLPFC (F4) or left DLPFC (F3) according to the EEG 10-20 
international system (Herwig, Satrapi, & Schönfeldt-Lecuona, 2003). The ramp-up and 
ramp-down time were 15 seconds each at the onset and offset of stimulation to 
decrease the likelihood of discomfort. The sham group consisted of 15 seconds of 
stimulation at the beginning and end of the 20 minutes. 
 
6.3.4 Materials and measures 
All materials used in this experiment were validated and established tasks from the 
literature. Furthermore, all tasks were counterbalanced to guard against carry-over 
effects and other confounds (Figure 6.1). The Cognitive Reflection Test (Oldrati et al., 
2016), n-back (Hill, Fitzgerald, & Hoy, 2016) and belief bias syllogisms (Tsujii, 
Sakatani, Masuda, Akiyama, & Watanabe, 2011) have been used in previous 
neuromodulation studies. See Appendix B for all items contained within this 
experiment. 
 
Cognitive Reflection Test and verbal-CRT: As described in Chapter 4 the Cognitive 
Reflection Test (CRT and verbal-CRT) was administered in this experiment in two 
parts of equal numbers of items. The CRT used in Experiment 2 consisted of a total 
of twenty CRT items (the CRT plus the verbal-CRT) which were administered to 
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participants in two parts of ten items. For the original, numeracy-based CRT (called 
the CRT throughout this thesis) there were eight items with a maximum score of eight. 
For the verbal-CRT there were twelve items with a maximum score of twelve. 
Participants had a maximum of twenty minutes to answer all CRT and verbal-CRT 
items. The use of the verbal-CRT in this experiment is the first time that this task has 
been paired with tDC stimulation. The verbal-CRT has been validated in previous non-
stimulation experiments (Sirota, 2017). In the example of a verbal-CRT item below the 
incorrect intuitive Type 1 answer is the monkey or bird, whilst the correct Type 2 
answer is that there are no bananas in coconut trees. 
 
A monkey, a squirrel, and a bird are racing to the top of a coconut tree. Who will get 
the banana first, the monkey, the squirrel, or the bird? 
 
The CRT and verbal-CRT have the same item structure, participants respond with free 
choices in both tasks and the tasks only differ in their reliance on numeracy. 
  
Other tasks used in previous chapters: As described in Chapter 5 the n-back, belief 
bias syllogisms and representativeness vignettes (also called incongruent base-rate 
vignettes) were used in this experiment. The n-back contained a total of one hundred 
and twenty trials (correct and incorrect) were presented to participants for a maximum 
score of thirty. Belief bias syllogisms consisted of a total of sixteen items with 4 valid-
unbelievable, 4 valid-believable, 4 invalid-unbelievable and 4 invalid-believable items. 
There was a total of ten representativeness vignettes with a maximum score of ten. 
The following additional tests were used in Experiment 2: 
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Attention Switching Task: The attention switching task (AST) is a measure of 
inhibition (Hanania & Smith, 2010). Participants see an arrow that points either to the 
right or to the left with an instruction above the arrow indicating to report either (i) the 
direction that the arrow is pointing in (right or left) or (ii) the side of the screen that the 
arrow is on (right or left).   
 
A total of one hundred and twenty trials (sixty congruent and sixty incongruent) were 
administered to participants. Participants took a maximum of five minutes to complete 
the AST. 
 
Actively Open-minded Thinking: The actively open-minded thinking (AOT) scale 
measures the willingness to consider new information and remain ‘open-minded’ 
(Stanovich & West, 1997; Haran, Ritov, & Mellers, 2013). The short-form version of 
the AOT was administered in this experiment with a total of seven items. Participants 
took a maximum of five minutes to complete this task and responded on a scale from 
1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). 
 
Rational Experiential Inventory: The rational experiential inventory (REI) measures 
cognitive style (the use of intuitive or analytic thinking) (Epstein et al., 1996). The short 
form of the REI was administered in this experiment with a total of ten items. 
Participants took a maximum of five minutes to complete this task and responded  on 
a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
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National Adult Reading Test: The National Adult Reading Test (NART) is a list of 50 
short words with irregular pronunciation (e.g., BOUQUET, PLACEBO) (Crawford et 
al., 1989; Nelson & Willison, 1991). Performance on the NART predicts cognitive 
ability (i.e., intelligence) in the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) (Crawford et 
al., 1989). Participants are scored on their pronunciation of words in the test which 
takes a maximum of five minutes to complete. 
 
 6.4 Analysis Plan 
The raw data were screened for outliers and missing values before conducting any 
analysis. Outliers were identified as data points outside of a 1.5 interquartile (IQR) 
range. There were no missing values.  
 
A first analysis investigated whether there were any a priori differences between 
groups regarding thinking styles as this could potentially explain stimulation results. A 
multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA) was performed, with type of stimulation 
(right DLPFC, left DLPFC or sham) as the between-subject factor. Dependent 
variables were the REI subscales: rationale (REI 10 R) and experiential (REI 10 E), 
the actively open-minded thinking scale (AOT) and National Adult Reading Test 
(NART). 
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6.4.1 Judgement and decision-making analyses 
To test the effects of stimulation on Type 2 responses, a further multivariate analysis 
of variance (MANOVA) was performed with type of stimulation (right DLPFC, left 
DLPFC or sham) as the between-subject factor. Dependent variables were correct 
answers for the CRT, correct answers for the verbal-CRT, the number of correct 
answers from the representativeness questions, and the Logic Index from the belief 
bias syllogisms. Significant effects were analysed with ANOVAs to determine the 
specific contributing contrast. 
 
To examine the effect of stimulation on the belief index (from the belief bias syllogisms) 
a separate analysis of variance was performed with the type of stimulation (right 
DLPFC, left DLPFC or sham) as the between-subject factor. The dependent variable 
was the belief index score.   
 
To test intuitive incorrect answers (Type 1), a third multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) was conducted with the type of stimulation (right DLPFC, left DLPFC or 
sham) as the between-subject factor. Dependent variables were all intuitive incorrect 
answers for the CRT, verbal-CRT, and the representativeness vignettes.  
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6.4.2 Executive functioning: working memory (updating) 
task analysis 
The next multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) examined the effect of 
stimulation on working memory (updating). The between-subject factor was type of 
stimulation (right DLPFC, left DLPFC or sham). Dependent variables were number of 
correct 2-back answers and correct 3-back answers. 
 
6.4.3 Executive functioning: inhibition task analysis 
The final analysis of variance (ANOVA) then examined the effect of stimulation on 
inhibition. Between-subject factor was Attention Switching Task (AST) effect score 
(correct congruent answers minus correct incongruent answers).   
 
6.5 Results 
There were no missing values or outliers in the correct mean scores for the thinking 
tasks (i.e., CRT, representativeness and belief bias syllogisms), nor were there any 
missing values for the cognitive characteristics. Table 6.2 shows the relevant summary 
for means and standard deviations for all thinking tasks with stimulation group. The 
assumptions of each analysis were examined at analysis. Unless otherwise stated 
there were no violations of assumptions. 
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Table 6.2. Raw data for the battery of thinking tasks (mean sum total across participants in 
group and standard deviations). Reflective / correct answers are provided for the Cognitive 
Reflection Test (CRT: for the CRT there were 8 items; verbal-CRT 12 items) and the 
representativeness (incongruent base-rate) problems (10 items). Belief bias syllogism 
variables were the Logic index and belief index – these were calculated from a total of 16 
items.        
 Stimulation group 
Task / measure Left DLPFC Sham Right DLPFC 
CRT correct 3.33 (2.14) 3.72 (1.67) 5.33 (2.50) 
Verbal-CRT correct 4.11 (2.74) 3.11 (2.11) 4.05 (2.20) 
Representativeness correct 4.33 (3.51) 4.22 (2.82) 6.83 (4.06) 
BBS Logic Index 0.33 (1.80) 1.94 (2.12) 1.88 (2.24) 
BBS Belief Index -2.77 (1.63) -3.38 (1.24) -3.11 (1.60) 
Abbreviations: Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), 
Belief bias syllogisms (BBS).  
 
A MANOVA with cognitive characteristics as dependent variables showed no effect of 
stimulation group (Pillai’s trace = 0.18, p = 0.28) on thinking disposition. The Box’s test 
results showed that equality of covariance had been violated (p = 0.03) so Pillai’s trace 
was used. Thus, the three experimental groups did not differ in the cognitive 
characteristics scores (see Table 6.1), which have previously been associated with 
judgement and decision-making performance (e.g., Toplak et al., 2011). 
 
The second MANOVA tested the effect of stimulation on the judgement and decision-
making performance. The Box’s test results showed equality of covariance matrices, 
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p = 0.946. There was a significant main effect of stimulation, Wilks’ λ = 0.67, F(8, 96) 
= 2.602.63, p = 0.01, partial η2 = 0.17, on thinking task performance – showing that 
performance improved after stimulation compared to sham.  
 
Follow-up ANOVAs revealed that there were main effects of stimulation group on CRT 
scores, F(2, 51) = 4.45, p = 0.01, partial η2 = 0.15, representativeness correct answers, 
F(2, 51) = 3.20, p = 0.04, partial η2 = 0.11, and the Logic Index, F(2, 51) = 3.54, p = 
0.03, partial η2 = 0.12. Performance increased following right DLPFC anodal 
stimulation compared to sham for the CRT scores and representativeness answers. 
For the Logic Index, scores were higher for the right DLPFC stimulation compared to 
left DLPFC stimulation only. There was no effect of stimulation group on verbal-CRT, 
F(2, 51) = 1.02, p = 0.37, partial η2 = 0.04, scores. The relevant summary for means 
and standard deviations for both stimulation groups are presented in Figure 6.2. 
 
Planned contrasts revealed that CRT performance improved following right DLPFC 
anodal stimulation (M = 5.33, SD = 2.50) in comparison to both left DLPFC anodal 
stimulation, F(2, 51) = 4.45, p = 0.01, 95% CI [-3.42, -0.57] (M = 3.33, SD = 2.14) and 
sham, F(2, 51) = 4.45, p = 0.03, 95% CI [-3.03, -0.20] (M = 3.72, SD = 1.67). 
 
The planned contrasts revealed that representativeness performance was higher 
following right DLPFC anodal stimulation (M = 6.83, SD = 4.06) in comparison to both 
left DLPFC anodal stimulation, F(2, 51) = 3.20, p = 0.03, 95% CI [-4.84, -0.15] (M = 
4.33, SD = 3.51) and sham, F(2, 51) = 3.20, p = 0.03, 95% CI [-4.95, -0.26] (M = 4.22, 
SD = 2.82). 
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For the logic index, planned contrasts revealed that logical responding was higher 
following right DLPFC anodal stimulation (M = 1.88, SD = 2.24) in comparison to left 
DLPFC anodal stimulation, F(2, 51) = 3.54, p = 0.03, 95% CI [-2.93, -0.17] (M = 0.33, 
SD = 1.80), but not to sham, F(2, 51) = 3.54, p = 0.93, 95% CI [-1.32, 1.43] (M = 1.94, 
SD = 2.12). 
 
A post-hoc t-test examined the effect of stimulation of the left DLPFC versus sham for 
the Logic Index. The t-test revealed a difference between Logic Index performance 
after left DLPFC stimulation compared to sham, t(34) = 2.46, p = 0.02, 95% CI [0.28, 
2.94] – performance was worse after left DLPFC stimulation (M = 0.33, SD = 1.78) 
compared to sham (M = 1.94, SD = 2.12). 
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Figure 6.2. Effects of tDCS neuromodulation on thinking task performance. The panels show 
the effects of tDCS (left DLPFC, sham, or right DLPFC) on mean correct answers for the 
Cognitive Reflection Test (panel A), mean correct answers for representativeness 
(incongruent base-rate neglect) vignettes (panel B), and the effects of tDCS on the Logic Index 
for the belief bias syllogisms (panel C). Comparisons were right DLPFC vs. sham, and right 
DLPFC vs. left DLPFC. High values for all panels denote high levels of analytic thinking. 
Significance levels from planned contrasts in follow-up analysis of variance (ANOVAs), error 
bars denote standard errors from mean: an asterisk denotes p < 0.05. Abbreviations: 
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT).  
 
Next, a separate analysis of variance (ANOVA) examined the effect of stimulation on 
the belief index. There was no effect of simulation on the belief index, F(2, 51) = 0.74, 
p = 0.48, partial η2 = 0.03. 
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The third MANOVA tested the effect of stimulation on the judgement and decision-
making tasks for Type 1 intuitive thinking answers. The Box’s test results showed 
equality of covariance matrices (p = 0.98). There was no main effect of stimulation, 
Wilks’ λ = 0.82, F(6, 98) = 1.65, p = 0.14, partial η2 = 0.10 on intuitive response scores. 
 
The next multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA) was performed to examine the 
effects of stimulation on updating (2-back and 3-back). The independent variable was 
the type of stimulation (right DLPFC, left DLPFC or sham). Dependent variables were 
number of correct 2-back answers and correct 3-back answers. The Box’s test of 
equality of covariance matrices was supported, p = 0.21. There were no multivariate 
effects using Wilks’ Lambda for the factors of stimulation, Wilks’ λ = 0.88, F(4, 100) = 
1.53, p = 0.20, partial η2 = 0.06. There were no main effects for the factor of stimulation 
on 2-back correct answers, F(2, 51) = 0.45, p = 0.64, partial η2 = 0.02 or 3-back correct 
answers, F(2, 51) = 1.2, p = 0.29, partial η2 = 0.05.  
 
To examine the effect of stimulation on inhibition in the AST a one-way analyses of 
variance (ANOVA) was performed. Dependent variable was AST effect (correct 
congruent answers minus correct incongruent answers) and between-subject factor 
was stimulation (right DLPFC left DLPFC or sham). There was no effect of stimulation 
on AST effect, F(2, 51) = 0.76, p = 0.47, partial η2 = 0.03. 
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6.6 Discussion 
Experiment 2 showed that, as compared to sham, offline anodal tDCS over the right 
DLPFC (with return electrode over left DLPFC) improves the number of correct 
answers on the Cognitive Reflection Test (Toplak et al., 2011; Thomson & 
Oppenheimer, 2016) and representativeness heuristics. In contrast, logical thinking 
was impaired when the left DLPFC was bilaterally stimulated (compared to right 
DLPFC). These results reflect those of Experiment 1 (albeit using online stimulation) 
that when applied to the right DLPFC anodal stimulation increases judgement and 
decision-making performance. The results also extend previous work by Oldrati et al., 
(2016), who showed a decrease in CRT performance after unilateral cathodal 
stimulation compared to anodal stimulation. To the best of our knowledge this is the 
first evidence (with Experiment 1) of an improvement in cognitive reflection from the 
application of an offline direct current to the right DLPFC. 
 
The main predictions were that increasing cortical excitability of the right DLPFC would 
increase performance on judgement and thinking tasks that require inhibition of 
automatic processes in order to result in normatively correct (unbiased) answers. This 
was based on the concept of an algorithmic mind (Stanovich, 2009; Stanovich, West, 
& Toplak, 2013) monitoring and inhibiting (Type 1) processes from an autonomous 
mind. TDCS over the right DLPFC is known to affect executive functions (Del Missier, 
Mäntylä, & Bruine de Bruin, 2010; Del Missier, Mäntylä, & Bruin, 2012) that include 
impulsivity control and set-shifting (Loftus et al., 2015). Greater resistance to intuitive 
thinking and pre-potent CRT responses rely on the engagement of impulsivity control 
and set-shifting during decision-making (Del Missier et al., 2012). The findings that 
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stimulation of the right DLPFC did improve cognitive reflection performance for 
mathematical CRT items and representativeness therefore is a direct test of the 
existence of a neural correlate for Type 2 cognitive reflection. In addition, this study 
showed that thinking tasks that arguably rely less on inhibition (syllogisms) and that 
did not include any belief bias components (using the logic index only) showed no 
improvement between right stimulation and sham, but did show an impairment after 
left DLPC stimulation (Stupple, Ball, Evans, & Kamal-Smith, 2011; Stupple et al., 
2013). Previous brain imaging studies (Goel, Buchel, Frith, & Dolan, 2000; Goel & 
Dolan, 2003), showed a relationship between the neural correlates of inhibition and 
Type 2 (reflective thinking) processes. Importantly, this study went further than 
previous comparable work (e.g., Oldrati et al., 2016) by controlling for individual 
differences with the NART, AOT, and REI – differences that presumably can influence 
decision-making (Stanovich & West, 1997; Campitelli & Labollita, 2010). 
 
However, if increased performance in the CRT and Representative vignettes were the 
result of inhibition processes, then we would have expected that Type 1 (intuitive) 
scores (in the additional analyses) would show a reduction. Similar to the results (for 
the CRT at least) in Experiment 1, however, there was no reduction in intuitive 
answers, so no indication of inhibition of prepotent associative answers after 
stimulation. 
 
For belief bias syllogisms (using the belief index) there was no effect of direct current 
stimulation. There are at least two reasons why an increase of cortical excitability of 
the right DLPFC might not influence syllogistic reasoning (logic index score). Firstly, 
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the dual-process theories of decision-making do not postulate that reasoning based 
on belief needs to be inhibited for all task variants. In some instances, beliefs are 
correct when logic and beliefs do not conflict, for example in no-conflict syllogisms 
(Ball, Phillips, Wade, & Quayle, 2006; De Neys & Schaeken, 2007). Here cognitive 
reflection and inhibitory control are not needed. Secondly, direct current stimulation 
was applied to the DLPFC - a brain region that is associated with executive functions 
(Loftus et al., 2015) that are needed for correctly responding to conflict, but not for no-
conflict belief-bias syllogisms. Rather than the DLPFC, the inferior frontal cortex (IFC) 
is associated with correctly solving no-conflict syllogisms (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; 
Tsujii, Sakatani, Masuda, Akiyama, & Watanabe, 2011). Left DLPFC stimulation 
(compared to right-DLPFC stimulation) did in fact reduce performance on the logic 
index – an area of the brain that is associated with self-regulation (Mengarelli et al., 
2015), affective modulation (Hare et al., 2009) and attentional processing (Goel et al., 
2006). 
 
As the dual-process framework of decision-making posits that executive functions (i.e., 
inhibition, updating) are crucial components of this framework (Sloman 1996; Evans 
and Stanovich 2013) it was hypothesised that any change in cognitive reflection would 
be mirrored by a change in these executive functions. There was no significant effect 
of anodal stimulation on inhibition or updating.  For updating, in which the 2-back and 
3-back were administered this is explained by the ease of the 2-back and difficulty of 
the 3-back (Jaeggi et al. 2010; Hill, Fitzgerald, and Hoy 2016). The results of the 2-
back suggested that across all stimulation groups participants performed at ceiling, 
scoring an almost perfect score of thirty out of thirty trials correct. Conversely, 
participants found that the 3-back was too difficult so scored poorly across all 
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stimulation groups. To remedy this problem Experiment 3 uses an additional validated 
working memory (updating) task, the Sternberg task (Sternberg 1969).  
 
As for inhibition the AST task was administered (Hanania and Smith 2010). There are 
two explanations for not finding an effect of stimulation on the AST. Firstly, the results 
revealed that across all stimulation groups participants scored highly on this task, 
suggesting that they found this task to be too easy. Secondly, the AST is thought to 
measure a form of planned inhibition (called ‘far inhibition’) rather than a singular type 
of inhibition (Hanania and Smith 2010). During planned inhibition participants see the 
instruction prior to viewing the stimuli, thus giving them time to anticipate and prepare 
a response (Hanania and Smith 2010). If the planned inhibition is not the same type 
of inhibition that is involved when Type 2 thinking override the pre-potent Type 1 
response then no change in planned inhibition would be expected. In Experiment 3 
the Stop-Signal Task (Boehler et al. 2010), which is thought to not reply on planned 
inhibition was administered. 
 
Critics of the CRT make the claim that the CRT is a test of numerical ability rather than 
cognitive reflection (Weller et al., 2013; Welsh, Burns, & Delfabbro, 2013). Indeed, 
there was an effect of bilateral right DLPFC stimulation for the typical (numerical) CRT 
items (Frederick, 2005; Toplak et al., 2011) but not the verbal version of the CRT items. 
However, the representativeness vignettes were also affected positively by right 
DLPFC stimulation, while logic index (Stupple et al., 2011; 2013) did not improve. 
Whilst one cannot rule out the influence of numeracy on the CRT scores, the pattern 
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of stimulation effects on the judgement and decision-making scores seems not to 
suggest an undue influence of numeracy alone on the current findings.  
 
Limitations of this study were that bilateral montages of the DLPFC areas were used 
for this investigation of the neural correlates of cognitive reflection and dual-process 
judgement and decision-making. A bilateral montage makes it difficult to separate 
effects from anodal and return electrodes. In this experiment bilateral montages were 
used here because the literature on decision-making with tDCS is very limited, the 
majority of research on risk-based decision-making has used this bilateral montage 
(see Chapter 4) (Gorini, Lucchiari, Russell-Edu, & Pravettoni, 2014; Cheng & Lee, 
2015). Despite the bilateral montage in this study there was only an improvement in 
decision-making that tapped inhibitory control (i.e., cognitive reflection test and 
representativeness) after the anodal stimulation of the right DLPFC (with the return 
electrode over left DLPFC) compared to the contralateral montage and sham. If an 
increase in decision-making was the result of the return electrode over the left DLPFC 
one would expect to the see a significant decrease in decision-making in our left 
DLPFC group – there was not.  
 
6.7 Summary 
This experiment built on the findings of Experiment 1. Here offline stimulation was 
applied rather than online stimulation (as in Experiment 1). The results revealed that 
anodal stimulation of the right DLPFC improved judgement and decision-making tasks 
that require inhibitory control such as the cognitive reflection test and 
representativeness heuristic problems. The findings extended those of Experiment 1 
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by increasing the number of cognitive reflection test items so that mathematics / 
numeracy- and verbal-based items could be analysed separately – the CRT items that 
required mathematics to complete received a boost from the stimulation whilst the 
verbal items did not.   
 
The next chapter builds on Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 by examining whether 
different executive functioning tasks such as the Sternberg task (updating) and Stop 
Signal Task (inhibition) are modulated by neuromodulation. Furthermore, the total 
number of CRT items is increased to thirty-two so that there can be a greater sensitivity 
to the stimulation of numeracy- and verbal-based cognitive reflection.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Daniel Edgcumbe [Chapter 7 – Experiment 3] 
135 
  
Chapter 7 
The effect of multiple sessions of tDCS modulation on 
cognitive reflection 
 
7.1 Background  
This experiment builds on the results of Experiment 1 (Chapter 5) and 2 (Chapter 6). 
The results of the first two experiment in chapters 5 and 6 revealed that anodal 
stimulation of the right DLPFC enhances Type 2 decision-making. Anodal stimulation 
when administered online (Experiment 1) or offline (Experiment 2) both increase Type 
2 thinking for the CRT and representativeness vignettes, however, despite 
administering multiple tasks to measure updating (2-back and 3-back) and inhibition 
(AST) no effects of neuromodulation were found for executive functioning.  
 
Although many experiments have reported effects of single-session tDCS on cognition 
(Hill et al., 2016; Oldrati, Patricelli, Colombo, & Antonietti, 2016) few experiments have 
investigated the effects of multiple sessions of anodal tDCS on cognition (Lally, Nord, 
Walsh, & Roiser, 2013; Martin et al., 2013; Richmond, Wolk, Chein, & Olson, 2014; 
Talsma, Kroese, & Slagter, 2017). In the working memory literature, four studies have 
administered multiple sessions of tDCS in the investigation of the neural substrates of 
working memory (Lally et al., 2013; Martin et al., 2013; Richmond et al., 2014; Talsma 
et al., 2017). Talsma et al., (2017) found an effect of anodal stimulation for a single-
session, but no further effect in a second and third session. Whilst, Richmond et al., 
(2014) found an incremental effect of anodal stimulation after ten sessions that 
resulted in increased verbal working memory compared to sham. This suggests that 
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there is a cumulative effect of stimulation that carries over from the first session to the 
second session when the intra-session interval is a maximum of twenty-four-hours 
(Richmond et al., 2014). The lack of an effect of stimulation from multiple sessions in 
some studies might be explained by differences in tDCS protocol (e.g., electrode 
montage, stimulation intensity etc), participant physiology (e.g., skull thickness, hair 
thickness etc) whereby, the direct current has less resistance when passing through 
thin hair compared to thick hair, and the duration of experimental cognitive tasks (e.g., 
n-back versus the Sternberg task  – both of which measure working memory (Hill et 
al., 2016)) - all of these differences result in different rates of efficacy for the 
neuromodulation between experimental sessions. In this experiment the effects of two 
sessions of anodal stimulation on cognitive reflection in the dual-process framework 
was examined. 
 
As in Experiment 2 (Chapter 6) the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) (Frederick, 2005), 
verbal-CRT (Sirota, Kostovicova, Juanchich, Marshall, & Dewberry, 2017) and 
incongruent base-rate (representativeness) vignettes (Grether, 1980) were 
administered in this experiment to examine dual-process framework decision-making. 
Since a between subjects (multivariate analysis of variance) and within subjects 
(repeated measure analysis of variance) design was used at analyses here, there was 
an increase in the number of items across these tasks compared to Experiment 2 so 
that no participant saw the same item twice – seeing the same items more than once 
would increase the likelihood of a correct Type 2 answer. As variances in CRT 
performance can be explained by thinking dispositions (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 
2011; Baron, Scott, Fincher, & Metz, 2015) the actively open-minded thinking scale 
(AOT) (Haran, Ritov, & Mellers, 2013) and rational-experiential inventory (REI) 
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(Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996) were included. Cognitive ability was also 
recorded and examined using the National Adult Reading Test (NART) (Nelson & 
Willison, 1991). These measures of thinking dispositions and cognitive ability were 
previously used in Experiment 2. 
 
Aside from thinking dispositions (Epstein et al. 1996; Haran, Ritov, and Mellers 2013) 
and cognitive ability (Nelson and Willison 1991), impulsivity can influence judgement 
and decision-making (Oldrati et al. 2016). In order to control for the potential 
moderating effects of impulsivity the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS) was 
administered (Patton, Stanford, and Barratt 1995). The BIS was chosen as it 
distinguishes between cognitive inhibition (i.e., the suppression of pre-potent 
responses) and impulsivity at the motor and behavioural levels. Based on this it was 
predicted that highly impulsive individuals would perform poorly on the CRT compared 
to low impulsive individuals.  
 
Next, to examine the role executive functions when Type 2 thinking overrides Type 1 
thinking in the dual-process framework different updating and inhibition tasks were 
administered alongside the n-back. For updating the original (used in Experiments 1 
and 2) n-back was used with the additional Sternberg task (Sternberg 1969). Both the 
n-back and Sternberg tasks are validated measures of updating (Hill, Fitzgerald, and 
Hoy 2015). To examine inhibition the Stop-Signal Task was administered (Aron et al. 
2003). It was predicted that as updating and inhibition are critical functions of the dual-
process framework an increase in Type 2 responding should occur when there is an 
increase in updating and inhibition.   
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In order to investigate the effects of single-session anodal stimulation and multiple-
sessions anodal stimulation on the dual-process framework a mixed between-subjects 
and within-subjects design was used in this experiment. Anodal stimulation was 
applied to the right DLPFC or sham. It was hypothesised that anodal tDCS to the right 
DLPFC would increase Type 2 processing as shown by increased scores in the CRT 
and incongruent base-rate vignettes compared to sham – this is in accordance with 
the results of the previous two experiments in this thesis. Next, the second session of 
stimulation would boost any effects of neuromodulation more than a single-session as 
evidenced by the cumulative effect of stimulation across experimental sessions in 
previous studies by Richmond et al., (2014) and Lally, Nord, Walsh, and Roiser, (2013)  
(see Table 7.1). As for the executive functioning tasks it was hypothesised that working 
memory (updating) performance as measured by the Sternberg task would improve 
after right DLPFC stimulation compared to sham. The hypothesis for the stop-signal 
task which measures inhibition was that the inhibitory control would improve following 
the stimulation of the right DLPFC compared to sham.  
 
7.2 Research questions 
Research question 1 
Does offline anodal tDCS of the right DLPFC enhance cognitive reflection as 
measured by the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) and representativeness 
(incongruent base-rate) vignettes? 
Prediction 1: offline anodal stimulation of the right DLPFC will increase Type 2 
processing as shown by higher accuracies for the CRT and representativeness 
vignettes after stimulation compared to sham. 
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Research question 2 
Does offline anodal tDCS of the right DLPFC enhance decision-making in the verbal 
CRT? 
Prediction 2: offline anodal stimulation of the right DLPFC will increase Type 2 
processing that does not rely on numeracy as shown by higher accuracies for the 
verbal-CRT after stimulation compared to sham. 
 
Research question 3 
Do multiple anodal stimulation sessions spaced twenty-four-hours apart influence 
cognitive reflection more than a single stimulation session? 
Prediction 3: multiple stimulation sessions spaced in consecutive days will increase 
Type 2 processing as shown by higher accuracies from day 1 to day 2 for the CRT 
and representativeness vignettes in the experimental group with two days of 
stimulation compared to the experimental group with 1 day of stimulation followed by 
a day of sham. 
 
Research question 4 
Do multiple anodal stimulation sessions spaced twenty-four-hours apart influence 
verbal-CRT scores more than a single stimulation session? 
Prediction 4: multiple stimulation sessions spaced in consecutive days will increase 
Type 2 processing as shown by higher accuracies from day 1 to day 2 for the verbal-
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CRT in the experimental group with two days of stimulation compared to the 
experimental group with 1 day of stimulation followed by a day of sham. 
 
Research question 5 
Does offline anodal tDCS of the right DLPFC affect updating (working memory) as 
measured by the 2-back (n-back) and Sternberg task? 
Prediction 5: working memory performance will increase after stimulation as shown by 
higher accuracies for the 2-back and Sternberg tasks in the stimulation experimental 
groups compared to sham.  
 
Research question 6 
Do multiple anodal stimulation sessions spaced twenty-four-hours apart influence 
updating (working memory) as measured by the 2-back (n-back) and Sternberg more 
than a single stimulation session? 
Prediction 6: multiple stimulation sessions spaced in consecutive days will increase 
working memory performance as shown by higher accuracies from day 1 to day 2 for 
the 2-back and Sternberg tasks in the experimental group with two days of stimulation 
compared to the experimental group with 1 day of stimulation followed by a day of 
sham. 
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Research question 7 
Does offline anodal tDCS of the right DLPFC affect inhibition as measured by the Stop 
Signal Task? 
Prediction 7: offline anodal stimulation of the right DLPFC will increase inhibitory 
control as shown by higher accuracy in the Stop Signal Task after stimulation 
compared to sham.  
 
Research question 8 
Do multiple anodal stimulation sessions spaced twenty-four-hours apart influence 
inhibition as measured by the Stop Signal Task more than a single stimulation 
session? 
Prediction 8: multiple stimulation sessions spaced in consecutive days will increase 
inhibitory control as shown by higher accuracies from day 1 to day 2 for the Stop Signal 
Task in the experimental group with two days of stimulation compared to the 
experimental group with 1 day of stimulation followed by a day of sham. 
 
7.3 Methodology 
7.3.1 Design 
This experiment adopted a mixed between-subjects and within-subjects design. 
Participants in the first two groups completed two sessions each, whilst participants in 
the sham group completed one session (Table 7.1). The independent between-
subjects variable was stimulation polarity (anodal right DLPFC or sham). Stimulation 
began before the start of behavioural tasks and continued whilst the participants 
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relaxed in a comfortable chair. When the twenty minutes of stimulation ended the tDCS 
equipment was removed from the participant’s head and they began the tasks. All 
experimental tasks were counterbalanced (Figure 7.1). Single session effects of 
stimulation (or the absence of an effect) on performance could be ascertained by 
comparing the first sessions from groups 1 and 3 – the single session of sham was 
included in this design for this purpose. The second single session effects of 
stimulation (or absence of an effect) for groups 1 and 2 could also be compared – 
higher scores in group 1 compared to group 2 would denote an effect of stimulation 
on performance. A cumulative effect of stimulation across two sessions could be 
ascertained by comparing both sessions from group 1 – higher scores in the second 
session in the absence of higher scores in the second session for group 2 would show 
a cumulative effect of stimulation on performance. Crucially, a comparison of the 
scores from the tasks in the second session of group 2 compared the first session of 
the same group could ascertain whether there was a practice effect on performance 
across the tasks – higher scores on tasks in the second session would suggest that 
there was a practice effect.     
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Table 7.1 Procedural design of Experiment 3. 
 Sessions 
Group Session 1 Session 2 
1 (a-a) X X 
2 (a-s)  X X 
3 (sham) X  
An ‘x’ denotes the sessions in which participants of a group took part in the experiment. 
Abbreviations: anodal right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex stimulation (DLPFC) in sessions 1 
and 2 (a-a), anodal right DLPFC in session followed by sham in session 2 (a-s). 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Schematic of procedure in Experiment 3. Arrows denote time course. The 
Cognitive Reflection Test, incongruent base-rate (representativeness) vignettes, 2-back, 
Sternberg task and Stop signal task issued to participants after twenty minutes of stimulation 
(offline). All tasks were counterbalanced during data collection. 
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7.3.2 Participants 
Forty-eight participants were recruited through advertising and word-of-mouth at The 
University of East London (UEL) (mean age = 26.08 ± 0.54 years; 27 females) (Table 
7.2). The AOT and REI thinking dispositions were recorded as was cognitive ability 
(NART) (Table 7.3).  
 
A power analysis calculation using G Power 3.0 revealed that a sample size of 18 
participants was needed to reach a significant result. This was based on a medium 
effect size of f = 0.30, according to the convention set out by Cohen (1969, p348), and 
an alpha (α) significance level of p = 0.05 in a within-subjects design experiment with 
a total of 5 measures and 3 groups.    
 
The inclusion criteria were (i) aged 18 years or above; (ii) fluent English speakers; (iii) 
right-handed; (iv) naïve to tDCS and (v) naïve to the behavioural tasks used. The 
exclusion criteria were (i) history of seizures; (ii) family history of seizures; (iii) past or 
present neurological history; (iv) past or present psychiatric history; (v) past head injury 
or surgery; (vi) metal implants; (vii) current medication usage; (viii) drug or alcohol 
dependence; (ix) pregnancy and (x) past training in logic reasoning (e.g., during a 
university course).  All participants provided informed written consent. This experiment 
was approved by The University of East London (UEL) Research Ethics Committee. 
After giving consent participants completed all scales and questionnaires (NART, AOT 
and REI), and the demographic form containing information about sex (male, female 
or do not wish to say), age, religiosity (1 = not at all religious to 5 = very religious), 
paranormal beliefs (yes or no) and education level – self reported highest current 
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education level (Tables 7.2 and 7.3). Participants were asked about religiosity based 
on the dual-process framework literature that suggest that high levels of religiosity 
positively correlates with high levels of intuitive thinking on the CRT (Pennycook et al., 
2012; Razmyar & Reeve, 2013).   
 
Table 7.2. Demographics for all participants. 
 Stimulation group (anode location session 1-
session 2) mean (SD) 
Demographics Right DLPFC-Right 
DLPFC 
Right DLPFC-
sham 
Sham 
Sex (M/F) 6/10 7/9 8/8 
Age (mean/SD) 25.70 (4.33) 26.70 (3.21) 25.88 (3.91) 
Religious (Yes/No) 10/6 5/11 6/10 
Education 4.90 (1.60) 5.56 (1.21) 5.38 (1.25) 
Education represents the mean qualification level. Abbreviations: Standard Deviations (SD), 
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), females (F), and males (M). 
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Table 7.3. Cognitive characteristics for all participants. 
 Stimulation group (anode location session 1-session 2) 
mean (SD) 
Cognitive 
characteristics 
Right DLPFC-Right 
DLPFC 
Right DLPFC-
sham 
Sham 
NART score 121.06 (2.81) 121.00 (2.28) 119.31 (2.44) 
AOT score 37.81 (6.75) 40.20 (5.13) 42.70 (4.75) 
REI 10 R subscale 16.75 (4.83) 15.90 (4.16) 19.75 (3.60) 
REI 10 E subscale 14.81 (2.04) 16.00 (2.16) 15.56 (1.63) 
The means and standard deviations are presented in parentheses. Abbreviations:  
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), National Adult Reading Test (NART), Actively open-
minded thinking (AOT), Rational Experiential Inventory Rational subscale (REI 10 R), Rational 
Experiential Inventory Experiential subscale (REI 10 E). 
 
7.3.3 tDCS montage and parameters 
The same tDCS device, electrode sizes, sham procedure and current intensity 
(1.5mA) were used as in Experiments 1 and 2. TDCS was delivered using a battery-
driven stimulator device (Neuroelectrics, Barcelona) using two sponge electrodes 
(anodal and return) each circular with a surface area of 25cm2. The tDCS montage 
was dependent upon the stimulation group (anode electrode – return electrode): (i) 
anode right DLPFC return left DLPFC, (ii) sham right DLPFC sham left DLPFC. The 
electrodes were placed over the right DLPFC (F4) or left DLPFC (F3) according to the 
EEG 10-20 international system (Herwig, Satrapi, & Schönfeldt-Lecuona, 2003). The 
ramp-up and ramp-down time were 15 seconds each at the onset and offset of 
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stimulation to decrease the likelihood of discomfort. The sham group consisted of 15 
seconds of stimulation at the beginning and end of the 20 minutes. 
 
7.3.4 Materials and measures 
All materials used in this experiment were validated and established tasks from the 
literature. All task items can be found in Appendix C. The Cognitive Reflection Test 
(Frederick, 2005; Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016), n-back (Dedoncker et al., 2016; 
Hill et al., 2016), Sternberg task (Sternberg, 1969; Gladwin, den Uyl, Fregni, & Wiers, 
2012) and stop-signal task (Horvath, Forte, & Carter, 2015) have been used in a 
previous neuromodulation studies (Marshall, Mölle, Siebner, & Born, 2005; Gladwin et 
al., 2012; Horvath et al., 2015; Oldrati et al., 2016). None of the other tasks included 
in this experiment have been used in any other neuromodulation experiment. All 
experimental tasks were counterbalanced (Figure 7.1). 
 
As described in Experiment 2 (Chapter 4) the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) was 
administered in this experiment. The battery used here consisted of a total of thirty-
two CRT items which were issued to participants in two parts of sixteen items 
(Frederick 2005; Toplak, West, and Stanovich 2011; Thomson and Oppenheimer 
2016; Szaszi et al. 2017). There was a total of twenty numeracy-based CRT items, 
with ten items in each of the parts. For the verbal-CRT there was a total of twelve 
items, with six items in each of the parts. The maximum score for all CRT items 
(numeracy-based CRT plus the verbal-CRT) when answered correctly was thirty-two. 
As described in Experiment 2 (Chapter 5) the n-back was used in this experiment. The 
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n-back contained a total of one hundred and twenty trials (correct and incorrect) were 
presented to participants for a maximum score of thirty.  
 
Scales and questionnaires that record thinking dispositions, as in Chapter 6 were used 
here. The actively open-minded thinking scale (AOT), Rational Experiential Inventory 
(REI) and National Adult Reading Test (NART) were all administered prior to 
stimulation.  
 
As described in Experiment 1 (Chapter 5) the representativeness (incongruent base-
rate) vignettes were used in this experiment. A detailed description of the base-rate 
vignettes follows.  
 
Base-rate vignettes: The base-rate vignettes, also called the representativeness 
heuristic when administered with an incongruent vignette (Grether, 1980; Teigen & 
Keren, 2007) demonstrate that when a base-rate (e.g., the probability of independent 
events occurring) and a vignette (e.g., stereotype of an occupation or age) are 
presented participants neglect the former in favour of the latter (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1972). There are three types of base-rate vignette with vignettes and base-rates that 
either (i) conflict (incongruent), (ii) do not conflict (congruent), or (iii) are not associated 
(neutral) (Table 7.4). During this task participants took ten minutes to respond to the 
ten base-rate vignettes by responding with either the correct probability response or 
the lure-based stereotype response.  
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Table 7.4. Examples of each of the types of base-rate vignette.  
Type of base-
rate vignette 
Example base-
rate 
Example vignette Answer options 
Incongruent A survey of 1500 
people was 
conducted. Among 
the participants 
there were 11 
sixteen-year olds 
and 1489 fifty-year 
olds. 
Ellen is a randomly chosen 
participant of this survey. 
Ellen likes to listen to hip 
hop and rap music. She 
enjoys wearing tight shirts 
and jeans. She’s fond of 
dancing and has a small 
nose piercing. 
Option a: 
Ellen is sixteen years 
old 
 
Option b: 
Ellen is fifty years old 
 
 
Congruent 
 
In a study of 700 
people there were 
615 television 
reporters and 85 
builders. 
 
Ray is a randomly chosen 
participants of this study. 
Ray always dresses 
smartly, liking to wear a suit. 
He keeps up to date with 
current affairs and speaks 
very clearly. 
 
Option a: 
Ray is a builder 
 
Option b:  
Ray is a television 
reporter  
 
Neutral 
 
In a study of 1000 
people there were 
997 people who 
played the drums 
and 3 who played 
the saxophone. 
 
Tom is a randomly chosen 
participants in this study. 
Tom is 20 years old. He is 
studying in Washington and 
has no steady girlfriend. He 
just bought a second-hand 
car with his savings. 
 
Option a:  
Tom plays the 
saxophone 
 
Option b: 
Tom plays the drums  
These are example base-rate vignettes for demonstration purposes only. The correct answer 
for each of these examples is option ‘b’. In the items used during the experiment the correct 
answer was not always option ‘b’.     
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A total of twenty base-rate items were given to participants: 10 incongruent, 5 
congruent and 5 neutral. The maximum score recorded per participant was 10 
(incongruent base-rates). 
 
Sternberg: The Sternberg task measures working memory / updating (Sternberg, 
1969). In this task participants are presented with a short-list of 8 letters (e.g., E G H I 
N K O W). After the initial presentation of the stimuli the participant is then shown a 
letter (e.g., K) and asked if the letter had appeared in the short-list of letters.  
 
A total of one hundred and eighty trials (correct and incorrect) were presented to 
participants with a maximum score of sixty correct answers in sixty matching trials. 
Participants had a maximum of ten minutes to complete the Sternberg task.  
 
Stop Signal Task: The Stop Signal Task (SST) measures response inhibition (Li, 
Huang, Constable, & Sinha, 2006; Chikazoe et al., 2009). In this task participants saw 
an ‘X’ of an ’O’ on screen. They were instructed to press the button that 
correspondents to the symbol that is presented (e.g., an ‘X’ for an ‘X’). In the second 
part of the task participants continue to select the buttons, however, if they heard an 
auditory signal (a beep) they withheld their response by not pressing any button.  
 
A total of three hundred and twenty trials split into four blocks of eighty trials were 
presented to participants. This task took a maximum of ten minutes to complete.  
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Barratt Impulsiveness Scale: The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS) is a measure 
of impulsivity (Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995). Participants respond to thirty items 
(e.g., I don’t pay attention) on a four-point Likert scale from 1 (never/rarely) to 4 (almost 
always/always). Participants completed the BIS on pen and paper and were limited to 
a maximum of five minutes to complete this task.   
 
For the executive function tasks – n-back task, Sternberg task and Stop Signal Task 
– participants completed the same trials in both experimental conditions. For all other 
tasks participants completed different trials/items in each experimental session. 
  
7.4 Analysis plan 
The raw data were screened for outliers and missing values before conducting any 
analysis. Outliers were identified as data points outside of a 1.5 interquartile (IQR) 
range. For all judgement and decision-making, and working memory (updating) tasks 
accuracies (or percentages for the Type 1 analyses) were used during analysis as 
there were different numbers of items for the CRT, verbal-CRT, and incongruent base-
rate vignettes. There was also a different number of trails in the 2-back and Sternberg 
tasks. There were no missing values.  
  
The first analysis examined whether there were any a priori differences between 
experimental groups regarding cognitive characteristics, as in Experiment 2. A 
multivariate of analyses of variance (MANOVA) was performed, with type of 
stimulation (right DLPFC or sham) as between-subject factor. Dependent variables 
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were the actively open-minded thinking scale (AOT), National Adult Reading Test 
(NART), and the REI subscales: rationale (REI 10 R) and experiential (REI 10 E). 
 
The second analysis examined whether there were any a priori differences between 
experimental groups with regards to Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS). A multivariate 
analyses of variance (MANOVA) was performed, with type of stimulation (right DLPFC 
or sham) as the between-subject factor. Dependent variables were the BIS second 
order subscales, attentional impulsiveness, motor impulsiveness and non-planning 
impulsiveness.       
 
Next a series of multivariate analyses of variances (MANOVAs) and repeated 
measures analyses of variances (RM ANOVAs) examined the effects of stimulation 
on judgement and decision-making tasks, working memory tasks (updating), and 
inhibition. In the MANOVAs the sum total of correct responses of each variable was 
used during analysis. For the RM ANOVAs accuracy was used during analysis for 
each of the variables because of different numbers of items across tasks, e.g., the 
CRT had ten items whilst the verbal-CRT had six items per session.  
 
7.4.1 Judgement and decision-making analyses 
To examine the effects of stimulation on decision-making four separate multivariate 
analysis of variances (MANOVA) were conducted with stimulation (sham or right 
DLPFC) as the between-subject factor. In the first MANOVA dependent variables were 
accuracies for: CRT, verbal-CRT and incongruent base-rate vignettes. In the second 
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MANOVA dependent variables were the percentage of intuitive incorrect answers for 
the: CRT, verbal-CRT and incongruent base-rate vignettes. The third and fourth 
MANOVAs were similar to the first and second with the exception that all dependent 
variables contained data from the second experimental session. Significant effects 
were analysed with ANOVAs to determine the specific contributing contrast. 
 
To test the effects of stimulation on decision-making over the two experimental 
sessions four separate repeated measures analysis of variances (RM ANOVA) were 
conducted with stimulation (first or second) and thinking task performance (accuracies 
for: CRT, verbal-CRT and incongruent base-rate vignettes) as within-subject factors. 
The first two RM ANOVAs examined decision-making in the experimental group with 
two anodal stimulation sessions across both days. In the first RM ANOVA dependent 
variables were accuracies for the: CRT, verbal-CRT and incongruent base-rate 
vignettes. In the second RM ANOVA dependent variables were the percentage of 
intuitive incorrect answers for the: CRT, verbal-CRT and the incongruent base-rate 
vignettes. The third and fourth RM ANOVAs differed from the first and second RM 
ANOVAs above in that the data was from the experimental group that had one anodal 
stimulation session followed by a sham session – these final analyses tested for a 
practice effect across stimulation sessions. Significant effects were analysed with 
ANOVAs to determine the specific contributing contrast. 
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7.4.2 Executive functioning: working memory (updating) 
task analyses 
The working memory (updating) analyses were set-up the same as in decision-making 
MANOVAs and RM ANOVAs above with the exception of the dependent variables. 
Dependent variables were accuracies for the 2-back and Sternberg tasks.  
 
7.4.3 Executive functioning: inhibition task analyses 
The inhibition analyses were set-up the same as in decision-making MANOVAs and 
RM ANOVAs above with the exception of the dependent variables. Dependent 
variables were stop signal go errors and stop signal stop errors. 
 
7.4.4 Decision-making and impulsivity: Type 2 regression 
analyses 
To test the relationship between stimulation group and BIS impulsivity on the Type 2 
responses in the decision-making tasks (CRT, verbal-CRT and incongruent base-rate 
vignettes) multiple regression analyses were conducted. Both stimulation (dummy-
coded) and the BIS impulsivity subscales were used as predictors of decision-making 
tasks.   
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7.4.5 Decision-making and impulsivity: Type 1 regression 
analyses 
To test the relationship between stimulation group and BIS impulsivity on the Type 1 
responses in the decision-making tasks (CRT, verbal-CRT and incongruent base-rate 
vignettes) multiple regression analyses were conducted. Again, both stimulation and 
the BIS impulsivity subscales were entered as predictors of decision-making tasks. 
 
7.5 Results 
A first analysis investigated whether there were any a priori differences between 
groups regarding thinking styles. A multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA) was 
performed, with the stimulation group (right DLPFC in repeated stimulation, right 
DLPFC in single stimulation group, or sham) as the between-subject factor. 
Dependent variables were the REI subscales: rational (REI 10 R) and experiential (REI 
10 E), the actively open-minded thinking scale (AOT) and National Adult Reading Test 
(NART). 
 
A MANOVA with cognitive characteristics as dependent variables showed an effect of 
stimulation group (Pillai’s trace = 0.35, p = 0.03) on thinking disposition. A follow-up 
ANOVA found that the experimental groups differed in REI 10 R scores, F(2, 45) = 
3.70, p = 0.03, partial η2 = 0.14. Planned contrasts revealed REI 10 R scores were 
statistically higher for the sham group (M = 19.75, SD = 3.60) compared to the anodal 
first (with sham second) group (M = 15.88, SD = 4.16) p = 0.01, 95% CI [-6.88, -0.86], 
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but not compared to the anodal first (with a second stimulation) group (M = 16.75, SD 
= 4.83) p = 0.051, 95% CI [-6.01, 0.01].   
 
To examine if there any differences in REI 10 R scores between the anodal first (with 
sham second) group and anodal first (with a second stimulation) group a t-test was 
run. The t-test revealed that there was no difference between REI 10 R scores 
between these stimulation groups, t(30) = 0.55, p = 0.32, 95% CI [-2.40, 4.13].      
 
There was no effect of stimulation group on the REI 10 E, AOT or NART scores all ps 
> 0.06. Thus, the three experimental groups did not differ in the cognitive 
characteristics scores for the REI 10 E, AOT or NART which have previously been 
associated with judgement and decision-making performance (e.g., Toplak et al., 
2011). 
 
The second analyses examined whether there were any a priori differences between 
experimental groups regarding impulsivity. A multivariate analyses of variance 
(MANOVA) was performed, with the stimulation group (right DLPFC in repeated 
stimulation, right DLPFC in single stimulation group, or sham) as the between-subject 
factor. Dependent variables were the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS) second order 
subscales were: attentional impulsiveness, motor impulsiveness and non-planning 
impulsiveness. The MANOVA revealed that there was no effect of stimulation group 
on BIS impulsivity subscales, all ps > 0.13. Therefore, the three experimental groups 
did not differ in impulsivity for any of the BIS subscales.      
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Table 7.5. Barrett Impulsiveness Scale (BIS) second order results across 
experimental groups.  
 Stimulation group (anode location session 1-session 
2) mean (SD) 
BIS 2nd order 
factors 
Right DLPFC-Right 
DLPFC 
Right DLPFC-
sham 
Sham 
Attentional 17.90 (3.00) 18.25 (4.30) 18.75 (4.14) 
Motor 23.70 (3.07) 24.20 (4.55) 24.38 (3.74) 
Non-planning 25.75 (4.54) 25.25 (6.01) 24.31 (5.05) 
The means and standard deviations are presented in parentheses. Abbreviations:  
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and Barrett Impulsiveness Scale (BIS). 
 
7.5.1 Judgement and decision-making results 
Raw data was screened for outliers and missing values. There were no missing values 
or outliers in the accuracy scores (i.e., correct response) for the thinking tasks (i.e., 
CRT, verbal-CRT and incongruent base-rate vignettes / representativeness). All 
assumptions including data distribution were examined during analysis – unless 
otherwise stated these were not violated. 
 
To test the effects of stimulation on Type 2 responses (thinking performance) in the 
first session a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed with type 
of stimulation (right DLPFC or sham) as between-subject factor. Dependent variables 
were accuracies for the: CRT, verbal-CRT, and incongruent base-rate vignettes. The 
Box’s test results showed equality of covariance matrices p = 0.70. Using Wilks’ 
Lambda, there was a significant effect of stimulation on thinking task performance, λ 
= 0.78, F(3, 44) = 4.09, p = 0.01, partial η2 = 0.21 – performance improved after 
stimulation of the right DLPFC. 
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There was no effect of stimulation (M = 3.70, SD = 1.57) on the verbal-CRT, F(1, 46) 
= 1.60, p = 0.21, partial η2 = 0.03, compared to sham (M = 3.13, SD = 1.26). 
 
The follow-up ANOVA for CRT accuracy revealed that there was an effect of 
stimulation on CRT performance, F(1, 46) = 5.00, p = 0.03, partial η2 = 0.10. CRT 
performance was higher after right DLPFC stimulation (M = 4.00, SD = 1.42) compared 
to sham (M = 3.00, SD = 1.46) (Figure 7.2, panel A). 
 
The follow-up ANOVA for accuracy in the incongruent base-rate vignettes revealed 
that there was an effect of stimulation on performance, F(1, 46) = 5.31, p = 0.02, partial 
η2 = 0.10. Performance for the incongruent base-rate vignettes was higher after right 
DLPFC stimulation (M = 6.70, SD = 2.73) compared to sham (M = 4.63, SD = 3.22) 
(Figure 7.2, panel B). 
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Figure 7.2. Effects of tDCS neuromodulation on thinking task performance. The panels show 
the effects of tDCS (sham or right DLPFC) on mean correct answers for the Cognitive 
Reflection Test (panel A) and mean correct answers for representativeness (incongruent 
base-rate vignettes) (panel B). High values for both panels denote high levels of analytic 
thinking. Significance levels from follow-up ANOVAs, error bars denote standard errors from 
mean: an asterisk denotes p < 0.05. Abbreviations: Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), 
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). 
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The second MANOVA examined the effects of stimulation on incorrect, intuitive Type 
1 scores in the first session. The between-subject factor was type of stimulation (right 
DLPFC or sham). Dependent variables were the percentage of intuitive scores for the 
CRT, verbal-CRT and the incongruent base-rate vignettes. The Box’s test results 
showed equality of covariance matrices, p = 0.48. Using Wilks’ Lambda, there was no 
main effect of stimulation on thinking task performance, λ = 0.85, F(3, 44) = 2.60, p = 
0.06, partial η2 = 0.15. 
 
Despite the non-significant result from the MANOVA, a follow-up ANOVA for the 
percentage of intuitive incongruent base-rate vignettes was performed to be able to 
compare them to the observed effects in Experiment 1. This revealed an effect of 
stimulation on these scores, F(1, 46) = 5.40, p = 0.02, partial η2 = 0.10. There were 
fewer intuitive responses after right DLPFC stimulation (M = 3.31, SD = 2.73) 
compared to sham (M = 5.37, SD = 3.22) (Figure 7.3).  
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Figure 7.3. Effects of tDCS on intuitive representativeness answers. This figure shows mean 
incorrect intuitive answers for representativeness (incongruent base-rate) vignettes. High 
values denote high levels of intuitive thinking. Significance level from follow-up ANOVA, error 
bars denote standard errors from mean: an asterisk denotes p < 0.05. Abbreviations: 
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). 
 
Next, to test the effects of stimulation on Type 2 responses (thinking performance) 
across the second sessions a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was 
performed with type of stimulation (right DLPFC or sham) as between-subject factor. 
Dependent variables were accuracies for the: CRT, verbal-CRT and the incongruent 
base-rate vignettes. The Box’s test results showed equality of covariance matrices p 
= 0.92. Using Wilks’ Lambda, there was a significant main effect of stimulation on 
thinking task performance, λ = 0.68, F(3, 28) = 4.36, p = 0.01, partial η2 = 0.01 – 
performance improved after stimulation of the right DLPFC compared to sham. 
 
There was no effect of stimulation on performance for the verbal-CRT (stimulation M 
= 4.75, SD = 1.53, sham M = 3.88, SD = 1.63), F(1, 30) = 2.83, p = 0.10, partial η2 = 
0.08, or the incongruent base-rate vignettes (stimulation M = 6.75, SD = 2.80, sham 
M = 5.25, SD = 3.00), F(1, 30) = 2.14, p = 0.15, partial η2 = 0.07. 
 
A follow-up ANOVA for CRT performance revealed that there was an effect of 
stimulation on the CRT, F(1, 30) = 10.30, p = 0.01, partial η2 = 0.25. Performance in 
the repeat sessions was higher for right DLPFC stimulation group (M = 5.56, SD = 
2.03) than in the sham group (M = 3.40, SD = 1.66) (Figure 7.4). 
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Figure 7.4. Effects of tDCS on cognitive reflection test performance in the second 
experimental session. This figure shows mean correct answers for the Cognitive Reflection 
Test. High values denote high levels of analytic thinking. Significance levels from follow-up 
ANOVAs, error bars denote standard errors from mean: an asterisk denotes p < 0.05. 
Abbreviations: Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). 
 
The fourth MANOVA examined the effects of stimulation on the percentage of incorrect 
intuitive Type 1 responses in second sessions of both experimental groups. The 
between-subject factors was the type of stimulation (right DLPFC or sham). 
Dependent variables were the percentage of intuitive CRT scores, verbal-CRT and 
incongruent base-rate vignettes scores. The Box’s test results showed equality of 
covariance matrices p = 0.78. Using Wilks’ Lambda, there was a significant main effect 
of stimulation on intuitive thinking task scores, λ = 0.68, F(3, 27) = 4.07, p = 0.01, 
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partial η2 = 0.31 – there were fewer intuitive responses after the stimulation of the right 
DLPFC compared to sham. 
 
There was no effect of stimulation group on intuitive answers for the incongruent base-
rate vignettes (stimulation M = 3.46, SD = 2.75, sham M = 4.75, SD = 3.00), F(1, 29) 
= 1.53, p = 0.22, partial η2 = 0.05, or intuitive answers or for verbal-CRT scores 
(stimulation M = 1.60, SD = 1.30, sham M = 2.37, SD = 1.36), F(1, 29) = 2.62, p = 
0.11, partial η2 = 0.08.  
 
The follow-up ANOVA revealed an effect of stimulation group on intuitive CRT scores, 
F(1, 29) = 11.20, p = 0.01, partial η2 = 0.28 (Figure 7.5). A follow-up t-test revealed 
that intuitive CRT scores decreased following right DLPFC stimulation (M = 2.06, SD 
= 1.22) compared to sham t(28) = 1.05, p = 0.01 (M = 4.00, SD = 1.90). 
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Figure 7.5. Effects of tDCS on incorrect intuitive cognitive reflection test scores in second 
sessions. This figure shows mean incorrect intuitive answers for the Cognitive Reflection Test. 
High values denote high levels of intuitive thinking. Significance levels from follow-up 
ANOVAs, error bars denote standard errors from mean: an asterisk denotes p < 0.05. 
Abbreviations: Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). 
 
Next, a repeated measures analyses of variance (RM ANOVA) examined the 
cumulative effects of stimulation in the experimental group with two anodal stimulation 
sessions spaced twenty-four-hours apart. Within-subjects variables were stimulation 
session (first or second) and thinking task (accuracies for: CRT, verbal-CRT and 
incongruent base-rate vignettes).  
 
There was an effect of stimulation across the two experimental sessions on thinking 
task performance, F(1, 15) = 4.50, p = 0.05, partial η2 = 0.23. Performance improved 
in the second session compared to the first session (Figure 7.6). 
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The follow-up t-test for the CRT scores revealed that performance improved in the 
second experimental session (M = 0.60, SD = 0.22) compared to the first session (M 
= 0.41, SD = 0.17), t(15) = -2.80, p = 0.013.  
 
Separate follow-up t-tests revealed that there was no statistically significant difference 
across experimental sessions for the verbal-CRT (1st session: M = 0.58, SD = 0.23, 
2nd session: M = 0.71, SD = 0.20), t(15) = -2.03, p = 0.06, or for the incongruent base-
rate vignettes (1st session: M = 0.66, SD = 0.26, 2nd session: M = 0.67, SD = 0.28), 
t(15) = -0.23, p = 0.82. 
 
There was a 2-way interaction between stimulation session and thinking task, F(2, 30) 
= 4.70, p = 0.02, partial η2 = 0.24. As shown above, CRT performance improved across 
stimulation sessions, with higher performance in the second experimental session 
than the first session, whereas, there was no difference between first and second 
session for incongruent base-rate vignette performance (Figure 7.6).  
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Figure 7.6. Thinking task accuracy across stimulation sessions in the repeated stimulation 
experimental group. This figure shows accuracy for the CRT, verbal-CRT and 
representativeness (incongruent base-rate) vignettes across the stimulation sessions in the 
repeated stimulation group. High values denote high levels of analytic thinking. Abbreviations: 
Experimental group with two anodal stimulation sessions (a-a), Cognitive Reflection Test 
(CRT). 
 
The second two-way repeated measures ANOVA was run with stimulation session 
(first or second) and the percentage of intuitive Type 1 thinking task scores (CRT, 
verbal-CRT and incongruent base-rate vignette) as within-subjects variables.  
 
There was an effect of stimulation across the experimental sessions on intuitive 
thinking task scores, F(1,15) = 14.58, p = 0.01, partial η2 = 0.51. Intuitive responding 
decreased in the second session compared to the first session. 
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A follow-up t-test for intuitive CRT responses revealed that there were fewer intuitive 
responses in the second stimulation session (M = 0.20, SD = 0.12) than the first 
session (M = 0.40, SD = 0.18), t(15) = 3.00, p = 0.01. 
 
The separate follow-up t-tests for intuitive responses for the verbal-CRT, t(15) = 1.37, 
p = 0.20, and incongruent base-rate vignettes, t(15) = -0.23, p = 0.82 revealed no 
difference in responses across sessions. For the verbal-CRT there was no statistically 
significant difference in intuitive responses for the first (M= 0.30, SD = 0.23) and 
second (M = 0.20, SD = 0.20) sessions. There was also no difference in intuitive 
responding for the incongruent base-rate vignettes across the first (M = 0.66, SD = 
0.26) and second (M = 0.67, SD = 0.28) sessions.  
 
There was no 2-way interaction between stimulation session and task, F(2, 30) = 2.03, 
p = 0.15, partial η2 = 0.12 (Figure 7.7). 
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Figure 7.7. Type 1 intuitive thinking task scores as percentages across stimulation sessions 
in the repeated stimulation experimental group. This figure shows percentage of Type 1 
answers for the CRT, verbal-CRT and representativeness (incongruent base-rate) vignettes 
across the stimulation sessions in the repeated stimulation group. High values denote high 
levels of analytic thinking. Abbreviations: Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), repeated anodal 
stimulation experimental group (a-a). 
 
The third RM ANOVA was run to examine if there were any practice effects between 
sessions in the stimulation first and sham second experimental condition. Within-
subjects variables were stimulation session (first or second) and thinking task 
(accuracies for: CRT, verbal-CRT, and incongruent base-rate vignettes). There were 
no effects of stimulation session on thinking task performance, F(1, 15) = 1.60, p = 
0.22, partial η2 = 0.10.   
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There was an effect of thinking task across sessions, F(2, 30) = 5.86, p = 0.01, partial 
η2 = 0.30. The planned contrasts revealed that accuracy was higher for the incongruent 
base-rate vignettes (1st session: M = 0.68, SD = 0.30, 2nd session: M = 0.52, SD = 
0.30) compared to CRT accuracy (1st session: M = 0.41, SD = 0.13, 2nd session: M = 
0.36, SD = 0.18) regardless of stimulation session, F(1,15) = 7.82, p = 0.01. There 
was no difference in accuracy between the verbal-CRT (1st session: M = 0.56, SD = 
0.23, 2nd session: M = 0.58, SD = 0.22) and incongruent base-rate vignettes (1st 
session: M = 0.68, SD = 0.30, 2nd session: M = 0.52, SD = 0.30), F(1,15) = 0.14, p = 
0.71 (Figure 7.8). 
 
There was no statistically significance interaction between stimulation session and 
task, F(2, 30) = 1.37, p = 0.27, partial η2 = 0.10 (Figure 7.8). 
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Figure 7.8. Thinking task accuracy across stimulation sessions in the anodal first and sham 
second experimental group. This figure shows accuracy for the CRT, verbal-CRT and 
representativeness (incongruent base-rate) vignettes across the stimulation sessions in the 
anodal first and sham second experimental group. High values denote high levels of analytic 
thinking. Abbreviations: Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), anodal first and sham second 
experimental group (a-s). 
 
The final RM ANOVA for the judgement and decision-making tasks examined if there 
was any practice effect on the percentage of Type 1 intuitive response scores across 
sessions in the stimulation first and sham second experimental condition. Within-
subjects variables were stimulation session (first or second) and intuitive thinking task 
percentage scores (CRT, verbal-CRT, and incongruent base-rate vignettes). There 
was no effect of stimulation session on intuitive response scores, F(1,15) = 1.46, p = 
0.24, partial η2 = 0.08.  
 
There was an effect of thinking task across sessions F(2, 30) = 18.32, p = 0.01, partial 
η2 = .55. The planned contrasts revealed that there were fewer intuitive responses for 
the CRT compared (1st session: M = 0.38, SD = 0.15, 2nd session: M = 0.40, SD = 
0.18) to the incongruent base-rate vignettes (1st session: M = 0.67, SD = 0.30, 2nd 
session: M = 0.52, SD = 0.30), F(1, 15) = 20.78, p = 0.01, and for the CRT compared 
to the verbal-CRT (1st session: M = 0.35, SD = 0.22, 2nd session: M = 0.34, SD = 0.20), 
F(1, 15) = 22.95, p = 0.01 (Figure 7.9). 
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There was no statistically significant interaction between stimulation session and task, 
F(2, 30) = 1.26, p = 0.30, partial η2 = 0.08 (Figure 7.9). 
 
Figure 7.9. Intuitive thinking task scores as percentages across stimulation sessions in the 
anodal first and sham second experimental group. This figure shows percentage of Type 1 
answers for the CRT, verbal-CRT and representativeness (incongruent base-rate) vignettes 
across the stimulation sessions in the anodal first and sham second experimental group. High 
values denote high levels of analytic thinking. Abbreviations: Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), 
anodal first and sham second experimental group (a-s). 
 
7.5.2 Executive function: working memory (updating) 
results 
To test the effects of stimulation on working memory accuracy in the first session a 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed with type of stimulation 
(right DLPFC or sham) as between-subject factor. Dependent variables were the 
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percentage of correct answers for the 2-back and Sternberg tasks. The Box’s test 
results showed equality of covariance matrices p = 0.40. Using Wilks’ Lambda, there 
was no main effect of stimulation on working memory performance, Wilks’ λ = 0.92, 
F(2, 45) = 1.86, p = 0.16, partial η2 = 0.07. There were no effects of stimulation on 2-
back correct answers, F(1, 46) = 0.90, p = 0.35, partial η2 = 0.02 or Sternberg correct 
answers, F(1, 46) = 2.22, p = 0.14, partial η2 = 0.04. 
 
To examine the effects of stimulation on working memory accuracy a multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed with type of stimulation (right DLPFC 
or sham) as between-subject factor. Dependent variables were the percentage of 
correct answers for the 2-back and Sternberg tasks. The Box’s test results showed 
that the equality of covariance had been violated p = 0.04 so Pillai’s trace was used. 
Using Pillai’s Trace, there was no main effect of stimulation on working memory 
performance, Pillai’s trace = 1.26, F(2, 29) = 1.26, p = 0.30, partial η2 = 0.08. There 
were no effects of stimulation on 2-back correct answers, F(1, 30) =2.00, p = 0.17, 
partial η2 = 0.06 or Sternberg correct answers, F(1, 30) = 1.58, p = 0.21, partial η2 = 
0.05. 
 
Next, a repeated measures ANOVA was run with stimulation session (first or second) 
and working memory performance (the percentage of correct answers in the: 2-back 
and Sternberg tasks) as within-subjects variables. There was no main effect of 
stimulation session on working memory performance, F(1, 15) = 0.01, p = 0.96, partial 
η2 = 0.01.  
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There was a main effect of type of working memory task across stimulation sessions, 
F(1, 15) = 36.56, p = 0.01, partial η2 = 0.71. The planned contrasts revealed that there 
was a difference between the n-back (1st session: M = 0.65, SD = 0.15, 2nd session: 
M = 0.65, SD = 0.18) and Sternberg (1st session: M = 0.88, SD = 0.06, 2nd session: M 
= 0.88, SD = 0.05) with higher accuracy for the Sternberg task, p = 0.01. 
 
There was no 2-way interaction between stimulation session and working memory 
task, F(1, 15) = 0.08, p = 0.78, partial η2 = 0.01. 
 
The second RM ANOVA examined if there was a practice effect between sessions in 
the stimulation first and sham second experimental condition. Within-subjects 
variables were stimulation session (first or second) and working memory performance 
(percentage of correct answers for the 2-back and Sternberg tasks). There was no 
main effect of stimulation session on working memory performance, F(1, 15) = 0.28, p 
= 0.60, partial η2 = 0.02.  
 
There was a main effect of type of working memory task across stimulation sessions, 
F(1, 15) = 77.01, p = 0.01, partial η2 = 0.83. The planned contrasts revealed that there 
was a difference between the n-back (1st session: M = 0.60, SD = 0.16, 2nd session: 
M = 0.58, SD = 0.15) and Sternberg (1st session: M = 0.86, SD = 0.07, 2nd session: M 
= 0.84, SD = 0.10) with higher accuracy for the Sternberg task p = 0.01. There was no 
2-way interaction between stimulation session and working memory performance, F(1, 
15) = 0.81, p = 0.80, partial η2 = 0.01. 
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7.5.3 Executive function: inhibition results 
The first MANOVA to examine inhibition data was performed with type of stimulation 
(right DLPFC or sham) as between-subject factor. Dependent variables were stop 
signal task go errors and stop signal task stop errors. The Box’s test results showed 
equality of covariance was violated so Pillai’s trace was used. Using Pillai’s trace, there 
was no main effect of stimulation on performance, Pillai’s trace = 0.05 F(2, 45) = 1.31, 
p = 0.28, partial η2 = 0.05. There were no main effects of stimulation on type of error 
for the stop signal task go errors, F(1, 46) = 0.51, p = 0.48, partial η2 = 0.01 or stop 
signal task stop errors, F(1, 46) = 1.26, p = 0.26, partial η2 = 0.02. 
 
To test the effects of stimulation on inhibition in the second session a multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed with type of stimulation (right DLPFC 
or sham) as between-subject factor. Dependent variables were stop signal task go 
errors and stop signal task stop errors. The Box’s test results showed equality of 
covariance matrices p = 0.91. Using Wilks’ Lambda, there was no main effect of 
stimulation on performance, Wilks’ λ = 0.96 F(4, 88) = 0.44, p = 0.77, partial η2 = 0.02. 
There were no effects of stimulation on types of error for the stop signal task go errors, 
F(2, 45) = 0.50, p = 0.61, partial η2 = 0.02 or stop signal task stop errors, F(2, 45) = 
0.45, p = 0.64, partial η2 = 0.02. 
 
Next, a repeated measures ANOVA was performed with stimulation session (first or 
second) and inhibition (stop signal task go errors and stop signal stop errors) as within-
subjects variables. There were no main effects of stimulation session on performance, 
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F(1, 15) = 0.61, p = 0.44, partial η2 = 0.04 or no main effects of type of error across 
stimulation sessions, F(1, 15) = 3.16, p = 0.10, partial η2 = 0.17.  
 
There was no 2-way interaction between stimulation session and error type, F(1, 15) 
= 1.20, p = 0.30, partial η2 = 0.07. 
 
The final repeated measures ANOVA examined if there was a practice effect between 
sessions in the stimulation first and sham second experimental condition. Within-
subjects variables were stimulation session (first or second) and error type (stop signal 
task go errors and stop signal stop errors). There was no significant main effect of 
stimulation across sessions on performance, F(1, 15) = 3.60, p = 0.07, partial η2 = 
0.20. 
 
There was an effect of type of error across stimulation sessions, F(1, 15) = 10.13, p = 
0.01, partial η2 = 0.40. The contrasts revealed that there were more stop errors (1st 
session: M = 90.62, SD = 54.30, 2nd session: M = 80.46, SD = 36.80) than go errors 
(1st session: M = 34.63, SD = 98.92, 2nd session: M = 13.54, SD = 27.61). There was 
no 2-way interaction between stimulation session and inhibition task, F(1, 15) = 0.13, 
p = 0.72, partial η2 = 0.01. 
 
There was no 2-way interaction between stimulation session and inhibition task, F(1, 
15) = 0.13, p = 0.72, partial η2 = 0.01. 
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7.5.4 Decision-making and impulsivity: Type 2 regression 
results 
The first multiple linear regression was calculated to predict CRT performance based 
on stimulation group (right DLPFC or sham) and BIS subscales. In the first model – 
with only stimulation group (dummy coded) as sole predictor - a significant regression 
equation was found for stimulation group, F(1, 46) = 4.85, p = 0.03, with an R2 of 0.10. 
Stimulation predicted CRT performance with increased Type 2 responding after 
stimulation compared to sham, β = -0.97, 95% CI [-1.85, -0.08]. The regression 
equation was not significant for the second model, F(4, 43) = 2.17, p = 0.08, which 
also included the 3 BIS subscales, with an R2 of 0.17 – none of the BIS subscales 
predicted CRT performance. 
 
The second multiple linear regression was calculated to predict verbal-CRT 
performance based on stimulation group (right DLPFC or sham) and BIS subscales. 
In the first model there was no significant regression equation for stimulation group, 
F(1, 46) = 1.54, p = 0.22, with an R2 of 0.03. The regression equation was also not 
significant for the second model, F(4, 43) = 0.60, p = 0.67, with an R2 of 0.22 – none 
of the BIS scales predicted verbal-CRT performance. 
 
The final multiple linear regression was calculated analogue to the above to predict 
incongruent base-rate vignette (representativeness) performance based on 
stimulation group (right DLPFC or sham) and BIS subscales. In the first model a 
significant regression equation was found for stimulation group, F(1, 46) = 5.40, p = 
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0.02, with an R2 of 0.10. Stimulation predicted incongruent base-rate vignette 
performance with increased Type 2 responding after stimulation compared to sham, β 
= -0.32, 95% CI [-3.85, -0.27]. The regression equation was not significant for the 
second model, F(4, 43) = 1.93, p = 0.12, with an R2 of 0.15 – none of the BIS subscales 
predicted CRT performance. 
 
7.5.5 Decision-making and impulsivity: Type 1 regression 
results 
A multiple linear regression was calculated to predict intuitive Type 1 CRT scores 
based on stimulation group (right DLPFC or sham) and BIS subscales. In the first 
model there was no significant regression equation for stimulation group, F(1, 46) = 
0.30, p = 0.60, with an R2 of .-0.01. The regression equation was not significant for the 
second model which also included the 3 BIS subscales, F(4, 43) = 0.21, p = 0.93, with 
an R2 of -0.02 – none of the BIS subscales predicted intuitive CRT scores. 
 
The second multiple linear regression was calculated to predict intuitive Type 1 verbal-
CRT scores based on stimulation group (right DLPFC or sham) and BIS subscales. In 
the first model there was no significant regression equation for stimulation group, F(1, 
46) = 0.70, p = 0.41, with an R2 of 0.01. The regression equation was not significant 
for the second model containing the 3 BIS subscales, F(4, 43) = 1.04, p = 0.46, with 
an R2 of 0.04 – none of the BIS subscales predicted intuitive verbal-CRT scores. 
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The final multiple linear regression was calculated to predict intuitive Type 1 
incongruent base-rate vignette (representativeness) scores based on stimulation 
group (right DLPFC or sham) and BIS subscales. In the first model a significant 
regression equation was found for stimulation group, F(1, 46) = 5.40, p = 0.02, with an 
R2 of 0.10. Stimulation predicted intuitive Type 1 incongruent base-rate vignette scores 
with decrease in Type 1 responding after stimulation compared to sham, β = 0.32, 
95% CI [0.27, 3.85]. The regression equation was not significant for the second model 
which also included the 3 BIS subscales, F(4, 43) = 1.93, p = 0.12, with an R2 of 0.15 
– none of the BIS subscales predicted intuitive CRT scores. 
 
In summary, using the BIS, impulsivity was not found to be a significant predictor of 
judgement and decision-making performance across types of tasks and scores. 
 
7.6 Discussion 
Experiment 3 replicated many of the basic effects in Experiment 1 (Chapter 5) and 
Experiment 2 (Chapter 6). There was an effect of anodal stimulation over the right 
DLPFC on cognitive reflection after one session (offline) as in Experiment 1 (Chapter 
5) and Experiment 2 (Chapter 6). Type 2 cognitive reflection, as measured with the 
CRT and incongruent base-rate vignettes increased after the enhancement of cortical 
excitability in the right DLPFC following a single session of stimulation. Other crucial 
findings of this experiment were that multiple anodal stimulation sessions with a 
twenty-four-hour intra-session interval resulted in a cumulative boost in cognitive 
reflection, as measured by the CRT (but not the incongruent base-rate vignettes). The 
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key finding was the increased cognitive reflection between first and second stimulation 
provides some evidence of a cumulative effect of neuromodulation. Importantly, there 
was no substantial practice effect on decision-making tasks over the two experimental 
sessions. 
 
The main predictions were as in Chapter 6, that increasing cortical excitability of the 
right DLPFC would increase performance on judgement and decision-making tasks 
that presumably rely on the inhibition of Type 1 automatic processing (Evans, 2003; 
Stanovich, 2009). The findings support the results of Experiment 2 (Chapter 6) which 
show that cognitive reflection (Type 2) was boosted for the mathematical CRT and 
incongruent base-rate vignettes, but not for the verbal-CRT compared to sham 
(Frederick, 2005; Sirota et al., 2017). These accuracy levels are also higher than the 
accuracies for papers that do not use brain stimulation methods (Frederick, 2005; 
Toplak, 2014; Sirota et al., 2017). 
 
The second main prediction was that applying anodal stimulation to the right DLPFC 
in two sessions of stimulation spaced twenty-four-hours apart would produce an 
additional increase in cognitive reflection. This was based on the idea that multiple 
stimulation sessions would have a cumulative effect on cognitive reflection as in the 
clinical literature (Talsma et al., 2017; Gilmore, Dickmann, Nelson, Lamberty, & Lim, 
2018) for other tasks. One paper that found an cumulative effect of multiple stimulation 
sessions, with no effect in a single session, showed that fifteen anodal stimulation 
sessions of the right DLPFC are needed to reduce risky decision-making in the BART 
(see Chapter 4) by decreasing impulsiveness (Gilmore et al., 2018). Although the 
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paper by Gilmore et al., uses a clinical sample this provides some evidence of the 
similar cumulative effect of stimulation that also increased cognitive reflection in this 
experiment. In this experiment the results suggest that there is a cumulative effect of 
stimulation on cognitive reflection when the stimulation is applied over the right 
DLPFC. 
 
The final prediction was that the cumulative effect of anodal stimulation on the right 
DLPFC for the CRT and incongruent base-rate vignette scores would surpass any 
practice effect (Lemay, Bédard, Rouleau, & Tremblay, 2004; Talsma et al., 2017). 
When a participant completes an identical task more than once their performance 
gradually often increases in step with the number of times that they perform the task 
until a ceiling effect is reached (i.e., the practice effect) (Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994; 
Donovan & Radosevich, 1999). In this experiment, the second experimental group 
(with one session of anodal stimulation followed by sham) was used to assess if there 
was any practice effect across all tasks. If a practice effect was present then 
participants would perform better in the second experimental session than the first 
session (e.g., higher CRT scores in the second session compared to the first) - they 
did not. There was no practice effect on decision-making tasks or executive functioning 
in this experiment. Therefore, adapting an experimental design with the addition of this 
second group eliminates a confounding practice effect whilst confirming that the 
cumulative effect of anodal stimulation was the source of the increase in cognitive 
reflection across experimental sessions.   
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The increase in cognitive reflection after right DLPFC stimulation could not be 
explained by cognitive characteristics such as thinking disposition, cognitive ability or 
impulsivity (BIS) as none of the relevant analyses revealed any effects on Type 2 
thinking. Furthermore, the measures of updating (Sternberg and 2-back) and inhibition 
(SST) that were administered to capture executive functioning also revealed no effects 
of stimulation on these variables. A review of forty-three studies by Toplak et al., (2010) 
suggests that although many studies report correlations between thinking dispositions, 
cognitive ability, executive functions and cognitive reflection only a small proportion of 
these experiments actually reveal a significant relationship between decision-making 
and these variables.  
 
Limitations of this study were the bilateral montages of the DLPFCs which were used 
to examine the neural correlates of cognitive reflection and dual-process judgement 
and decision-making. The bilateral montage was used here to build on the results from 
the meta-analysis (Chapter 5) and Experiment 1 (Chapter 6). Some researchers may 
consider that the bilateral montage, with electrodes of the right and left DLPFCs would 
leave the question of whether any effect on cognitive reflection is the direct result of 
anodal stimulation or the right DLPFC, or the anodal stimulation of the right DLPFC 
with a return over the left DLPFC (i.e., the return electrode contributing to the effect). 
Measures were taken in Experiment 2 to account for the potential effect of the 
contralateral return electrode on cognitive reflection and executive function scores. As 
there was no decrease in cognitive reflection in the left DLPFC experimental group in 
Experiment 2 the effects of stimulation in this experiment were likely not a result of the 
return electrode over the left DLPFC (see Chapter 6). The final limitation was that due 
to time constraints the cumulative effects of stimulation were observed over only two 
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experimental sessions – given more time the total number of experimental sessions 
could be increased to investigate this cumulative effect of stimulation further (see 
Talsma et al., 2017; Gilmore et al., 2018).    
 
7.7 Summary 
This experiment built on the findings of Experiments 1 and 2. Offline stimulation was 
applied to the right DLPFC in a mixed between-subjects and within-subjects 
experimental design so that: (i) a replication of Experiment 2 results on cognitive 
reflection could be tested, (ii) the effects of multiple sessions of anodal stimulation on 
cognitive reflection could be examined, and (iii) practice effects across decision-
making and executive functioning tasks could be eliminated. The results replicated 
and extended those of Experiments 1 and 2 – offline anodal stimulation of the right 
DLPFC continued to increase cognitive reflection after a single stimulation session 
when more test items were added. Furthermore, the multiple anodal stimulation 
sessions with a twenty-four-hour intra-session interval revealed that the second 
session of stimulation enhanced cognitive reflection further than a single session – this 
provides some evidence of a cumulative effect of stimulation carrying over from the 
first session to the second. The influence of practice effects on cognitive reflection was 
eliminated as the source of the boost on cognitive in the second stimulation session.  
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Chapter 8 
8.1 General Discussion 
The meta-analysis and three experiments in this thesis demonstrate that anodal 
neuromodulation of the frontal lobe affects performance on judgement and decision-
making tasks. The meta-analysis revealed that anodal stimulation of the left frontal 
lobe (FL) (orbital frontal cortex, inferior frontal cortex and DLPFC) significantly 
improved decision-making performance and reduced risk-taking behaviour. The three 
experimental studies then examined the dual-process framework with tasks designed 
to measure different components of the framework (inhibition, set-shifting and 
updating) more precisely. Rather than reducing Type 1 processing, as in the meta-
analysis, anodal stimulation of the right DLPFC enhanced analytic Type 2 processing 
without always reducing Type 1 thinking. Taken together the four studies (including 
the meta-analysis) provide evidence that that the neural substrates of judgement and 
decision-making that are involved in Type 2 processing (e.g., CRT) are localised in the 
right DLPFC.    
 
The meta-analysis (Chapter 4) examined the effects of anodal and cathodal 
stimulation on the dual-process framework of decision-making. In this chapter there 
were sub-group analyses on risk-taking decision-making, Type 1 decision-making and 
Type 2 decision-making – each of these sub-groups also assessed online versus 
offline stimulation and right versus left FL stimulation. The results revealed that online 
anodal stimulation of the left FL had a significant effect on decision-making, reducing 
the use of Type 1 processing. One explanation for the reduction in Type 1 processing 
is that the left FL supports the convergence of interconnections with other brain 
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structures that coordinate planning and problem solving (Hecht, Walsh, and Lavidor, 
2010; Cheng and Lee, 2015). Secondly, the left FL is associated with cognitive 
functions that are important in impulsive decision-making such as self-regulation (or 
self-control) (Mengarelli et al., 2015) and affective modulation (Hare, Camerer, and 
Rangel, 2009), as both affective modulation and self-regulation are associated with 
this type of thinking. For example, when in a highly affective (i.e., emotional) state one 
is likely to make an impulsive decision rather than a calm and calculated decision 
(Hare, Camerer, and Rangel, 2009). Interestingly, there was no significant effect on 
Type 2 processing which may be due to the limitations of this meta-analysis.  
 
The second main finding from the meta-analysis was that online anodal stimulation of 
the left DLPFC reduced risky decision-making. Unlike the sub-group analyses for Type 
1 and Type 2 processing most of the papers in the risk-taking analysis used the same 
experimental task, the BART (four of five used the BART). These findings have been 
corroborated with a recently published study that replicated these results by Nejati, 
Salehinejad, and Nitsche (2018). The reduction in risk-taking can be explained through 
the dual-process framework of decision-making. Impulsive risky decision-making 
relies on automatic Type 1 processing (Evans, 2006; 2012). To suppress risky 
decision-making, one must override these decisions by engaging in analytic Type 2 
thinking (Nejati, Salehinejad, and Nitsche, 2018). Therefore, it is probably due to 
shared neural substrates of risky decision-making and Type 1 processing that anodal 
stimulation of the left DLPFC reduces risk-taking. 
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Experiment 1 (Chapter 5) provided the first empirical evidence of an increase of 
cognitive reflection (Type 2 thinking) during neuromodulation. In this experiment, 
online anodal stimulation was administered whilst participants completed a battery of 
decision-making tasks that included belief bias syllogisms, the CRT and 
representativeness vignettes. There was an effect of stimulation on performance for 
the CRT and representativeness vignettes with Type 2 cognitive reflection 
performance increasing after anodal stimulation of the right DLPFC. A further analysis 
of the incorrect intuitive Type 1 responses for the representativeness vignettes 
revealed a reduction in Type 1 processing after the anodal neuromodulation of the 
right DLPFC. These findings can in principle be explained by the involvement of the 
right DLPFC in inhibition (Aron, Robbins, and Poldrack, 2004; Bari and Robbins, 2013) 
and set-shifting (Loftus et al., 2015) – both of which are executive functions that 
underpin decision-making in the dual-process framework (Evans, 2008; Friedman and 
Miyake, 2017). However, although two executive function tasks were used in this 
experiment to assess updating (the n-back) and inhibition (the numerical Stroop) 
neither task captured the exact executive functions that are proposed to be involved 
in the dual-process framework.  
 
It was then tested whether working memory tasks in which high levels of updating are 
needed for the successful completion such as the 3-back or Sternberg task (Sternberg, 
1969; Katsoulaki, Kastrinis, and Tsekoura, 2017) may capture updating more 
efficiently than arguably easier tasks such as the 2-back (Jaeggi et al., 2010; Friedman 
and Miyake, 2017). Experiments 2 and 3 therefore used multiple updating and 
inhibition tasks to better capture the potential relationship between these executive 
functions and dual-process decision-making (including cognitive reflection).   
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The second experiment (Chapter 6 – Experiment 2) again showed that stimulating the 
right DLPFC with offline stimulation (rather than online stimulation in Experiment 1) 
increased cognitive reflection. As in the first experiment, however, these findings could 
not be explained by the involvement of the executive functions – namely inhibition 
(Bari and Robbins, 2013), updating (Jaeggi et al., 2010) and set-shifting (Loftus et al., 
2015). There was an effect of stimulation on Type 1 processing in this experiment for 
the representativeness vignettes, but not for the CRT items.  
 
An important point in Experiment 2 is that, rather than using online stimulation, as in 
Experiment 1, offline stimulation was used. Where Experiment 1 used online 
stimulation for the judgement and decision-making tasks (CRT and heuristics) with 
offline stimulation for the executive functioning tasks, Experiment 2 used offline 
stimulation for all tasks. Offline stimulation was chosen here for two reasons (i) the 
meta-analysis indicated that offline stimulation effects intuitive (Type 1) processing but 
not online, and (ii) that offline stimulation has potentially more applied value as it 
promises more long-term modulation of behaviour. Crucially, as with the online 
stimulation in Experiment 1 there was an effect of offline stimulation in Experiment 2 
on Type 2 processing – both modes of neuromodulation increased cognitive reflection. 
A possible explanation for the mechanisms of online and offline stimulation on the 
neural substrates of Type 2 processing is given in Chapter 2. In short, online 
stimulation preferentially affects the task-relevant activated neurons (Coffman et al., 
2012; Bikson and Rahman, 2013) whilst offline stimulation modulates the neuronal 
populations independent from, and prior to, the tasks – this distinction does not 
eliminate the involvement of the neuronal population in the said task (Nitsche et al., 
2003; 2008).      
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Interestingly, and surprisingly, the absence of an effect of stimulation of the right 
DLPFC for executive functioning from Experiment 1 was also observed in Experiment 
2. In Experiment 2 updating was measured with the 2-back and 3-back versions of the 
n-back (Lally et al., 2013), and inhibition was examined with the Attention Switching 
Task (AST) (Hanania and Smith, 2010). As discussed in previous chapters, one 
reason for the lack of effect of stimulation on updating may be that the n-back task 
does not capture the type of updating that is involved in Type 2 decision-making – 
experiment 3 tested this hypothesis. With reference to inhibition tasks such as the AST 
– an additional task introduced in Experiment 3 - some scholars have suggested that 
there are different forms of inhibition which are measured across the established 
measures of inhibition such as the Go / No-go task (Aron, Robbins, and Poldrack, 
2014), Stop Signal Task (SST) (Boehler et al., 2010) and AST (Hanania and Smith, 
2010). The AST was used to measure a type of planned inhibition (also called ‘far 
inhibition’) whereby a participant has the chance to see an instruction a short time 
before the appearance of the task stimulation and therefore prepare their response 
(Hanania and Smith, 2010). Whilst the SST measures unplanned inhibition (also called 
‘near inhibition’), as participants do not have the time to prepare a response due to 
seeing the instruction at the same time as the test stimuli (Swick, Ashley, and Turken, 
2011). Experiment 3 examined the relationship between near inhibition and cognitive 
reflection by administering the SST. 
 
The third experiment (Chapter 7 - Experiment 3) replicated the results of Experiment 
2 by showing that offline anodal stimulation of the right DLPFC increased cognitive 
reflection when this form of Type 2 processing is measured by the CRT and 
representativeness (also called incongruent base-rate) vignettes (Grether, 1980; 
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Frederick, 2005). As in the previous two experiments there was no indication of an 
involvement of the right DLPFC in executive functioning performance that may have 
underpinned Type 2 processing. Interestingly, there was an effect of anodal 
stimulation on Type 1 processing for the CRT – intuitive thinking decreased after the 
neuromodulation of the right DLPFC compared to sham. The reason why there was 
an effect of stimulation on Type 1 processing here, but not in Experiment 2, may be 
that in the second experiment there were fewer CRT items. Crucially, whilst there was 
no effect of stimulation on Type 1 intuitive scores for the CRT with a single session of 
stimulation (in both Experiments 2 and 3) there was a reduction in intuitive thinking 
following two sessions of stimulation (as in Experiment 3). This pattern of results 
provides evidence for the reduction of Type 1 thinking (for the CRT) which only occurs 
as a result of a cumulative effect of stimulation from a minimum of two sessions of 
neuromodulation.    
 
The second aim of Experiment 3 was to assess whether there was a cumulative effect 
of stimulation (Talsma, Kroese, and Slagter, 2017; Gilmore et al., 2018) on the neural 
substrates of the dual-process framework of decision-making – does cognitive 
reflection increase in a stepwise manor with the increased quantity of stimulation 
sessions? The results of this experiment revealed that cognitive reflection does 
increase after a second session of stimulation as if it increases with each step. 
Moreover, the same cumulative effect of stimulation was present in the Type 1 
analyses when intuitive responding decreased even more in a second session of 
stimulation than a single session. One possible alternative explanation for the 
apparent cumulative effect of stimulation was that there may have been a practice 
effect, with participants improving in task performance simply because they had 
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experienced the same task before (Donovan and Radosevich, 1999; Fugate, 2007). 
The design of Experiment 3 accounted for this possibility, finding that there was no 
effect of practice on any of the tasks that were administered in this experiment.  
 
The results of the meta-analysis and all three experiments are presented in tables 8.1 
and 8.2 so that the effects of neuromodulation across all aspects of this thesis can be 
observed.       
Table 8.1. The effects of anodal stimulation on Type 2 processing and executive functions 
across all four experiments (meta-analysis & three experiments) in this thesis. 
Type 2 Meta- Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 
 Analysis (online 
JDM & 
offline EF) 
(offline) (offline cumul.) 
    Stim vs. 
sham 1st 
Stim vs. 
sham 2nd 
Stim vs. 
stim 
Reflection Left - n/a - n/a n/a n/a 
Reflection Right - Y Y Y N Y 
Inhibition Left n/a - - - - - 
Inhibition Right n/a - - - - - 
Updating Left n/a - - - - - 
Updating Right n/a - - - - - 
All effects are increases in Type 2 cognitive reflection. Abbreviations: ‘Cumul.’ -  experiment 
examining the cumulative effect of stimulation, ’left’ – left hemisphere stimulation, ‘right’ – right 
hemisphere stimulation, ‘JDM’ – judgement and decision-making tasks, ‘EF’ – executive 
functioning tasks, ‘-’ - no effect of stimulation, ‘N/A’ - not applicable as this was not tested in 
this experiment. Under the Experiment 3 heading the experimental conditions and groups are 
split into: (a) the first experimental groups only for the first sessions (‘stim vs. sham 1st’), (b) 
the second experimental groups only for the second sessions (‘stim vs. sham 2nd’), and (c) 
cumulative stimulation for the repeated stimulation group (‘stim vs. stim’). 
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Table 8.2. The effects of anodal stimulation on Type 1 processing across all four experiments 
(meta-analysis & three experiments) in this thesis. 
Type 1 Meta- Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 
 Analysis (online) (offline) (offline cumul.) 
    Stim vs. 
sham 1st 
Stim vs. 
sham 2nd 
Stim vs. 
stim 
Online Left Y n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Online Right - N n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Offline Left - n/a - n/a n/a n/a 
Offline Right - n/a N N Y Y 
All effects are increases in Type 1 processing. Abbreviations: ‘Cumul.’ -  experiment examining 
the cumulative effect of stimulation, ’left’ – left hemisphere stimulation, ‘right’ – right 
hemisphere stimulation, ‘-’ - no effect of stimulation, ‘N/A’ - not applicable as this was not 
tested in this experiment. Under the Experiment 3 heading the experimental conditions and 
groups are split into: (a) the first experimental groups only for the first sessions (‘stim vs. sham 
1st’), (b) the second experimental groups only for the second sessions (‘stim vs. sham 2nd’), 
and (c) cumulative stimulation for the repeated stimulation group (‘stim vs. stim’). 
 
Throughout the experiments in this thesis there were three main themes (i) online 
stimulation versus offline stimulation effects on Type 1 and Type 2 processing, (ii) the 
effects of stimulation on executive functioning, and (iii) the effects left hemisphere 
stimulation versus right hemisphere stimulation on the dual-process framework of 
judgement and decision-making. All of these themes go some way to answering the 
aims of this research that were set out in Chapter 1, to examine the neural substrates 
of judgement and decision-making in the dual-process framework. 
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In the meta-analysis the effects of online and offline neuromodulation were analysed 
to reveal that only online stimulation of the left hemisphere modulated decision-making 
– decreasing Type 1 processing (Table 8.2). Experiment 1 found that online 
stimulation enhanced cognitive reflection (Type 2) (Tables 8.1 and 8.2). Experiments 
2 and 3 found that offline stimulation also increased cognitive reflection (Table 8.1). 
The effects of online stimulation on judgement and decision-making occur as a result 
of the task-relevant neuronal populations in the right DLPFC, which are active whilst 
engaging in decision-making, being enhanced further by the anodal neuromodulation 
(Aron, Robbins, and Poldrack, 2004; Nitsche et al., 2008). The online stimulation 
boosts the probability for controlled cognitive reflection (Type 2) to override and correct 
autonomous intuitive thinking (Type 1). The effects of offline stimulation on decision-
making are likely driven be changes in synaptic strength that involve the modulation 
of glutamatergic activity through the potentiation of synaptic glutamatergic receptors 
(Nitsche et al., 2003; Stagg & Nitsche, 2011) – however, other yet unknown 
neurotransmitters may also be involved in this process. Thus, one can conclude that 
the neuronal population in the right DLPFC are involved in decision-making, and as 
such are enhanced by anodal stimulation regardless of whether online or offline 
stimulation is administered (Liebetanz et al., 2002).   
 
As there was an effect of neuromodulation on Type 1 and Type 2 processing this poses 
the critical question as to why there was no effect of stimulation on any of the executive 
functioning tasks. The dual-process framework posits that inhibition, updating and set-
shifting are crucial to engaging in judgement and decision-making (see Chapter 3) 
(Stanovich, 2009; Pennycook, Fugelsang, and Koehler, 2015; Friedman and Miyake, 
2017). The evidence from neuroimaging and neuromodulation studies also indicate 
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that the right DLPFC is involved in all three executive functions (Rubia et al., 2003; 
Simmonds, Pekar, and Mostofsky, 2008; Loftus et al., 2015). The evidence for 
updating primarily comes from experiments that utilise the n-back (Jaeggi et al., 2010; 
Katsoulaki, Kastrinis, and Tsekoura, 2017) and Sternberg (Gladwin et al., 2012; Hill, 
Fitzgerald, and Hoy, 2015) tasks. Some of these experiments implicate the 
involvement of other brain regions suggesting that the right DLPFC is not responsible 
for updating alone (Hill, Fitzgerald, and Hoy, 2015; Talsma, Kroese, and Slagter, 
2017). Whilst many other experiments that target the right DLPFC based on 
neuroimaging data fail to find an effect of stimulation on updating (Hill, Fitzgerald, and 
Hoy, 2015; Nikolin et al., 2018). A meta-analysis by Hill and colleagues (2015) 
questioned the efficacy of neurostimulation for modulating updating. Once the sixteen 
experiments included in their meta-analysis were analysed there was a small effect 
size for offline stimulation on working memory and no significant effect for online 
stimulation. They emphasise that higher current densities and longer stimulation 
durations might be more effective at modulating working memory performance (Hill, 
Fitzgerald, and Hoy, 2015). The lack of an effect of stimulation on updating in the 
experiments in this thesis do not necessarily eliminate the involvement of the right 
DLPFC in updating. 
 
Another reason may be that the neural substrates of type of inhibition involved in the 
SST being located in the inferior frontal cortex (IFC) rather than the right DLPFC 
(Jacobson, Javitt, and Lavidor, 2011; Tian, Ren, and Zang, 2012). Neuromodulation 
(Jacobson, Javitt, and Lavidor, 2011) and neuroimaging (Tian, Ren, and Zang, 2012) 
studies have both found that the IFC is active during inhibitory control during the SST 
performance. In the neuroimaging research functional magnetic resonance imaging 
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(fMRI) has revealed that activity in the IFC increases with the recruitment of response 
inhibition in the stop signal reaction time trials (Tian, Ren, and Zang, 2012). These 
neuroimaging results indicate that (i) the type of inhibition involved in cognitive 
reflection, although similar, is not identical to the inhibition involved in Type 2 
processing when overriding Type 1, and (ii) that another inhibition task such as the Go 
/ no go task could detect inhibitory control during decision-making (Swick, Ashley, and 
Turken, 2011). The Go / no go task was not administered during any of the 
experiments in this thesis as it was believed at the time of data collection that the 
inhibition involved in the dual-process framework functions could be captured with the 
Stroop (Stroop, 1935), AST (Hanania and Smith, 2010), SST (Aron, 2003). The Go / 
no go could be applied to capture inhibition during decision-making as it is linked to 
inhibition to the DLPFC (Menon et al., 2001; Simmonds, Pekar, and Mostofsky, 2008). 
This is supported by a meta-analysis of the fMRI and Go / no go task studies which 
have revealed that the right DLPFC is involved in response inhibition (Simmonds, 
Pekar, and Mostofsky, 2008).  
 
A possible further explanation is that whilst response inhibition is crucial to Type 2 
processing overriding Type 1 processing, the exact type of inhibition remains unclear 
– as there is not a single type of inhibition (Rubia et al., 2003; Bari and Robbins, 2013). 
Efforts were made in this thesis to examine also far inhibition with the AST (Hanania 
and Smith, 2010) and near inhibition with the SST (Swick, Ashley, and Turken, 2011). 
As with the updating literature neuromodulation and neuroimaging studies suggest 
that the right DLPFC is involved in inhibitory control (Simmonds, Pekar, and 
Mostofsky, 2008; Loftus et al., 2015). Although the right DLPFC is involved in inhibition 
it is possible that this region acts with interconnected regions such as the IFC (Menon 
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et al., 2001; Aron, Robbins, and Poldrack, 2004) to inhibit pre-potent responses during 
Type 1 thinking. Evidence for this comes from the many experiments that find that the 
other regions such as the IFC (Menon et al., 2001; Aron, Robbins, and Poldrack, 
2014), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) (Aron, Robbins, and Poldrack, 2014) and medial 
prefrontal cortex (MPFC) (Rubia et al., 2003) are active during response inhibition. 
Secondly, as mentioned previously the inhibition tasks administered during this thesis 
may not capture the type of inhibition that is crucial to Type 2 processing overriding 
Type 1. This suggests that if another inhibition task, for example the Go / no go task 
(Aron, Robbins, and Poldrack, 2004; Swick, Ashley, and Turken, 2011) was 
administered with higher current densities and longer stimulation durations this might 
capture inhibitory control during decision-making (Rubia et al., 2003; Bari and 
Robbins, 2013). As with the updating processes these findings do not necessarily 
mean that there is no involvement of the right DLPFC in inhibition during judgement 
and decision-making.   
 
Further to testing the typical CRT (Frederick, 2005; Toplak, West, and Stanovich, 
2011), in which mathematical ability is needed to correctly solve the items Experiments 
2 and 3 went one step further. Verbal-CRT items that do not have a mathematics 
element were administered alongside the typical items to reduce the potential reliance 
on numerical skills (Frederick, 2005; Sirota et al., 2017). Interestingly, neither 
Experiment 2 nor 3 found an effect of anodal stimulation on the verbal-CRT items 
despite the increased accuracy for the typical CRT items after stimulation. This was 
potentially because the CRT’s presumed reliance on mathematical ability (Weller et 
al., 2013; Thomson and Oppenheimer, 2016). However, at the same time, tasks 
invoking representativeness heuristics showed similar patterns as the typical 
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(numerical) CRT, despite no need for any number-based operations. This pattern of 
findings suggests that it is not mere numerical processing that is improved after anodal 
stimulation of the right DLPFC. One explanation for this result could be that typical 
CRT items prompt cognitive reflection whilst verbal information primes more intuitive 
level processes (Windschitl & Wells, 1996). A more straightforward explanation could 
be that success in the verbal CRT was simply less reliant on inhibitory processes but 
rather relied on linguistic ability. In contrast, the typical CRT may depend more on 
executive functions that may include impulse control (Loftus et al., 2015) and set-
shifting (Tayeb and Lavidor, 2016) – both of which have neural substrates in the right 
DLPFC (Santarnecchi, Rossi, and Rossi, 2015; Tayeb and Lavidor, 2016), even 
though as described there was no evidence of these processes here.  
 
For belief bias syllogisms there was no effect of direct current stimulation on the right 
DLPFC in Experiments 1 or 2. There are a number of possible reasons for this 
observation. An increase of cortical excitability of the right DLPFC might not influence 
syllogistic reasoning (as evidenced by the logic index score) because there is no need 
for inhibition for all task variants, e.g., when logic and beliefs do not conflict (Ball et al., 
2006; De Neys and Schaeken, 2007). Furthermore, rather than the DLPFC, the inferior 
frontal cortex has been increasingly associated with correctly solving syllogisms (Tsujii 
and Watanabe, 2009; Tsujii et al., 2011). In fact, left DLPFC stimulation in comparison 
to right DLPFC stimulation reduced overall deductive thinking (indicated by the logic 
index score) in Experiment 2. This result does fit in general with previous observations 
that deductive performance with categorical syllogisms seems associated with left 
frontal brain areas (Goel et al., 2009). 
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One way in which this thesis went a step further than much of the previous research 
on the dual-process framework (Haigh, 2016; Szaszi et al., 2017) was to control for 
thinking dispositions and cognitive characteristics that could interfere with decision-
making (Epstein et al., 1996; Haran, Ritov, and Mellers, 2013). Across Experiments 2 
and 3 the participants’ scores for AOT (Haran, Ritov, and Mellers, 2013), REI (Epstein 
et al., 1996), BIS (Patton, Stanford, and Barratt, 1995) and NART (Nelson and 
Willison, 1991) were measured before stimulation. These were recorded because 
some of the variance in CRT performance can be explained by these thinking 
dispositions (Campitelli and Labollita, 2010; Stanovich et al., 2009) and cognitive 
characteristics (Epstein et al., 1996). Likewise, individual differences in Type 2 
processing in general have been proposed to reflect differences in thinking 
dispositions, and not merely abilities in executive function, such as inhibition. For 
example, individuals who score highly on the AOT scale (Haran, Ritov, and Mellers, 
2013) are thought to be open-minded and prone to processing new information. High 
AOT scores have indeed been positively correlated with performance in the CRT and 
belief bias syllogistic reasoning (Campitelli and Labollita, 2010). Stanovich's (2009) 
tripartite model of decision-making contains not only Type 1 and Type 2 processes, 
but also the reflective mind (i.e., the proclivity to like and engage in reflective thinking 
will determine the use of one’s algorithmic mind, which is the ability to inhibit Type 1 
responses) which corresponds to thinking dispositions. Other cognitive models that 
were covered in the introduction for this thesis contain components for executive 
functions such as inhibitory control (De Neys’ 2012; Handley & Trippas, 2015; 
Pennycook 2015) but not thinking dispositions or cognitive characteristics. Analyses 
factoring in these thinking dispositions and cognitive characteristics in Experiments 2 
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and 3 revealed that the increase in cognitive reflection (Type 2) cannot be explained 
by any of these controls.  
 
There are at least two alternative explanations for the increase in cognitive reflection 
(Type 2) after the neuromodulation of the right DLPFC. The first explanation is that 
although efforts were made to control for thinking dispositions and cognitive 
characteristics by measuring these prior to stimulation the possibility exists the change 
in cortical excitability altered these after they were recorded. For example, in the case 
of the AOT, the analyses found no difference in open-mindedness across any of the 
experimental conditions and groups (across each of the experiments). However, if 
open-mindedness was boosted by the neuromodulation then only measuring AOT 
scores before stimulation would not capture a change in this thinking disposition. Once 
would need to record AOT scores before and after stimulation to capture a change 
here. Thus, there is a possibility that the neuromodulation caused a change in thinking 
disposition, which in turn, increased Type 2 thinking. The second explanation is that 
an unknown variable could have could have contributed or caused the increase in 
cognitive reflection after the stimulation of the right DLPFC.    
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8.2 Research question one: Does neuromodulation of the 
frontal brain areas affect judgement and decision-making 
tasks?    
Throughout all experiments in this thesis, and the meta-analysis, the results have 
provided evidence that neuromodulation of the frontal brain areas does affect 
judgement and decision-making which are purported to rely on the inhibition of pre-
potent responses (e.g., the CRT). The meta-analysis started by showing that online 
stimulation of the left frontal lobe decreases intuitive (Type 1) thinking and reduces 
risk-taking (Chapter 4). The experimental studies (Chapters 5-7) then provided clear 
evidence that anodal stimulation of the right DLPFC reduces intuitive (Type 1) thinking 
whilst increasing cognitive reflection (Type 2). The meta-analysis was limited by the 
number of publications on decision-making and neuromodulation, many of which 
solely focused on risk-taking. The presumed mechanisms behind the improved 
cognitive reflection and Type 2 processing across all of the experiments was that the 
neural substrates of inhibitory control (Jacobson, Javitt, and Lavidor, 2011; Swick, 
Ashley, and Turken, 2011) and updating (Hill, Fitzgerald, and Hoy, 2015; Nikolin et al., 
2018) a localised to the frontal lobe. As inhibition and updating are crucial components 
of the dual-process framework (Sloman, 1996; Evans, 2012) it was hypothesised, but 
not found, that neuromodulation would enhance the capacity for Type 2 processing to 
override and correct Type 1 processing, thereby increasing the percentage of correct 
answers on the CRT and representativeness vignettes (Grether, 1980; Frederick, 
2005). In short, executive functions may be dissociable from decision-making (Toplak, 
2014). Neuromodulation of the frontal lobe does affect judgement and decision-
making.  
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8.3 Research question two: Does stimulating different areas 
of the prefrontal cortex modulate performance in tasks 
associated with Type 1 and Type 2 processing differently? 
The meta-analysis and three experiments have sought to answer this question with 
the use of a number of tasks that tap decision-making as conceptualised by the dual-
process framework. In all of the experiments Type 1 and Type 2 analyses were 
conducted to address this question. 
 
The meta-analysis found an effect of left frontal lobe stimulation on Type 1 processing 
with decreased intuitive responding during online stimulation. Crucially, there was no 
significant effect of stimulation on Type 2 processing in the meta-analysis for the left 
frontal lobe. An important point to remember here is that decreasing Type 1 processing 
is not necessarily the same as increasing Type 2 processing which is why the 
individual Type 1 and Type 2 analyses were conducted. The left frontal lobe was 
stimulated in Experiment 2. No effect of stimulation for the left frontal lobe was found 
for experiment 2 on either Type 1 or Type 2 processing. However, there was an effect 
of left frontal lobe stimulation for decision-making in which inhibitory control, as 
conceptualised by the dual-process framework, was not needed (Stupple, Ball, Evans, 
& Kamal-Smith, 2011; Stupple, Gale, & Richmond, 2013) – as the BBS logic index 
scores decreased here. This suggests that the left frontal lobe may be involved in 
decision-making that does not require the successful inhibition of pre-potent 
responses.  
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The key findings for the neural substrates of Type 1 and Type 2 processing are 
provided by the three experiments in this thesis. Across all three experiments right 
DLPFC stimulation enhanced Type 2 processing whilst there was no change Type 1 
processing (after a single session of neuromodulation). This suggests that the right 
DLPFC is involved in cognitive reflection as stimulating here increases the capacity 
for the Type 2 processing to override Type 1 processing. Alternatively, the left DLPFC 
presumably has in a role in Type 1 thinking (albeit this was not evident with anodal 
stimulation), as Oldrati et al., (2016) found a reduction in Type 1 responding for the 
CRT after cathodal stimulation.      
 
Table 8.3. The effects of anodal stimulation on the CRT (Type 1 and Type 2) across all three 
experiments in this thesis after right DLPFC neuromodulation. 
 Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 
 (online) (offline) (offline cumul.) 
   Stim vs. 
sham 1st 
Stim vs. 
sham 2nd 
Stim vs. 
stim 
Type 1 N N N Y Y 
Type 2 Y Y Y Y Y 
Abbreviations: ‘Cumul.’ -  experiment examining the cumulative effect of stimulation. Under 
the Experiment 3 heading the experimental conditions and groups are split into: (a) the first 
experimental groups only for the first sessions (‘stim vs. sham 1st’), (b) the second 
experimental groups only for the second sessions (‘stim vs. sham 2nd’), and (c) cumulative 
stimulation for the repeated stimulation group (‘stim vs. stim’). 
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8.4 Research question three: What is the relationship 
between executive functions (e.g., updating, inhibition) and 
Type 2 thinking performance? 
The experiments in this thesis sought to address the relationship between executive 
functions and Type 2 thinking performance. The numerical Stroop (Stroop, 1935), 
attention switching task (AST) (Hanania and Smith, 2010) and stop signal task (SST) 
(Boehler et al., 2010) were all administered to measure inhibition. To measure 
updating the Sternberg task (Gladwin et al., 2012) and the n-back (2-back and 3-back) 
(Hill, Fitzgerald, and Hoy, 2015) were administered. None of the studies revealed any 
significant effects of anodal stimulation on executive functions which went against the 
predictions. As Type 2 processing overriding Type 1 processing is reliant on the 
inhibition of the latter it was expected that any effects of stimulation on cognitive 
reflection (Type 2) would correspond to an increase in inhibition and updating. This 
was based on the psychological literature (without neuromodulation) which often 
reports a positive correlation between executive functioning and Type 2 processing – 
as inhibition and updating increase so does Type 2 processing (Campitelli and 
Labollita, 2010; Toplak, West, and Stanovich, 2011; Teovanović, Knežević, and 
Stankov, 2015). 
 
Crucially, although there was no effect of anodal stimulation of the right DLPFC (or left 
DLPFC) on executive functioning the only increase in Type 2 processing was observed 
after the stimulation of the right DLPFC. Since neuroimaging and neuromodulation 
studies report that the right DLPFC is associated with the neural substrates of 
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inhibition (Simmonds, Pekar, and Mostofsky, 2008; Imburgio and Orr, 2018) and 
updating (Hill, Fitzgerald, and Hoy, 2015; Nikolin et al., 2018) the increase in Type 2 
processing infers a relationship between executive functioning and Type 2 processes. 
As the right DLPFC is stimulated inhibition and updating improves and thereby 
increases Type 2 processing - bearing in mind that the executive function tasks 
included in this thesis may have not been sensitive to neurostimulation.  
 
The dual-process framework models explicitly predict a relationship between 
executive functioning and Type 2 processing (Stanovich, 2009; De Neys, 2012). For 
example, De Neys’ (2012) logical intuition model and Stanovich’s tripartite model 
(2009) both posit that in order for the successful use of Type 2 processing to occur the 
pre-potent Type 1 process must cease and be overridden by the former.  
   
8.5 Research question four: What is the nature of the 
interaction between Type 1 and Type 2 processing in the 
dual-process framework of judgement and decision-
making? 
The Type 1 and Type 2 analyses in the meta-analysis and all experiments sought to 
examine the interaction between the processes in the dual-process framework of 
judgement and decision-making. By using the CRT, which can be answered with 
responses that are consistent with Type 1 or Type 2 processing it was possible to 
examine the interaction between these processes. Moreover, executive functioning 
tasks were used to examine the properties of these dual-processes. Specifically, 
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inhibition was examined with the use of the AST and SST, whilst to investigate 
updating the n-back (2-back and 3-back) and Sternberg tasks were used.    
 
Crucially, although tasks were administered to capture executive functioning in these 
experiments there were no effects of stimulation on inhibition or updating in 
Experiments 1, 2 or 3. However, there were consistent effects of stimulation on the 
CRT throughout these experiments. Specifically, Type 1 processing was not 
modulated by a single session of stimulation, whilst conversely, Type 2 processing 
was – with cognitive reflection increasing in all instances. From these results there is 
no evidence to support the sequential models of dual-process decision-making 
(Evans, 1989; Pennycook, Fugelsang, and Koehler, 2015). If Type 1 processing 
precedes Type 2 processing, as in the sequential models, then there would be a 
consistent effect of stimulation on both Type 1 and Type 2 processing (there was not). 
Furthermore, the sequential models specify that when Type 1 processing ends and 
Type 2 processing begins there is a conflict detection function that inhibits the former 
in favour of the latter – there was no evidence of inhibition from the executive function 
tasks (i.e., the AST and SST) in these experiments.   
 
In short, the pattern of results from the experiments within this thesis are more 
compatible with the hybrid (Strack and Deutsch, 2004; Stanovich, 2009) and parallel 
(Epstein, 1973; Sloman, 1996) models of dual-process judgement and decision-
making as Type 1 and Type 2 processing are not both modulated in the same 
stimulation conditions / groups. Thus, it is presumed that Type 1 and Type 2 
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processing may run in parallel, in a ‘first-horse-past-the-post’ pattern until either 
process produces a solution to the CRT. 
 
8.6 Study limitation and caveats 
There were a few limitations and caveats to the experiments included in thesis. Firstly, 
bilateral montages were used throughout the three experiments. A bilateral montage 
was used in the first experiment because this experiment sought to replicate and 
extend research that had previously used an identical bilateral montage over the right 
DLPFC and left DLPFCs (Cheng and Lee, 2015). After Experiment 1, Experiment 2 
used experimental groups with the anode electrode over the right DLPFC with return 
electrode over the left DLPFC then in another experimental group the montage was 
reversed. As there was no effect of stimulation for the anodal left DLPFC group on 
cognitive reflection (in either direction) the return electrode in the first group did not 
interfere with the anode over the right DLPFC – thus this bilateral montage was not an 
issue. Study three then continued to use the same bilateral montage to extend the 
findings of the first two experiments.      
 
A second potential limitation for the studies in this thesis were the sample sizes that 
were used in each of these experiments. There were thirty, fifty-four, and forty-eight 
participants in Experiments 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Although this may appear to be a 
limitation compared to much of the psychological research which use larger sample 
sizes neuromodulation research typically use small sample sizes (Hecht, Walsh, and 
Lavidor, 2010; Hecht, Walsh, and Lavidor, 2013). Power calculations were used to 
determine sample sizes for each of these experiments. Then slightly larger sample 
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sizes were used to account for participant drop-out rates, participants not following 
task instructions and problems with the neuromodulation equipment.  
 
The final limitation for the experiments in this thesis were that due to time constraints, 
and the desire to avoid participant fatigue as a confound, on administering tasks 
during, or after, anodal stimulation (Fritsch et al., 2010; Bikson et al., 2016) multiple 
tasks measuring executive functioning were not administered throughout all 
experiments. None of the tasks that reportedly measure executive functioning 
(inhibition and updating) detected effects of anodal stimulation over the right DLPFC. 
It is possible that since some of the neural substrates of executive functioning are 
located in the right DLPFC, administering the correct task such as the Go / no go may 
capture an effect of stimulation (Aron, Robbins, and Poldrack, 2004). Although this 
was a limitation in these experiments efforts were made to measure executive 
functioning with multiple tasks in the second and third experiments.      
  
8.7 Study strengths 
The experiments in this thesis go further than much of the research on cognitive 
reflection with the CRT in a number of ways (De Neys, Rossi, and Houdé, 2013; 
Johnson, Tubau, and De Neys, 2016). During the design of these experiments thinking 
dispositions (Epstein et al., 1996; Haran, Ritov, and Mellers, 2013) and executive 
functions (Miyake et al., 2000; Friedman and Miyake, 2017) were accounted for. 
Neuromodulation montages examined the neural correlates of the left frontal lobe and 
right frontal lobe with online and offline stimulation for the dual-processes. Cognitive 
reflection was then investigated with items that varied in their mathematical content 
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(Thomson and Oppenheimer, 2016; Sirota et al., 2017) and at analyses for Type 1 
and Type 2 responses (Oldrati et al., 2016).     
 
Experiments 2 and 3 controlled for thinking dispositions (Epstein et al., 1996; Haran, 
Ritov, and Mellers, 2013) and cognitive ability (Nelson and Willison, 1991). These 
individual differences are presumed to affect decision-making as they positively 
correlate with Type 2 processing in many experiments (Toplak, West, and Stanovich, 
2011; Teovanović, Knežević, and Stankov, 2015). Furthermore, the reflective mind in 
Stanovich’s tripartite was built into his model account for these individual differences. 
Thus, unlike the researchers that do not carefully design experiments account for 
these thinking dispositions and cognitive characteristics these can be eliminated as a 
source of interference in results.     
 
All of the experiments examined the crucial executive functions for the dual-process 
framework, namely inhibition and updating (Kiesel et al., 2010; Ren et al., 2017). Set-
shifting would have been investigated had a suitable test been available (Miyake et 
al., 2000). These executive functions were examined alongside Type 1 and Type 2 
processing.  
 
Furthermore, the neural correlates of the dual-process framework were examined in 
the progressive series of experiments in the left frontal lobe (Chapters 4 and 5) and 
right frontal lobe (Chapters 4 to 7). Examining one side of the frontal lobe alone would 
leave the question as to whether the contralateral side would produce an opposite 
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pattern of results. By examining the left and right frontal lobes the neural correlates of 
Type 1 and Type 2 processing were linked to the right DLPFC.  
 
To examine the efficacy of neuromodulation to modify Type 1 and Type 2 processing 
online (Chapters 4 and 5) and offline (Chapters 4, 6 and 7) stimulation were used 
throughout these experiments. Typically, neuromodulation experiments only examine 
the effects of stimulation through the use of only one of these types of stimulation, 
either online or offline, as they are limited by time (Gorini et al., 2014; Sellaro et al., 
2015). The progressive nature of these experiments meant that online and offline 
neuromodulation could be used across these experiments.   
 
At the task level there were two strengths to the experiments in this thesis. Firstly, 
critics of the CRT suggest that mathematical ability explains CRT results (Weller et al., 
2013; Welsh, Burns, and Delfabbro, 2013). Part of the experimental designs of 
experiments 2 and 3 sought to investigate these criticisms by using the original CRT, 
with mathematical elements, and a version of the CRT without any elements of 
numeracy (Sirota et al., 2017). In doing this this was the first test of the none-
mathematical verbal-CRT (Sirota et al., 2017). Secondly, the CRT items and 
representativeness vignettes were analysed for Type 1 and Type 2 responses. By 
analysing Type 1 and Type 2 responses rather than just Type 2 responses the nature 
of the interaction between these processes could be examined as in Oldrati et al., 
(2016).    
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8.8 Future research 
There are several directions that research could take in the future to build on and 
extend the findings of the experiments in this thesis. One direction would be to 
examine either Type 1 or Type 2 processing with neuromodulation and a battery of 
tasks that measure executive functioning (inhibition, updating and set-shifting (Criaud 
and Boulinguez, 2013; Nikolin et al., 2018)) in the scope of one of the dual-process 
framework models. By doing so the relationship between these executive functions 
and either intuitive Type 1 processing or analytic Type 2 processing could be 
examined further. 
 
A second direction in which future research could go would be to examine the role of 
thinking dispositions and cognitive characteristic controls in dual-process decision-
making further. For example, by dividing experimental groups into high or low AOT 
(Haran, Ritov, and Mellers, 2013) before applying the neuromodulation. In this thesis 
these variables were recorded, but experimental groups were not divided into high 
versus low groups. By doing this one could determine if the neuromodulation of the 
right DLFPC interacts and moderates cognitive reflection in high or low thinking 
disposition scorers differently.  
 
Another direction in which the research could be taken would be to explore the 
cumulative effects of anodal stimulation that were found in Experiment 3. To-date 
these cumulative effects of stimulation used in clinical neuroscience for the treatment 
of depression (Brunoni et al., 2014; Mutz, Edgcumbe, Brunoni, & Fu, 2018) but there 
are very few examples in the cognitive neuroscience literature (Talsma, Kroese, and 
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Slagter, 2017; Gilmore et al., 2018). These cumulative effects revealed stepwise 
increase in cognitive reflection over two sessions of stimulation. More sessions of 
stimulation could be administered with different tasks or with varying stimulation 
parameters.   
 
Other directions would be to examine the resting state electroencephalography (EEG) 
with tasks that capture dual-process thinking and neuromodulation. Or to examine the 
role of covariates (e.g., religiosity, education etc) in the scope of the dual-process 
framework.  
 
8.9 Conclusion 
The present experiments sought to (i) investigate the neural substrates of judgement 
and decision-making in the dual-processes framework, (ii) to investigate the sources 
of variance in Type 2 responding, and (iii) to investigate the relationship between the 
processes of this framework. Sources of variance in decision-making were explored 
with measures of thinking dispositions, cognitive characteristics, and executive 
functions. Throughout the three experiments, and the meta-analysis, these aims were 
achieved with the use of tDCS neuromodulation. The crucial findings were that anodal 
neuromodulation of the right DLPFC can increase Type 2 processing whilst decreasing 
Type 1 responding. These experiments were not the first to explore Type 2 processing 
with tDCS neuromodulation (Oldrati et al., 2016), but were the first to enhance 
cognitive reflection (Type 2) with neuromodulation. These were also the first 
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experiments to use a version of the CRT that is not reliant on numeracy alongside the 
original CRT.   
 
The applied implications of this research, building on these experiments are that tDCS 
could be used to improve Type 2 thinking individuals with dementia or problem 
gambling behaviours. In persons with dementia this could improve, or help treat, the 
symptoms of dementia that make decision-making difficult. Whereas, in problem 
gamblers the tDCS over the right DLPFC can be used to cognitive reflection so that 
these individuals are less prone towards problem gambling.  
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 Appendix A 
Heuristics and biases material description 
Availability heuristic. The availability heuristic relies on an immediate example that 
comes to a person’s mind. The immediate example must be qualitatively different to 
another example. For example, when asked ‘Are there more hours of rain or sunshine 
in the United Kingdom?’ one may remember more hours of rain more easily than 
sunshine.    
 
Framing bias. The framing bias (also called the framing effect) relies on the way in 
which information is presented. If the information is presented positively then one may 
consider the information to be positive. For example, when the number of people with 
(or without) a disease is presented as a loss (i.e., a negative - 200 people out of 500 
caught the disease) or gain (i.e., a positive – 300 people out of 500 did not catch the 
disease) one considers the former to be negative, and the latter positive. Crucially, the 
information is identical in both case with only the way in which the information differing. 
 
Sample size bias. The sample size bias examines one’s understanding that a large 
sample size is more likely to approximate a population value when all other things are 
equal. For example, after one has been told that there are tennis players and player A 
is better than player B. Then ‘Which player is more likely to win with a 15-point scoring 
system?’ In this case, the better player (player A) chances of winning would increase 
with more scoring opportunities.      
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Sunk cost bias. The sunk cost bias (also called the sunk cost fallacy) relies on the 
misconception that after one has committed resources to something then one should 
continue to commit more resources, otherwise the original commitment would go to 
waste. For example, if a company committed £1 million to developing a new electric 
car and then electric cars become undesirable one should finish the development by 
committing the last £500,000 otherwise the original investment would go to waste. 
Crucially, not committing the second amount of money would be the logical thing to 
do.       
 
Ratio bias. The ratio bias relies on the preferences of individuals to bet on probabilities 
that are expressed as a ratio of larger numbers rather than the equivalent probability 
expressed as a ratio of small numbers. For example, when asked to choose which of 
the following option one prefers 20:60 or 1:3 the former would be chosen rather than 
the latter.  
 
Conjunction fallacy. The conjunction fallacy relies on the misconception that a 
specific condition with two or more properties is more probable than a single condition 
with only one property. For example, when one is asked ‘What is more probable?’ (a) 
Linda is a bank teller and a feminist, or (b) Linda is a bank teller. The conjunction 
fallacy incorrectly states that the former is more probable than the latter.    
 
Gambler’s fallacy. The gambler’s fallacy (also called the Monte Carlo fallacy) relies 
on the misconception that if something happened more frequently in the past then it is 
less likely to happen in the future. For example, if a coin is tossed ten times with this 
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coin landing with the tail side up 8 (out of the ten) times then it is more likely to land 
with the head side up in the future. Crucially, each of the coin throws are independent 
of each other, there do not influence each other.  
 
Outcome bias. The outcome bias relies on the value given to a decision (i.e., a good 
or bad decision) when the outcome of the decision is already known. For example, if 
one were told that a surgical operation was conducted on an individual to correct a life 
altering medical condition but there were unforeseen complications and the person 
died one would be likely to conclude that it was a poor decision to operate.    
 
Experiment 1 Stimuli 
Note. All stimuli were divided into two equal parts before administering to participants 
as this was a within-subjects design study. By dividing these items into two equal parts 
no participants saw the same item twice. For example, the practice syllogism items 
were divided so that item 1 (All zookeepers…) was administered in the first 
experimental session whilst item 2 (All Bentleys…) was seen in the second 
experimental session. All items were counterbalanced across participants. For 
example, participant 1 would see part A first then part B, whilst participant 2 would see 
part B followed by part A. Items were counterbalanced in parts so that the order of 
items was not the same for all participants. Finally, the different types of items (i.e., 
representativeness or framing bias) were counterbalanced so that items measuring 
identical biases (e.g., all framing bias items) did not appear together during testing.   
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Belief bias syllogisms 
Practice items (typical syllogisms) 
1. All zookeepers are shoppers. Some pilots are shoppers. Therefore, no pilots are 
zookeepers. (invalid) 
2. All Bentleys are fast. All cars are Bentleys. Therefore, all cars are fast. (valid) 
Main items. 
Valid-unbelievable 
1. No fish can fly. Some dolphins can fly. Therefore, dolphins are fish.  
2. All mammals walk. Whales are mammals. Therefore, whales can walk.  
3. No cats can swim. Some dog can swim. Therefore, no dogs are cats.  
4. All things that are smoked are good for the health. Cigarettes are smoked. 
Therefore, cigarettes are good for the health.  
5. All birds can fly. Penguins cannot fly. Therefore, penguins are not birds.  
6. All things that are smoked are good for the health. Cigarettes are smoked. 
Therefore, cigarettes are good for the health.  
7. All animals with four legs are dangerous. Poodles are not dangerous. Therefore, 
Poodles do not have four legs.  
8. All animals love water. Cats do not like water. Therefore, cats are not animals.  
Valid-believable 
1. No poisons are sold at grocers. Some mushrooms are sold at the grocers. 
Therefore, some mushrooms are not poisonous.   
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2. All snakes have scales. Cobras are snakes. Therefore, cobras have scales.  
3. All cats have tails. Goldfish do not have tails. Therefore, goldfish are not cats.  
4. All felines are curious. Domestic cats are felines. Therefore, domestic cats are 
curious.  
5. No reptiles can grow hair. Some elephants can grow hair. Therefore, no elephants 
are reptiles.  
6. All fizzy drinks are unhealthy. Lemonade is a fizzy drink. Therefore, lemonade is 
unhealthy.  
7. No cigarettes are inexpensive. Some additive things are inexpensive. Therefore, 
some addictive things are not cigarettes.  
8. All birds have feathers. Eagles are birds. Therefore, eagles have feathers.   
Invalid-unbelievable 
1. All coats made of wool are warm. Ski coats are not made of wool. Therefore, ski 
coats are not warm.  
2. No vegetables contain vitamins. Some vegetables are green foods. Therefore, no 
green foods have vitamins.  
3. All guns are dangerous. Swords are dangerous. Therefore, swords are guns.  
4. All athletes are healthy. Darts players are not athletes. Therefore, darts players 
are not healthy.  
5. All sugary foods are healthy. Apples are healthy. Therefore, apples are a sugary 
food.  
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6. No unhealthy foods have cholesterol. Some unhealthy foods are fried foods. 
Therefore, no fried foods have cholesterol.  
7. All things made out of wood can be used as fuel. Gasoline is not made out of 
wood. Therefore, gasoline cannot be used as fuel.  
8. All race cars are safe. Motorbikes are safe. Therefore, motorbikes are race cars.  
Invalid-believable 
1. Some green amphibians are toads. All green amphibians are frogs. Therefore, 
some frogs are toads.  
2. Some pets are cats. All pets are animals. Therefore, some animals are not cats.  
3. Some snakes are venomous. All snakes are fast. Therefore, some fast things are 
venomous.  
4. All flowers have petals. Roses have petals. Therefore, roses are flowers.  
5. All things that have a motor need oil. Automobiles need oil. Therefore, 
automobiles have motors. 
6. All unemployed people are poor. Bill Gates is not unemployed. Therefore, Bill 
Gates is not poor.  
7.  All eastern countries are communist. Canada is not an eastern country. Canada 
is not communist. 
 
8. Some men are athletes. All men are writers. Therefore, some men are not writers. 
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Cognitive Reflection Test (6-item version) 
Note. Due to programming limitations the CRT was administered on paper in 
experiment 1. This version of the CRT consisted of Frederick’s (2005) and Toplak’s 
(2014) CRT items with the omission of a single item (A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in 
total. The bat costs a pound more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?). The 
single item was omitted so that the 7-item version consisting of 3 items from Frederick 
(2015) and 4 items from Toplak (2014) could be evenly divided across the two 
experimental sessions. This item was chosen as across all 7 items as this item has 
received extensive publicity (e.g., academic publications, magazines, websites etc), 
therefore, it was likely that the results of this single item would be unreliable.  
 
Part 1 
Please answer the following questions by writing the first answer that comes-
to-mind.  
a) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 
machines to make 100 widgets? 
………………… minutes. 
b) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it 
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the 
patch to cover half the lake? 
………………..days. 
c) If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and Mary can drink one barrel of 
water in 12 days, how long would it take them to drink one barrel of water together? 
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………………….days. 
 
Please put a tick next to any questions that you have seen before. 
 
Part 2 
Please answer the following questions by writing the first answer that comes-
to-mind.  
a) Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. How 
many students are in the class? 
………………… students. 
b) A man buys a pig for £60, sells it for £70, buys it back for £80, and sells it finally 
for £90. How much has he made? 
………………..pounds. 
c) Simon decided to invest £8,000 in the stock market one day early in 2008. Six 
months after he invested, on July 17, the stocks he had purchased were down 50%. 
Fortunately for Simon, from July 17 to October 17, the stocks he had purchased 
went up 75%. At this point, Simon has:  
a. broken even in the stock market. 
b. is ahead of where he began. 
c. has lost money. 
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Please put a tick next to any questions that you have seen before. 
 
Heuristics and biases battery 
Practice for heuristics and biases battery 
1. In the United States annually which of the following causes more deaths? 
(availability) 
a. Lung cancer 
b. Vehicle accidents 
 
2. In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 5 
engineers and 995 lawyers. Jack is a randomly chosen participant of this 
study. Jack is 36 years old. He is not married and is somewhat introverted. He 
likes to spend his free time reading science fiction and writing computer 
programmes.                                                              (representativeness)   
 
What is most likely? 
a. Jack is an engineer 
b. Jack is a lawyer 
 
3. In the English Language which position is the letter R more likely to appear 
in?  (availability) 
a. The first position 
b. The third position                
Representativeness items 
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1. In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 4 
whose favourite television series is Star Trek and 996 whose favourite series 
is Eastenders. Jeremy is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Jeremy 
is 26 and is doing graduate studies in physics. He stays at home most of the 
time and likes to play video-games. 
What is most likely? 
a. Jeremy’s favourite television series is Star Trek 
b. Jeremy’s favourite television series is Eastenders 
 
2. In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 997 
nurses and 3 doctors. Paul is a randomly chosen participant of this study. 
Paul is 34 years old. He lives in a beautiful home in a posh suburb. He is well 
spoken and very interested in politics. He invests a lot of time in his career. 
What is most likely? 
a. Paul is a nurse 
b. Paul is a doctor 
 
3. In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 990 
actresses and 10 librarians. Susan is a randomly chosen participant of this 
study. Susan is very shy and withdrawn, invariably helpful, but has little 
interest in people, or in the world of reality. A gentle and tidy soul, she has a 
need for order and structure and a passion for detail. 
What is most likely? 
a. Susan is an actress 
b. Susan is a librarian 
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4. In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 910 
farmers and 90 illustrators. James is a randomly chosen participant of this 
study. James is meticulous, has a strong eye for detail, enjoys listening to 
music whilst working and has a creative trait. 
What is most likely? 
a. James is an illustrator 
b. James is a farmer 
 
5. In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 4 men 
and 996 women. Sam is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Sam is 
23 years old and is finishing a degree in engineering. On Friday nights, Sam 
like to go out cruising with friends whilst listening to loud music and drinking 
beer. 
What is most likely? 
a. Sam is a man 
b. Sam is a woman 
 
6. In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 992 
musicians and 8 retail managers. Colin is as randomly chosen participant of 
this study. Colin is a meticulous time keeper, makes notes of everything, 
keeps a diary, is charismatic and always plans his day ahead. 
What is most likely? 
a. Colin is a musician 
b. Colin is a retail manager 
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Availability heuristic 
1. In the average year in the United Kingdom which of the following are there 
more hours of? 
a. Rainfall 
b. Sunshine 
 
2. Which of the following countries has the highest number of billionaires? 
a. Turkey 
b. The United Kingdom 
 
3. Which of the following countries has the highest average amount of rainfall? 
a. The United Kingdom 
b. Costa Rica 
 
4. In London annually which of the following groups have more fatalities? 
a. Car drivers 
b. Cyclists 
 
Outcome bias 
1. A 55-year-old man had a heart condition. He had to stop working because of 
chest pain. He enjoyed his work and did not want to stop. His pain also 
interfered with other things, such as travel and recreation. A type of bypass 
operation would relieve his pain and increase his life expectancy from age 65 
to age 70. However, 8% of the people who have this operation die from the 
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operation itself. His physicians decided to go ahead with the operation. The 
operation was a success. Evaluate the physician’s decision to go ahead with 
the operation. 
a. 1 = correct 
b. 0 = neutral, both opposites are equally good 
c. -1 = incorrect 
 
2. A 60-year-old woman had a hip condition. She had to stop working because 
of the pain. She enjoyed her work and did not want to stop. Her pain also 
interfered with other things, such as travel and recreation. A type of hip 
operation would relieve her pain and increase her quality of life. However, 2% 
of the people who have this operation die from the operation itself. Her 
physicians decided to go ahead with the operation. The operation was a 
failure and the patient died. Evaluate the physician’s decision to go ahead 
with the operation. 
   a. 1 = correct 
   b. 0 – neutral, both opposites are equally good 
   c. -1 = incorrect 
 
Framing bias 
1. If you were faced with the following choice, which alternative would you 
choose? 
 
a. A sure gain of £300 
b. A 75% chance to gain £1300, and 25% chance to gain nothing. 
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2. If you were faced with the following choice, which alternative would you 
choose? 
a. A sure gain of £240 
b. A 25% chance to gain £1000, and 75% chance to gain nothing. 
 
3. Imagine that the US is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual disease, which 
is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternatives programmes to combat the 
disease have been proposed, which alternative would you choose? 
a. Programme A: 200 people will be saved 
b. Programme B: There is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and a 
2/3 probability that no people will be saved.  
 
4. Imagine that the US is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual disease, which 
is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternatives programmes to combat the 
disease have been proposed, which alternative would you choose? 
a. Programme A: 400 people will die. 
b. Programme B: There is a 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and a 2/3 
probability that 600 people will die. 
* Framing bias examples adapted from Toplak et al., (2014). 
 
Sunk cost bias 
1. Imagine that you have decided to see a play where the admission is £20 per 
ticket. As you enter the theatre you discover that you have lost a £20 note.  
Daniel Edgcumbe [Appendix A] 
269 
 
Would you still pay £20 for a ticket for the play? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
2. As a president of an airline company, you have invested £10 million of the 
company’s money into a research project. The purpose was to build a plane 
that would not be detected by conventional radar, in other words a stealth 
plane. When the project is 90 percent completed, another company begins 
marketing a plane that cannot be detected by radar. Also, it is apparent that 
their plane is much faster and far more economical than the plane that your 
company is building. 
The question is: Should you invest the last 10 percent of the research funds to 
finish the stealth plane? 
a. No – It makes no sense to continue spending the money on the project. 
b. Yes – As long as £10 million is already invested, I might as well finish the 
project. 
 
3. Imagine that you have decided to see a play where the admission is £10 per 
ticket. As you enter the theatre you discover that you have lost a £10 note.  
Would you still pay £10 for a ticket for the play? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
4. As a president of a supercar company, you have invested £10 million of the 
company’s money into a research project. The purpose was to build an 
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electric supercar that could perform better than any other supercar. When the 
project is 90 percent completed, another company begins marketing their 
electric supercar. Also, it is apparent that their supercar is much faster and far 
more economical than the car that your company is building. 
The question is: Should you invest the last 10 percent of the research funds to 
finish the electric supercar? 
a. No – It makes no sense to continue spending the money on the project. 
b. Yes – As long as £10 million is already invested, I might as well finish the 
project. 
 
Sample size bias 
1. A game of squash can be played either 9 or 15 points. Holding all other rules 
of the game constant, if A is a better player than B, which scoring scheme 
would give player A a better chance of winning? 
a. 9 points game. 
b. 15 points game. 
c. they are equal 
 
2. A certain town is served by two hospitals. In the larger hospital about 45 
babies are born each day, and in the smaller hospital about 15 babies are 
born each day. As you know, about 50 percent of all babies are boys. 
However, the exact percentage varies from day to day. Sometimes it may be 
higher than 50 percent, sometimes lower. For a period of 1 year, each 
hospital recorded the days on which more than 60 percent of the babies born 
were boys. 
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a. The larger hospital 
b. The smaller hospital 
c. About the same. 
 
Conjunction fallacy 
1. Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in 
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of 
discrimination. And social justice, and also participated in antinuclear 
demonstrations. 
Please pick the most likely alternative. 
a. Linda is a bank teller. 
b. Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.   
 
2. A health survey was conducted in a representative sample of adult males in 
London of all ages and occupations. Mr F. was included in the sample. He 
was selected by chance from the list of participants. 
Which of the following statements is more probable? 
a. Mr F. has had one or more heart attacks.  
b. Mr F. had had one or more heart attacks and he is over 55-years-old. 
 
3. The Scandinavian Peninsula is the European area with the greatest 
percentage of people with blonde hair and blue eyes. This is the case even 
though (as in Italy) every possible combination of hair and eye colour occurs. 
Suppose we choose at random an individual from the Scandinavian 
population. 
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Which do you think is the most probable? 
a. The individual has blonde hair 
b. The individual has blonde hair and blue eyes 
 
4. Professional volleyball players have greatly changed in the course of the last 
decade. In particular, they have grown younger yet taller. Women players in 
the first Italian division are on average taller than 1.80 m, ranging between 
1.75 m for some setters to more than 1.90 m for many spikers. Suppose we 
choose at random a female volleyball player from the Italian first division. 
Which of the following statement is more probable? 
a. The woman is less than 21 years old 
b. The woman is less than 21 years old and is taller than 1.77m 
 
Gambler’s fallacy 
1. Suppose an unbiased coin is flipped three times, and each time the coin lands 
on Heads. If you had bet £100 on the next toss, what side would you choose? 
a. Heads 
b. Tails 
c. No preference 
 
2. Suppose an unbiased coin is flipped five times, and each time the coin lands 
on Tails. If you had bet £100 on the next toss, what side would you choose? 
a. Heads 
b. Tails 
c. No preference 
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Remote Associative Test (RAT) 
Cues Solution 
Cottage/Swiss/Cake Cheese 
Cream/Skate/Water Ice 
Loser/Throat/Spot Sore 
Show/Life/Row Boat 
Night/Wrist/Stop Watch 
Duck/Fold/Dollar Bill 
Rocking/wheel/High Chair 
Dew/Comb/Bee Honey 
Basket/Eight/Snow Ball 
Cadet/Capsule/Ship Space 
River/Note/Account Bank 
Print/Berry/Bird Blue 
Safety/Cushion/Point Pin 
Dream/Break/Light Day 
Fish/Mine/Rush Gold 
High/District/House School/Court 
Sense/Courtesy/Place Common 
Pie/Luck/Belly Pot 
Fox/Man/Peep Hole 
Main/Sweeper/Light Street 
Down/Question/Check Mark 
Master/Toss/Finger Ring 
Hammer/Gear/Hunter Head 
Knife/Light/Pal Pen 
Change/Circuit/Cake Short 
Tail/Water/Flood Gate 
Marshal/Child/Piano Grand 
Cover/Arm/Wear Under 
Rain/Test/Stomach Acid 
Dive/Light/Rocket Sky 
Man/Glue/Star Super 
Tooth/Potato/Heart Sweet 
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Appendix B 
Experiment 2 Stimuli 
Note. As in experiment 1 all items were counterbalanced across participants. The first 
four of each category of syllogism (e.g., valid-believable) from Appendix A were used 
for the belief bias syllogisms in experiment 2 – to avoid repetition these do not appear 
in this appendix.   
Cognitive Reflection Test 
Note. All CRT items in experiment 2 were administered on a computer. Participants 
could type any answer on screen. The sources for each CRT item and answers are 
presented below.  
Original CRT (Frederick, 2005) 
1. A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat costs a pound more than the ball. 
How much does the ball cost? 
(Intuitive answer 10 pence; correct answer 5 pence). 
 
 
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 
100 machines to make 100 widgets? 
(Intuitive answer 100 minutes; correct answer 5 minutes). 
 
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If 
it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take 
for the patch to cover half the lake?  
(Intuitive answer 24 days; correct answer 47 days). 
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Toplak (2014). 
1. If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and Mary can drink one barrel 
of water in 12 days, how long would it take them to drink one barrel of water 
together?  
(Intuitive answer 9; correct answer 4). 
 
2. A man buys a pig for £60, sells it for £70, buys it back for £80, and sells it 
finally for £90. How much has he made? 
(Intuitive answer £10; correct answer £20). 
 
3. Simon decided to invest £8,000 in the stock market one day early in 2008. Six 
months after he invested, on July 17, the stocks he had purchased were down 
50%. Fortunately for Simon, from July 17 to October 17, the stocks he had 
purchased went up 75%. At this point, Simon has:  
a. broken even in the stock market. 
b. is ahead of where he began. 
c. has lost money. 
(Intuitive answer b; correct answer c value is £7000). 
 
4. Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. 
How many students are in the class? 
(Intuitive answer 30; correct answer 29). 
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Thomson & Oppenheimer (2016) 
1. If you’re running a race and you pass the person in second place, what place 
are you in? 
(Intuitive answer 1st; correct answer 2nd). 
 
2. A farmer had 15 sheep and all but 8 died. How many are left? 
(Intuitive answer 7; correct answer 8). 
 
3. Emily’s father had three daughters. The first two are named April and May. 
What is the third daughter’s name? 
(Intuitive answer June; correct answer Emily). 
 
4. How many cubic feet of dirt are there in a hole that 3’ deep x 3’ wide x 3’ 
long? 
(Intuitive answer 27; correct answer none/no dirt). 
 
Verbal CRT (Sirota, 2017)  
1. How many animals of each sex did Moses take on the ark? 
(Intuitive answer 2; correct answer None, according to mythology Noah did). 
 
2. A monkey, a squirrel, and a bird are racing to the top of a coconut tree. Who 
will get the banana first, the monkey, the squirrel, or the bird? 
(Intuitive answer monkey or bird; correct answer none, it is a coconut tree). 
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3. In a one-story pink house, there was a pink person, a pink cat, a pink fish, a 
pink computer, a pink chair, a pink table, a pink telephone, a pink shower - 
everything was pink! What colour were the stairs probably? 
(Intuitive answer pink; correct answer there are no stairs). 
 
4. The wind blows west. An electric train runs east. In which cardinal direction 
does the smoke from the locomotive blow? 
(Intuitive answer east or west; correct answer there is not smoke it is an 
electric train). 
 
5. If you have only one match and you walk into a dark room where there is an 
oil lamp, a newspaper and wood - which thing would you light first? 
(Intuitive answer the lamp; correct answer the match) 
 
6. It's a stormy night and a plane takes off from JFK airport in New York. The 
storm worsens, and the plane crashes - half lands in the United States, the 
other half lands in Canada. In which country do you bury the survivors? 
(Intuitive answer the United States or Canada; correct answer they are 
survivors, you don’t bury them).  
 
7. Would it be ethical for a man to marry the sister of his widow? 
(Intuitive answer yes or no; correct answer he cannot he is dead) 
 
8. Which sentence is correct: a) “the yolk of the egg are white” or b) “the yolk of 
the egg is white”? 
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(Intuitive answer b; correct answer neither).  
 
Other (to boost power) 
1. A clerk in the butcher shop is 5’ 10’’ tall. What does he weigh? 
(Intuitive answer I don’t know; correct answer meat). 
 
Representativeness items 
Practice item 
1. One thousand people were tested. Among the participants there were 997 girls 
and 3 boys. Erin is a participant of this study. Erin is 13 years old. Erin's favourite 
subject is art. Erin's favourite things to do are shopping and having sleepovers with 
friends to gossip about other children at school.  
What is most likely? 
a. Erin is a girl. 
b. Erin is a boy. 
Main items 
1. Among a sample of 900 people there were 810 farmers and 90 illustrators. James 
is a randomly chosen participant. James is meticulous, has a strong eye for detail, 
enjoys listening to music whilst working and has a creative trait.  
What is most likely? 
a. James is an illustrator. 
b. James is a farmer. 
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2. At the supermarket there were 600 people. Among the shoppers there were 570 
actresses and 30 librarians. Susan is a randomly chosen person from the 
supermarket. Susan is very shy and withdrawn, invariably helpful, but has little 
interest in people, or in the world of reality. A gentle and tidy soul, she has a need for 
order and structure and a passion for detail.  
What is most likely? 
a. Susan is an actress.  
b. Susan is a librarian. 
 
3. In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 992 
musicians and 8 retail managers. Colin is as randomly chosen participant of this 
study. Colin is a meticulous time keeper, makes notes of everything, keeps a diary, 
is charismatic and always plans his day ahead.  
What is most likely? 
a. Colin is a musician. 
b. Colin is a retail manager.   
 
4. A survey of 1500 people was conducted. Among the participants in the survey 
there were 11 sixteen-year olds and 1489 fifty-year olds. Ellen is a randomly chosen 
participant of this survey. Ellen likes to listen to hip hop and rap music. She enjoys 
wearing tight shirts and jeans. She’s fond of dancing and has a small nose piercing.  
What is most likely? 
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a. Ellen is sixteen years old. 
b. Ellen is fifty years old. 
 
5. In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 4 whose 
favourite television series is Star Trek and 996 whose favourite series is Eastenders. 
Jeremy is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Jeremy is 26 and is doing 
graduate studies in physics. He stays at home most of the time and likes to play 
video-games.  
What is most likely? 
a. Jeremy’s favourite television series is Star Trek 
b. Jeremy’s favourite television series is Eastenders. 
 
6. In a study of 1000 people there were 5 engineers and 995 lawyers. Jack is a 
randomly chosen participant of this study. Jack is 36 years old. He is not married and 
is somewhat introverted. He likes to spend his free time reading science fiction and 
writing computer programmes.  
What is most likely? 
a. Jack is an engineer. 
b. Jack is a lawyer. 
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7. 1200 people were tested. Among the participants there were three who live in a 
condo and 1197 who live in a farmhouse. Kurt is a randomly chosen participant of 
this study. Kurt works in Canary Wharf and is single. He works long hours and wears 
Amani suits to work. He likes wearing shades.  
What is most likely? 
a. Kurt lives in a condo. 
b. Kurt lives in a farmhouse. 
 
8. In a nightclub there are 700 people. Among the clubbers there were 4 men and 
696 women. Sam is a randomly chosen person from this nightclub. Sam is 23 years 
old and is finishing a degree in engineering. On Friday nights, Sam like to go out 
cruising with friends whilst listening to loud music and drinking beer.  
What is most likely? 
a. Sam is a man. 
b. Sam is a woman. 
 
9. Paul is at a large gathering of people. There are 2000 people at his gathering 
consisting of 1830 nurses and 170 doctors. Paul is a randomly chosen person from 
this group. Paul is 34 years old. He lives in a beautiful home in a posh suburb. He is 
well spoken and very interested in politics. He invests a lot of time in his career.  
What is most likely? 
a. Paul is a nurse. 
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b. Paul is a doctor. 
 
10. In a shopping centre there were 1600 people. Among the people in the shopping 
centre there were 1595 who buy their clothes in Primark and 5 who buy their clothes 
at high-end retailers. Karen is a 33-year-old female. She works in a business office 
and drives a Porsche. She lives in a fancy penthouse with her boyfriend.  
What is most likely? 
a. Karen buys her clothes at a high-end retailer. 
b. Karen buys her clothes at Primark. 
* All representativeness items adapted from De Neys & Glumicic (2008) or Toplak 
(2014). 
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Scales and questionnaires administered to record thinking dispositions and 
cognitive ability. 
Note. All of the following scales and questionnaires were administered on paper. 
Rational Experiential Inventory – 10 item (REI) (Epstein, 1973). 
Below are 10 statements please rate these from 1 to 5 using the following scale. 
Please write your answer in the space provided near the statement.  
Strongly 
disagree Disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 1. I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking_________ 
2. I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something___________ 
3. I prefer to do something that challenges my thinking abilities rather than something 
that requires little thought__________ 
4. I prefer complex to simple problems_________ 
5. Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little 
satisfaction__________ 
6. I trust my initial feelings about people__________ 
7. I believe in trusting my hunches_________ 
8. My initial impressions of people are almost always right__________ 
9. When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my “gut feeling”________ 
10. I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong even if I can’t explain how I 
know________ 
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Actively Open-Minded Thinking (AOT) scale (Stanovich & West, 2007) 
Please read the following instructions carefully, they differ from the 
instructions in part  
Please rate your agreement or disagreement with each statement on a 1 to 7 
scale, when 1 = Completely Disagree, 4 = Neutral, and 7 = Completely Agree. 
1.  Allowing oneself to be convinced by an opposing argument is a sign of good 
character. 
…………….. 
2. People should take into consideration evidence that goes against their beliefs. 
………….. 
3. People should revise their beliefs in response to new information or evidence. 
……………. 
4. Changing your mind is a sign of weakness. 
…………….. 
5. Intuition is the best guide in making decisions. 
…………… 
6. It is important to persevere in your beliefs even when evidence is brought to 
bear against them.  …………….. 
 
7. One should disregard evidence that conflicts with one’s established beliefs. 
……………. 
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National Adult Reading Test (NART) (Nelson, 1982). 
Word Card 
CHORD 
SUPERFLUOUS 
ACHE 
SIMILE 
DEPOT 
BANAL 
AISLE 
QUADRUPED 
BOUQUET 
CELLIST 
PSALM 
FACADE 
CAPON 
ZEALOT 
DENY 
DRACHM 
NAUSEA 
AEON 
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DEBT 
PLACEBO 
COURTEOUS 
ABSTEMIOUS 
RAREFY 
DETENTE 
EQUIVOCAL 
IDYLL 
NAIVE 
PUERPERAL 
CATACOMB 
AVER 
GAOLED 
GAUCHE 
THYME 
TOPIARY 
HEIR 
LEVIATHAN 
RADIX 
BEATIFY 
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ASSIGNATE 
PRELATE 
HIATUS 
SIDEREAL 
SUBTLE 
DEMESNE 
PROCREATE 
SYNCOPE 
GIST 
LABILE 
GOUGE 
CAMPANILE 
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Appendix C 
Experiment 3 Stimuli 
Note. As in experiments 1 and 2 all items were counterbalanced across participants. 
The REI, AOT and NART were administered in experiment 3 – to avoid repetition 
these are not presented below. 
Cognitive Reflection Test 
Note. The CRT items administered in experiment 3 were divided into two parts for 
use across the two experimental sessions. All items were counterbalanced as in 
experiments 1 and 2. All items were presented on a computer as in experiment 2. 
Each participant received an equal number of verbal CRT items and numeracy-
based CRT items per part. The sources of each item is presented below with the 
intuitive and correct answers. 
Part 1 
Verbal CRT (Sirota, 2017) 
1. How many animals of each sex did Moses take on the ark? 
(Intuitive answer 2; correct answer None, according to mythology Noah did). 
 
2. A monkey, a squirrel, and a bird are racing to the top of a coconut tree. Who 
will get the banana first, the monkey, the squirrel, or the bird? 
(Intuitive answer monkey or bird; correct answer none, it is a coconut tree). 
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3. In a one-story pink house, there was a pink person, a pink cat, a pink fish, a 
pink computer, a pink chair, a pink table, a pink telephone, a pink shower - 
everything was pink! What colour were the stairs probably? 
(Intuitive answer pink; correct answer there are no stairs). 
 
4. The wind blows west. An electric train runs east. In which cardinal direction 
does the smoke from the locomotive blow? 
(Intuitive answer east or west; correct answer there is not smoke it is an 
electric train). 
2016 CRT (Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016) 
5. If you’re running a race and you pass the person in second place, what place 
are you in? 
(Intuitive answer 1st; correct answer 2nd). 
 
6. A farmer had 15 sheep and all but 8 died. How many are left? 
(Intuitive answer 7; correct answer 8). 
Original CRT (Frederick, 2005) 
7. A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat costs a pound more than the ball. 
How much does the ball cost? 
(Intuitive answer 10 pence; correct answer 5 pence). 
Tremoliere & De Neys (2014)  
8. A Ferrari and a Ford together cost £190,000. The Ferrari costs £100,000 
more than the Ford. How much does the Ford cost? 
(Intuitive answer $90,000: correct answer $45,000) 
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Toplak (2014) 
9. If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and Mary can drink one barrel 
of water in 12 days, how long would it take them to drink one barrel of water 
together?  
(Intuitive answer 9; correct answer 4). 
 
10. A man buys a pig for £60, sells it for £70, buys it back for £80, and sells it 
finally for £90. How much has he made? 
(Intuitive answer £10; correct answer £20). 
Primi et al., (2015)  
11. If three elves can wrap three toys in an hour, how many elves are needed to 
wrap six toys in 2 hours? 
(Intuitive answer 6 elves: correct answer 3 elves) 
Ackerman (2014) 
12. A frog fell into a hole 30 meters deep. Every day it climbs up 3m, but during 
the night it slides 2m back down. How many days will it take the frog to climb 
out of the hole? 
(Intuitive answer 30 days; correct answer 28 days) 
 
13. Apple mash is comprised of 99% water and 1% apple solids. I left 100 kg 
mash in the sun and some of the water evaporated. Now the water is 98% of 
the mash. What is the mash weight? 
(Intuitive answer 99; correct answer 50) 
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14. If a test to detect a disease whose prevalence is 1/1000 has a false positive 
rate of 5% what is the chance that a person found to have a positive result 
actually has the disease, assuming that you know nothing about the person’s 
signs or symptoms? 
(Intuitive answer 95; correct answer 2) 
Szaszi et al (2017)  
15. There is a running race among A, B, C D, E, F. If B passes the person in 
second place, what place is B now in. 
(Intuitive answer A: correct answer B) 
 
16. In which decade did the Beatles become the most popular American band 
ever?  
(Intuitive answer 1960s: correct answer they were not American) 
 
Part 2 
Verbal CRT (Sirota, 2017)  
1. If you have only one match and you walk into a dark room where there is an 
oil lamp, a newspaper and wood - which thing would you light first? 
(Intuitive answer the lamp; correct answer the match) 
 
2. It's a stormy night and a plane takes off from JFK airport in New York. The 
storm worsens, and the plane crashes - half lands in the United States, the 
other half lands in Canada. In which country do you bury the survivors? 
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(Intuitive answer the United States or Canada; correct answer they are 
survivors, you don’t bury them).  
 
3. Would it be ethical for a man to marry the sister of his widow? 
(Intuitive answer yes or no; correct answer he cannot he is dead) 
 
4. Which sentence is correct: a) “the yolk of the egg are white” or b) “the yolk of 
the egg is white”? 
(Intuitive answer b; correct answer neither). 
Thomson & Oppenheimer (2016) 
5. Emily’s father had three daughters. The first two are named April and May. 
What is the third daughter’s name? 
(Intuitive answer June; correct answer Emily). 
 
6. How many cubic feet of dirt are there in a hole that 3’ deep x 3’ wide x 3’ 
long? 
(Intuitive answer 27; correct answer none – no dirt). 
Original CRT (Frederick, 2005) 
7. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 
100 machines to make 100 widgets? 
(Intuitive answer 100 minutes; correct answer 5 minutes). 
 
8. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If 
it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take 
for the patch to cover half the lake?  
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(Intuitive answer 24 days; correct answer 47 days). 
Toplak (2014) 
9. Simon decided to invest £8,000 in the stock market one day early in 2008. Six 
months after he invested, on July 17, the stocks he had purchased were down 
50%. Fortunately for Simon, from July 17 to October 17, the stocks he had 
purchased went up 75%. At this point, Simon has:  
a. broken even in the stock market. 
b. is ahead of where he began. 
c. has lost money. 
(Intuitive answer b; correct answer c value is £7000). 
 
10. Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. 
How many students are in the class? 
(Intuitive answer 30; correct answer 29). 
Primi et al., (2015)  
11. In an athletics team, tall members are three times more likely to win a medal 
than short members. This year the team had won 60 medals so far. How 
many of these have been won by short athletes? 
(Intuitive answer 20 medals; correct answer 15 medals) 
Ackerman (2014)  
12. Every day, a bakery sells 400 cookies. When the manager is not there, 20% 
of the cookies made that day are eaten by the staff. How many additional 
cookies should be made on the manager’s day off to ensure that 400 cookies 
can be sold? 
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(Intuitive answers 80, 500; correct answers 100) 
 
13. Steve was standing in a long line. To amuse himself he counted the people 
waiting, and saw that he stood 38th from the beginning and 56th from the end 
of the line. How many people are stood in the line? 
(Intuitive answers 94 or 92; correct answers 93) 
 
14. Ants are walking in a line. A bad-mannered ant cuts in front of the ant walking 
second. What is the rude ant’s place in the line? 
(Intuitive answer 1st; correct answers 2nd) 
Szaszi et al (2017) 
15. In which day of September did the Twin Towers in Washington DC get 
attacked by Islamist terrorists?  
(Intuitive answer 11th: correct answer The twin towers were in New York not 
Washington) 
 
16. A plane was flying from Germany to Barcelona. On the last leg of the journey, 
it developed engine trouble. Over the Pyrenees, the pilot started to lose 
control. The plane eventually crashed right on the border. Wreckage was 
equally strewn in France and Spain. Where should the survivors be buried?  
(Intuitive answer France or Spain; correct answer neither, they are living – 
don’t bury them) 
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Representativeness and base-rate items  
Part 1 
Incongruent vignettes (i.e., representativeness) 
1. Among a sample of 900 people there were 810 farmers and 90 illustrators. James 
is a randomly chosen participant. James is meticulous, has a strong eye for detail, 
enjoys listening to music whilst working and has a creative trait.  
What is most likely? 
a. James is an illustrator. 
b. James is a farmer. 
 
2. At the supermarket there were 600 people. Among the shoppers there were 570 
actresses and 30 librarians. Susan is a randomly chosen person from the 
supermarket. Susan is very shy and withdrawn, invariably helpful, but has little 
interest in people, or in the world of reality. A gentle and tidy soul, she has a need for 
order and structure and a passion for detail.  
What is most likely? 
a. Susan is an actress.  
b. Susan is a librarian. 
 
3. In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 992 
musicians and 8 retail managers. Colin is as randomly chosen participant of this 
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study. Colin is a meticulous time keeper, makes notes of everything, keeps a diary, 
is charismatic and always plans his day ahead.  
What is most likely? 
a. Colin is a musician. 
b. Colin is a retail manager.   
 
4. A survey of 1500 people was conducted. Among the participants in the survey 
there were 11 sixteen-year olds and 1489 fifty-year olds. Ellen is a randomly chosen 
participant of this survey. Ellen likes to listen to hip hop and rap music. She enjoys 
wearing tight shirts and jeans. She’s fond of dancing and has a small nose piercing.  
What is most likely? 
a. Ellen is sixteen years old. 
b. Ellen is fifty years old. 
 
5. In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 4 whose 
favourite television series is Star Trek and 996 whose favourite series is Eastenders. 
Jeremy is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Jeremy is 26 and is doing 
graduate studies in physics. He stays at home most of the time and likes to play 
video-games.  
What is most likely? 
a. Jeremy’s favourite television series is Star Trek 
b. Jeremy’s favourite television series is Eastenders. 
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6. In a study of 1000 people there were 5 engineers and 995 lawyers. Jack is a 
randomly chosen participant of this study. Jack is 36 years old. He is not married and 
is somewhat introverted. He likes to spend his free time reading science fiction and 
writing computer programmes.  
What is most likely? 
a. Jack is an engineer. 
b. Jack is a lawyer. 
 
7. 1200 people were tested. Among the participants there were three who live in a 
condo and 1197 who live in a farmhouse. Kurt is a randomly chosen participant of 
this study. Kurt works in Canary Wharf and is single. He works long hours and wears 
Amani suits to work. He likes wearing shades.  
What is most likely? 
a. Kurt lives in a condo. 
b. Kurt lives in a farmhouse. 
 
8. In a nightclub there are 700 people. Among the clubbers there were 4 men and 
696 women. Sam is a randomly chosen person from this nightclub. Sam is 23 years 
old and is finishing a degree in engineering. On Friday nights, Sam like to go out 
cruising with friends whilst listening to loud music and drinking beer.  
What is most likely? 
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a. Sam is a man. 
b. Sam is a woman. 
 
9. In a shopping centre there were 1600 people. Among the people in the shopping 
centre there were 1595 who buy their clothes in Primark and 5 who buy their clothes 
at high-end retailers. Karen is a 33-year-old female. She works in a business office 
and drives a Porsche. She lives in a fancy penthouse with her boyfriend.  
What is most likely? 
a. Karen buys her clothes at a high-end retailer. 
b. Karen buys her clothes at Primark. 
 
Congruent base-rate vignettes 
1. In a study, 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 997 who 
have a tattoo and 3 without a tattoo. Jay is a randomly chosen participant of this 
study.  Jay is a 29-year-old male. He has served a short time in prison. He has been 
living on his own for 2 years now. He has an older car and listens to punk music. 
What is most likely? 
a. Jay has a tattoo. 
b. Jay has no tattoo. 
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2. In a study of 1000 people there were 4 executive managers and 996 kindergarten 
teachers. Lilly is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Lilly is 37 years old. 
She is married and has 3 children. Her husband is a veterinarian. She is committed 
to her family and always watcher the daily cartoon shows with her children.  
What is most likely? 
a. Lilly is a kindergarten teacher 
b. Lilly is an executive manager 
 
3. In a study of 700 people there were 615 television reporters and 85 builders. Ray 
is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Ray always dresses smartly, liking to 
wear a suit. He keeps up-to-date with current affairs and speaks very clearly. 
What is most likely? 
a. Ray is a builder. 
b. Ray is a television reporter. 
 
4. In a study of 650 people there were 550 estate agents and 100 professional 
football players. Donald is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Donald 
travels a lot for work by car, spends a lot of time on the phone and keeps detailed 
diary.  
What is most likely? 
a. Donald is a professional football player. 
b. Donald is an estate agent. 
Daniel Edgcumbe [Appendix C] 
300 
 
 
5. In a study of 700 people there were 580 concert stage hands and 120 lawyers. 
Karl is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Karl enjoys player the guitar and 
listening to music in his spare time. He goes to as many concerts as he can. 
What is most likely? 
a. Karl is a lawyer. 
b. Karl is a concert stage hand.  
 
Neutral base-rate vignettes 
1. In a study of 1000 people there were 996 men and 4 women. Casey is a randomly 
chosen participant of this study. Casey is a 36-year-old writer. Casey has two 
brothers and one sister. Casey likes running and watching a good movie. 
What is most likely? 
a. Casey is a man. 
b. Casey is a woman. 
 
2. In a study of 1000 people there were 997 people who played the drums and 3 who 
played the saxophone. Tom is a randomly chosen participants in this study. Tom is 
20-years-old. He is studying in Washington and has no steady girlfriend. He just 
brought a second-hand car with his savings.  
What is most likely? 
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a. Tom plays the drums. 
b. Tom plays the saxophone. 
 
3. In a study of 1000 people there were 997 pool players and 3 basketball players. 
Jason is a randomly chosen participant in this study. Jason is 29-years-old and has 
lived his whole life in New York. He has green coloured eyes and black hair. He 
drives a light-grey coloured car.  
What is most likely? 
a. Jason is a pool player. 
b. Jason is a basketball player. 
 
4. In a study there were 1000 participants. Among the participants there were 4 who 
lived in New York and 996 who lived in Los Angeles. Christopher is a randomly 
chosen participant of this study. Christopher is 28-years-old. He had a girlfriend and 
shares an apartment with a friend. He likes watching basketball.  
What is most likely? 
a. Christopher lives in New York. 
b. Christopher lives in Los Angeles. 
 
5. In a study of 1000 people there were 5 computer science majors and 995 English 
majors. Matt is a randomly chosen participants of this study. Matt is 20-years-old and 
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lives in downtown Toronto. Matt’s favourite food is pasta with meatballs. His parents 
are living in Vancouver. 
What is most likely? 
a. Matt is a computer science major. 
b. Matt is an English major.   
Part 2 
Incongruent vignettes (ie., representativeness) 
1. In a study, 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 3 who 
have a tattoo and 997 without a tattoo. Jay is a randomly chosen participant of this 
study.  Jay is a 29-year-old male. He has served a short time in prison. He has been 
living on his own for 2 years now. He has an older car and listens to punk music. 
What is most likely? 
a. Jay has a tattoo. 
b. Jay has no tattoo. 
 
2. In a study of 1000 people there were 996 executive managers and 4 kindergarten 
teachers. Lilly is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Lilly is 37 years old. 
She is married and has 3 children. Her husband is a veterinarian. She is committed 
to her family and always watcher the daily cartoon shows with her children.  
What is most likely? 
a. Lilly is a kindergarten teacher 
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b. Lilly is an executive manager 
 
3. In a study of 1000 people there were 996 Bruce Springsteen fans and 4 Britany 
Spears fans. Tare was randomly chosen for this study. Tara is 15. She loves to go 
shopping at the mall and to talk with her friends about their crushes at school.  
What is most likely? 
a. Tara is a Bruce Springsteen fan. 
b. Tara is a Britany Spears fan. 
 
4. In a study there were 1000 people, there were 995 Americans and 5 French 
people. Martine is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Martine is 26-years-
old. She is bilingual and reads a lot in her spare time. She is a very fashionable 
dresser and a great cook. 
What is most likely? 
a. Martine is American. 
b. Martine is French. 
 
5. In a study of 1000 people there were 100 Italians and 900 Swedish participants. 
Marco has been selected at random for the study. Marco is 16-years-old. He loves to 
play football with his friends, after which they go out for pizza or to someone’s house 
for homemade pizza. 
What is most likely? 
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a. Marco is Italian. 
b. Marco is Swedish.  
 
6. In a study there were 1000 people in a room. There were 900 forty-year old 
participants and 100 seventeen-year old participants. Ryan is a randomly selected 
participant of this study. Ryan lives in Guildford. He hangs out with his buddies every 
day and likes watching MTV. He is a big fan of Green Day and is saving to buy his 
own car. 
What is most likely? 
a. Ryan is 40-years-old. 
b. Ryan is 17-years-old.  
 
7. In a study there were 1000 people. There were 150 architects and 850 taxi 
drivers. Steven is a randomly chosen participants of this study. Steven is very shy 
and withdrawn, invariably helpful, but with little interest in people, or in the world of 
reality. A meek and tidy soul, he had a need for order and structure, and a passion 
for detail.  
What is most likely? 
a. Steven is an architect. 
b. Steven is a taxi driver. 
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8. In a university there were 1000 people. There 175 students of beauty therapy and 
825 students of chemistry. Sarah is a randomly selected student from the 1000 
people. Sarah loves to listen to new age music and faithfully reads her horoscope 
each day. In her spare time, she enjoys aromatherapy and attending a local 
spirituality group. 
What is most likely? 
a. Sarah is a student of beauty therapy. 
b. Sarah is a student of chemistry.  
 
9. In a group there are 800 people. There are 640 social science students and 160 
engineering students. Tom was randomly selected from this group. Tom is highly 
intelligent, although lacking in true creativity. He has a need for order and clarity, and 
for neat and tidy systems in which every detail finds its appropriate place. His writing 
is rather dull and mechanical.  
What is most likely? 
a. Tom is a student of engineering. 
b. Tom is a student of social science. 
 
10. In study of 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 992 
musicians and 8 retail managers. David is as randomly chosen participant of this 
study. David is a meticulous time keeper, makes notes of everything, keeps a diary, 
is charismatic and always plans his day ahead.  
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What is most likely? 
a. David is a musician. 
b. David is a retail manager. 
 
Congruent vignettes 
1. In a study there were 800 people. There were 610 soldiers and 190 doctors. 
Robert is a randomly chosen participant in this study. Robert spends a lot of time in 
the gym, travels a lot and takes pride in his physical fitness. 
What is most likely? 
a. Robert is a soldier. 
b. Robert is a doctor. 
 
2. In a study of 650 people there were 600 business owners and 50 taxi drivers. 
Daisy is a randomly chosen participant in this study. Daisy spends a lot of her time in 
meetings, updating spreadsheets and on the phone.  
What is most likely? 
a. Daisy is a business owner. 
b. Daisy is a taxi driver. 
 
3. In a study of 900 people there were 750 history students and 150 physical 
education students. Jenny is a randomly chosen participant in this study. Jenny 
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spends most of her time reading. She enjoys travelling to National Trust sites and 
attends historical re-enactments.  
What is most likely? 
a. Jenny is a history student. 
b. Jenny is a physical education student. 
 
4. In a study of 850 participants there were 820 illustrators and 30 barristers. Grant is 
a randomly chosen participant of this study. Grant reads a lot of comic books, 
watches super hero films and attends comic con.  
What is most likely? 
a. Grant is a barrister. 
b. Grant is an illustrator. 
 
5. In a study of 1000 people there were 4 executive managers and 996 kindergarten 
teachers. Sandy is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Sandy is 37-years-
old. She is married and has 3 children. Her husband is a veterinarian. She is 
committed to her family and always watcher the daily cartoon shows with her 
children.  
What is most likely? 
a. Sandy is a kindergarten teacher 
b. Sandy is an executive manager 
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Neutral vignettes 
1. In a study of 1000 people there were 250 engineers and 750 lawyers. Richard was 
randomly chosen for this study. Richard is a 30-year-old man. He is married with no 
children. A man of high ability and high motivations, he promises to be quite 
successful in his field. He is well liked by his colleagues.  
What is most likely? 
a. Richard is an engineer. 
b. Richard is a lawyer. 
 
2. In a study of 800 people there were 650 scientists and 150 builders. Alvin was 
randomly chosen for this study. Alvin is 19-years-old and lives in London. Alvin’s 
favourite food is pizza. His parents live in Kent. 
What is most likely? 
a. Alvin is a scientist. 
b. Alvin is a builder.   
 
3. In a study of 900 people there were 750 pilots and 150 cashiers. May is a 
randomly chosen participant in this study. May is 31-years-old and has lived his 
whole life in Devon. He has green coloured eyes and black hair. He drives a light-
grey coloured car.  
What is most likely? 
a. May is a pilot. 
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b. May is a cashier. 
4. In a study of 900 people there were 896 men and 4 women. Bobby is a randomly 
chosen participant of this study. Bobby is a 36-year-old writer. Bobby has two 
brothers and one sister. bobby likes running and watching a good movie. 
What is most likely? 
a. Bobby is a man. 
b. Bobby is a woman. 
 
5. In a study of 600 people there were 597 people who played the piano and 3 who 
played the violin. Charlie is a randomly chosen participants in this study. Charlie is 
29-years-old. He is studying in Oxford and has no steady girlfriend. He just brought a 
second-hand car with his savings.  
What is most likely? 
a. Charlie plays the violin. 
b. Charlie plays the piano. 
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Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS)  
Please read the following instructions carefully.  
This is a test to measure some of the ways you act and think. Read each 
statement and indicate on the scale from 1 to 4 the appropriate answer. 
1 = Rarely/Never, 2 = Occasionally, 3 = Often, and 4 = Almost always/always. 
1. I plan tasks carefully….. 
2. I do things without thinking… 
3. I make-up my mind quickly… 
4. I am happy-go-lucky… 
5. I don’t “pay attention.”… 
6. I have “racing” thoughts… 
7. I plan trips well ahead of time…. 
8. I am self-controlled…. 
9. I concentrate easily… 
10. I save regularly… 
11. I “squirm” at plays or lectures…. 
12. I am a careful thinker…. 
13. I plan for job security…. 
14. I say things without thinking… 
15. I like to think about complex problems… 
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16. I change jobs… 
17. I act “on impulse”…. 
18. I get easily bored when soling thought problems…. 
19. I act on the spur of the moment…. 
20 I am a steady thinker… 
21. I change residences…. 
22. I buy things on impulse…. 
23. I can only think about one thing at a time…. 
24. I change hobbies…. 
25. I spend of charge more than I earn…. 
26. I often have extraneous thoughts when thinking…. 
27. I am more interested in the present than the future…. 
28. I am restless at the theatre of lectures…. 
29. I like puzzles…. 
30. I am future oriented…. 
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Experiments 1 and 2 
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UREC reference number: UREC 1516 67 
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